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This PhD dissertation analyzes espionage as a form of theatre and 
performance. Using archival documents, comparative analysis of theatre and 
espionage case-studies, and the application of critical theory, espionage is 
revealed to be a theatrical endeavor. It is a paramount example of a 
phenomenon which exists at the intersection of where art and life are blurred. 
One that gives urgency to an understanding of how theatre may be viewed 
outside of its traditional framing. This study of espionage is an undertaking 
that delves into a history of clandestine performances ranging from Mata Hari, 
James O’Keefe, Virginia Hall, Kim Philby, Maria Butina, and even theatre 
practitioner Augusto Boal. The project explores how espionage: is defined by 
a dialectic of success and failure, has mirrored actor training in the preparing 
of agents, is reliant on the archive for its execution, is governed by a desire to 
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In a sense, this project began with a play I performed in during the 2006 
summer season at the 4th Line Theatre in Millbrook, Ontario, and with a series 
of conversations with faculty at Aberystwyth University in Wales. I was 
interested in trying to find a profession that was irrefutably a form of theatre 
and performance, and that was also held in wide regard by the public. After 
moving to Amsterdam I proposed the PhD project to the Department of 
Theatre Studies, where Professor Jan Lazardzig helped guide its 
conceptualization. With his insightful suggestions, the project began to take 
shape. Following an unexpected invitation from Professor James Harding at 
the University of Maryland to move to College Park, and with the support of 
Professor Lazardzig, the project was relocated to the United Sates where it 
developed into the dissertation that is presented here. Though I am less 
inclined to think that espionage should be held in high regard, I still believe 
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Introduction - Finding the Hidden and Its Reflection 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes espionage as theatre and performance. 
Structurally the project is divided into four chapters with the following 
subjects: successful espionage and Applied Theatre, the appropriation of 
theatre training by espionage agencies, the archive as a methodological 
issue, and failed espionage seen within the dialectic of success and failure. 
Thematically the project is predominantly oriented in two ways. The first and 
last chapter are a mirroring of each other and are concerned with the topics of 
success and failure along with their dialectical nature within espionage, and 
theatre and performance. Both chapters draw on case studies to tease out 
this fundamental aspect of clandestine work. Chapters two and three are 
concerned with the archive. Chapter two utilizes the archive to explore 
espionage training as a form of theatre training, while chapter three explores 
the challenges of accessing the archive and the role the archive has in the 
production of espionage as performance event. Overall the project illustrates 
that when espionage is thought of as an endeavor in theatre and performance 
the complexities and hidden aspects of espionage can be teased out and 
scrutinized.  
The idea of mirroring, as it relates to artistic practices being a reflection 
of the world, is not a new concept and there may be no more impactful an 
idea in the Western world than the Ancient Greek concept of mimesis. In her 





identifies two predominant understandings of the term: “One, mimesis as 
representation, with its many doublings and unravelings of model, subject, 
identity (Irigaray, Derrida). Two, mimesis as a mode of reading that 
transforms an object into a gestus or a dialectical image (Brecht, Benjamin).”1 
While this project began as an exploration entirely within the first 
conceptualization of mimesis, the Benjamin/Brecht manner of approach has 
allowed for the analysis of the subjects of success and failure. Mirrors (and at 
its core mimesis) offer us a way of understanding representation and remind 
us that representation not only implies an audience, i.e. that it is for someone, 
but also that representation is always one step removed from presence itself. 
Thus, representation is neither identical with, or perfect in, its replication of 
that which it represents. The idea of a mirror is brought up in a more in depth 
manner in Chapter 4, but as a reflection of the larger project (forgive the pun) 
mirrors allow for the contrasting of cases; the exposure of dialectics including 
failure and success as well as Truth and Untruth; the reading of performance; 
and, in line with Diamond’s proposal of the “manipulating of the mirror”, the 
juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated concepts and phenomena.2  
Yet the notion of mirrors and mirroring only frames a portion of the 
project. The archive also plays a central role in the production of espionage 
as well as any sort of research on the subject. The introduction to chapter 
three addresses the challenge of accessing the archive as both a scholar and 
                                                
1 Elin Diamond, Unmaking Mimesis (London, UK: Routledge, 1997), ii. 
 





as an agent of espionage. One of the reasons that such challenges exist is 
that archives of espionage are built from the intelligence practices and intel 
collected from these clandestine operations. This means that even when 
created from historical intelligence the archives of espionage act as an echo 
of previous events and activities—effectively a ghosting of the past 
performances. Furthermore, the fundamental nature of espionage is that it is 
a secretive practice. To desire access to that which is secret sets up a 
conflict, which Sissela Bok notes are “conflicts over power: the power that 
comes through controlling information.”3 Information is power, and to lose 
control over information is to lose power. What this means for scholarship 
about espionage is that academic investigations of archives containing 
intelligence work challenge the control of agencies bent on maintaining their 
secrecy and power. It also changes the way we think of the academic 
research and its relationship with power production. 
One final concept that is integral to the analysis of espionage as 
theatre and performance is Louis Althusser’s work on ideology. Intelligence 
practices are governed by ideology. And espionage is most often understood 
to be an extension of the state. With the blurring of divisions between nations 
and corporations we might also view corporate espionage as an extension of 
the state. In his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus”, Louis 
Althusser implores his readers to consider the driving force behind state 
                                                
3 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 





control and domination. When the concept of ‘state control’ is being utilized, it 
is an incorporation of all contexts of state hegemony and is not limited to the 
idea of nationhood. This perspective is concerned with any power structure 
that can control or influence the existence of people. Thus, it would be 
possible to include a broad range of institutions. The initial suggestion put 
forward by Althusser is that such power and dominance evolves out of “the 
reproduction of the conditions of production.”4 A strong case can be made 
that espionage is a tactic that is not only used to reproduce the production of 
state power, but to also assert the power of a state where is does not 
currently exist, such as the United States in the Middle East through the CIA. 
Espionage, it could be reasoned, is the gathering of intel by a state, which is 
then used to ward off any threat to the cycle of domination and control. 
If we invoke any instance of espionage practice we can see a ‘state’ 
looking to exercise control. Althusser explains that there is a two-step process 
to such the production of control, “1. The productive forces, 2. The existing 
relations of Production.”5 He also defines the State as the “machine of 
repression which enables the ruling classes (in the nineteenth century the 
bourgeois class and the ‘class’ of big landowners) to ensure their domination 
over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the 
process of surplus-value extortion.”6 The state engages the ‘productive forces’ 
                                                
4 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, trans. Ben 
Brewster, (New York, USA: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 85. 
 






through its institutions, which include the police, the justice system, the 
military, the administration, and more. In Althusser’s formulation, these 
institutions are bound together under the concept of Repressive State 
Apparatus. In the modern era, these institutions or ‘production houses’ (to 
borrow a term from theatre) are often associated with espionage. They seek 
to gain information to preserve their role in society. Following the ideas 
proposed by Althusser, it can establish that espionage is a tool for the 
reproduction of power. 
The cleverness of Althusser’s cyclical explanation of state control is 
that it not only answers part of the question of what espionage is, but it also 
gives us an answer as to why espionage takes place. It is for the reproduction 
of control. Intriguingly, if espionage—often thought of a Repressive State 
Apparatus—is thought of as theatre practice, which is more often thought of in 
terms of Ideological State Apparatus, we then see a blurring between these 
two mechanism in the power production that Althusser is describing. In other 
words, espionage exists somewhere between RSA and ISA’s, and perhaps 
within both categories. This is made clear by the ideology that often drives 
espionage. Espionage as a tool of power has been utilized throughout history 
and across the world. With this contextualization, along with an investigation 
of the archive, and the notion of mirroring, this project attempts to tackle the 
work of espionage as a closed-off practice that can be accessed through a 
theatre and performance analysis. 
                                                





Overview: From Success to Failure 
Chapter one focuses on the idea of success within espionage. 
Separated into two sections, the chapter begins with an analysis of a 
historical case-study detailing a performance of Invisible Theatre, a practice 
conceived of and developed by Brazilian practitioner Augusto Boal. Through 
this case study, a comparison is drawn between Boal’s theories and practice, 
and the efforts of modern-day activists like James O’Keefe, and intelligence 
agencies. Focusing on the shared deception in these practices, the chapter 
investigates the ethical dilemmas brought forward by these theatrical 
engagements, and the dubious rationalization that is used to justify the work.  
Moving forward, the chapter transitions to a broad overview of Applied 
Theatre, tackling some of the fundamental theories and principles of the 
practice with the aim of establishing the conditions of analyzing applied 
theatre engagements. Beyond the mutual interest in stimulating change, there 
are three aspects shared by espionage and Invisible Theatre. These are the 
planning of action and pre-establish goals, the need for flexibility and 
adaptation towards new circumstances that befall the performers, and tight 
control of the objectives. At the core of both espionage and Invisible Theatre 
is the idea of intervention, that an entity, whether a person or institution, must 
and can intervene in events taking place. Moreover, while there is a myth that 
Applied Theatre is rooted in left-wing traditions, and thus assumed by some to 





Applied Theatre is merely a tool for the facilitation of whatever agenda is 
being undertaken.  
Necessary for this project, that chapter pivots to an exploration of 
theories and scholarship related to espionage as a form of theatre. This is 
accomplished by invoking Sarah K. Schneider’s work on undercover practices 
and her concept of “identity artists,” which was developed by Schneider to 
gain a footing in how theatre is employed by undercover operators.7 
Interweaving Schneider’s work with Laura Levin’s ideas on camouflage and 
the “art of blending in,”8 the chapter also cites Richard Schechner’s concept 
of “dark play”9 to illustrate how espionage intersects with performance. A 
subsequent exploration of how the concepts of explicit and indirect deception 
augment these performance practices, allows for these ideas to be further 
interrogated. True to the theme of mirroring, the first half of chapter one puts 
these theatre and performance practices in dialogue with the concept of 
mimesis, highlighting the notion that these representations are “for someone, 
and not only a representation of something else.”10 With these principles 
                                                
7 Sara K. Schneider, Art of Darkness: Ingenious Performances by 
Undercover Operators, Con Men, and Others (Chicago, USA: Cuneiform 
Books, 2008), 4. 
 
8 Laura Levin, Performing Ground: Space, Camouflage and the Art of 
Blending In (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 37. 
 
9 Richard Schechner. Performance Studies: An Introduction. 2nd ed. 
(London, UK: Routledge, 2002), 119. 
 





established the chapter moves to analyzing these ideas in a practical setting, 
which is accomplished via historical analysis. 
The case study of Virginia Hall, who was arguably the most successful 
United States spy of the Second World War, is the final portion of the chapter. 
The case-study analysis employs Phillip Taylor’s three characteristics of 
Applied Theatre to assess outcomes. These are: people, passion, and 
platform. Following Taylor’s ideas on Applied Theatre, the chapter argues that 
evaluations are a necessary aspect of determining which Applied Theatre 
events are most successful. Exploring the success of Virginia Hall’s efforts in 
WWII, the chapter identifies the desired outcomes from both the perspective 
of Hall herself, and the larger outcomes desired by the Special Operations 
Executive of the British Government, which Hall was working for at the time. 
The work of Hall and the outcomes are then put in dialogue with the generic 
goals and attributes of Applied Theatre identified earlier in the chapter. As a 
supplemental to the focus on Hall’s espionage work, the chapter explores the 
efforts of the Vichy and Nazi governments to undermine Hall’s clandestine 
initiatives, which acted a counterpoint to Hall, and by extension the SOE’s, 
success. The chapter concludes with a brief review of the goals laid out at the 
beginning of the project and draws linkages between espionage and theatre.  
Chapter two provides analysis of the training methods employed by 
espionage agencies, with focus placed on the efforts of the SOE during World 
War Two. The first half of the chapter is dedicated to the development of 





reviewing the established tenants of espionage identified in chapter one, the 
term cultural camouflage is proposed as a term for the conscious 
engagement and tactic of spies in their undercover work. This necessary 
intervention is meant to aid in clarifying why clandestine agents require 
training to blend in with societies. Following this, the chapter engages with 
training methods established by the SOE, and moves into a historical 
overview of the Special Training Schools. Of most relevance were the 
finishing schools, which housed specialists for instruction of specific 
clandestine tactics. Among the instructors was the actor Peter Folis, whose 
teaching focused on camouflage, disguises, and character back stories. 
Additionally, the chapter identifies pedagogical training methods to 
understand how information was disseminated and to what end. Of note is the 
use of anecdotes by the instructors, and a series of training manuals drafted 
by the SOE to aid in broad, as well as country-specific, instruction. Repeated 
routinely throughout the training manuals is various theatre terminology, 
which demands an exploration of the training methods of acting that were 
developed in the lead-up to World War Two. 
Transitioning to training methods, the chapter narrows in on four 
practitioners working in the United Kingdom, or whose work was being widely 
disseminated in Great Britain, during the 1930’s. Specifically, the chapter is 
concerned with realistic and naturalistic forms of acting. While there are many 
practitioners who could be considered for this study, attention is placed on 





Littlewood. Beginning with Stanislavsky, the central tenants identified in his 
work that relate to the training methods potentially appropriated by espionage 
instructors include his use of narrative, manual-writing, and Socratic 
technique. Shifting to Michael Chekhov, the chapter narrows in on his interest 
in the psychological gesture, atmosphere, and emphasis on physical training. 
The third instructor given focus in chapter two, Michel Saint-Denis, has had 
far-reaching influence in matters of theatre training. His legacy is indebted to 
Jacques Copeau, and Saint-Denis’ work is partly defined by his pursuit of a 
holistic style of performance training, which aligns well with the efforts of the 
SOE. This is also true of Saint-Denis’ interest in an evolving method of 
instruction, in addition to courses on language, movement, and improvisation. 
Joan Littlewood is positioned as the fourth acting pedagogue within the 
chapter. While her inclusion may seem strange, since her company ‘The 
Theatre Workshop’ did not exist until after World War Two, Littlewood was 
already exploring training methods for actors in the 1930’s through the 
interdisciplinary group Theatre Union.11 Like Saint-Denis, Littlewood did not 
have strong interest in establishing a singular form of instruction or actor 
training. Her system was also constantly evolving. Perhaps more than the 
other three she was most interested in a breadth of global practices, which 
informed her work.  
                                                






After tracing through four approaches to actor training developed in the 
years leading to the Second World War, the chapter shifts back to the training 
manuals written by the SOE and engages in a close reading of the text. This 
effort is tied together with an analysis of mimesis, camouflage, and 
explorations of role-play. Alongside this effort is a comparison between the 
training manuals of the SOE and Stanislavsky’s instruction on actor training. 
Attention is paid to Stanislavsky’s notion of the psychophysical, the 
immediacy of performance, communication, the method of physical actions, 
and active analysis. These concepts are then contrasted with terms cited by 
the SOE that include Identity, History, Documents, Clothes and Effects, 
Change of Appearance, and Final Search, to establish the commonalities of 
the training regimes in both theatre and Allied espionage of WWII.  
 Moving away from a practical exploration of the archive and instead 
looking towards the methodological challenges presented by the archive, 
chapter three begins with a reflection on accessing archives and is informed 
by the research that was used in the writing of chapter two. Central to this 
analysis is the position that archives are gated institutions with built-in gate-
keeping strategies that mediate the flow of information. There might be no 
better a metaphor for this than the decorative pond, reminiscent of a moat, 
that has been built around The National Archives, Kew, in London, where 
much of the archival information cited in this project was obtained. From the 
practical issues of access, the chapter narrows in on why such gate-keeping 





been bypassed. Beginning with the molehunt initiated by senior CIA agent 
James Jesus Angleton, the chapter transitions to the work of Kim Philby and 
his effort in raiding the archive of western nations to share with the Soviet 
Union. Tied to Diana Taylor’s archive and the repertoire, Philby’s work to 
access the archive serves as an entry point into understanding how 
espionage disrupts, exploits, and enables the archive as both physical 
repository and theorized aspect of performance. 
From Philby’s work for the British SIS, chapter three moves into an 
analysis of ‘the archive’ within performance and places it alongside the 
definitions of espionage cited in both chapters one and two. Of utmost 
importance are the various specialization of intelligence professionals 
identified by Michael Andregg. Threading in Taylor’s theories, the conclusion 
is drawn that each of the individuals identified by Andregg are performing a 
role and thus engaging with the archive and the repertoire. As the case-study 
of Philby indicates, the gate-keeping of the archive is central to the efforts at 
the core of espionage practices. Philby, in many ways, was the gate-keeper 
of the archive for the British SIS in Spain during WWII. Furthermore, Philby’s 
efforts definitively show how the overlap between various intelligence roles 
can exist and be exploited, affecting the archive of espionage documents, and 
the archive inherent to these clandestine performances.  
 By using a smaller case-study described by Philby to author Phillip 
Knightley, chapter three explores the role that the archive has in the 





Philby that was called off by senior members of the SIS, in turn sets off a 
chain-reaction of events that led to Philby’s exploiting the archive to inform 
the Soviet Union of British military efforts. Secrecy is central to this work and 
helps govern the archive of espionage. As noted, secrecy is defined by the 
ideas of control and power, and closely tied to identity. Philby, through his 
acts of secrecy tied to his hidden identity, exploits these secretive practices 
resulting in altered performances due to the manipulation of the archive. 
Further analysis of Philby’s work occurs by considering how secrecy itself is a 
performative undertaking, one that is reliant on both an accessing of the 
archive and a prevention of others from accessing it. Wrapped up in the larger 
case-study of Philby are his multiple and co-existing performances as ‘loyal 
British Agent’ and ‘Soviet Operative’, which allow him to simultaneously 
access archives to share intel, and also alter archives to produce alternative 
performances. In essence, Philby’s performance is produced out of the 
archive and repertoire, which is used to raid a secondary archive, to provide 
materials to a third archive. To illuminate how a corruption of the archive can 
affect future performances, the chapter invokes the narrative of WWII 
Operation Mincemeat executed by the Allied Forces. A famous moment of 
deception where a body with false invasion plans attached to it was placed in 
the ocean off the coast of Spain to create a ruse in which the Axis forces were 
mislead about an imminent invasion. The misdirection contained in this effort 
led the Axis forces to believe that an invasion of Greece was in the near 





alongside the efforts of Philby, the chapter also considers the role of ‘truth’ 
within the context of archives, performance, and espionage. Drawn from this 
study is the conclusion that ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ are subjective to the contexts 
in which they take place, and the mode of analysis in which Truth is sought.  
Shifting the focus from Philby, the second half of chapter three invokes 
contemporary espionage practices to understand how the methodological 
challenge of the archive continues to exist in the digital age. This is 
accomplished by putting the case-study of Philby in dialogue with the ongoing 
issues surrounding the company Huawei, which has been repeatedly accused 
of being a vessel for Chinese state intelligence. By considering Laura Levin’s 
proposal of camouflage as performance practice, digital espionage might be 
seen as manifesting as literal infrastructure. Following this, espionage fulfills 
the criteria of embeddedness and in many regards utilizes camouflage as a 
performative strategy to remain hidden. The site or location for the 
undercover performance of espionage is no longer a physical site but perhaps 
a web-site, which gleans information in real-time. Or the very infrastructure 
allowing individuals to access the internet, siphoning off information 
surreptitiously. However, unlike analogue espionage, digital espionage is 
definable as a high speed, insidious, delocalized iteration of spy-work. These 
new methods of infiltration and clandestine undertakings are further 
contextualized by the blurring of lines between corporations and 






The last section of chapter three addresses the motivations behind 
corporate and government espionage in the digital age. Big Data and 
Dataveillance become the focus of research by returning to the position that 
power and control are the base motivation of espionage, and that control of 
the archive is the paramount form of institutional domination. Archives of 
institutions and citizens have become monetized to the extent that 
corporations raid the archive to generate profit, other companies protect that 
data for a profit, and certain corporations enable forms of systemic 
discrimination through the act of online-steering via their selling of archival 
information. Here the project again aligns with Althusser’s formulation of 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. To conclude, the chapter 
focuses on efforts that have been developed to circumvent digital espionage 
and online steering and make use of counter-espionage practices in a form of 
theatre meant to undermine artificial intelligence and algorithms.  
As chapter one focused on the success of espionage, in true mirroring 
fashion chapter four pays attention to the failures of espionage. Beginning 
with a review of the convicted WWI Dutch spy Mata Hari, the chapter explores 
the concepts of failure and success to expose their dualistic nature. More 
specifically, the chapter looks to expose the dialectic of success and failure 
that is at the crux of espionage, as well as theatre and performance. Working 
through the execution of Mata Hari, the project identifies instances that can 
be read as both successes and failures. Mata Hari is far from the only woman 





forward is that espionage exploits these discriminatory tropes to succeed. 
This in itself is an exploitation of failure—a sort of moral failing governed by a 
misogynistic framing—that enables espionage. This framing can be extended 
to Mata Hari and her role as a mother, dancer, and prostitute, all used to 
justify her execution. Failure in turn is extended beyond the character of Mata 
Hari to the physical events of the execution, which echoes Dwight 
Conquergood’s essay on lethal theatre. The actions of both the execution 
squad and Mata Hari herself can be read as instances of failure and success, 
yet again gesturing to the dialectic under investigation.  
The lens of failure then shifts to the espionage events that Mata Hari 
took part in, which eventually led to her arrest. Here the blurring of success 
and failure is further analyzed. Phillip Knightley’s suggestion that espionage is 
reliant on a lack of acknowledgement of successes and failures is easily 
identified and aids in the analysis. The assertion is that espionage bureaus 
have developed a strong ability to conjure up success out of nothing and 
perpetuate a state of action and self-justification, and that these justifications 
are rooted in a sort of theatrically based persuasion. This, like in previous 
chapters, is evocative of Althusser’s RSA-ISA formulation, and echoes the 
suggestion made by numerous scholars that Mata Hari was not only 
insignificant in her efforts as a spy, but that her capture was exploited by both 
the French and Germans to justify and enable their war-time efforts. The 
position put forward from here is that espionage possesses a self-justifying 






 To interrogate these concepts further, chapter four turns to Elinor 
Fuch’s Death of Character to identify how contemporary theatre has found life 
by shifting the central focus of production away from ‘character’. Tying Fuchs 
position back to Mata Hari lends credence to the idea that spies who are 
caught experience the death of character, often in multiple ways. 
Furthermore, by analyzing espionage alongside the death of character, the 
death of a clandestine operative’s character is not only seen as signifying the 
destruction of who they represent, but also the individual qualities of such a 
persona. This may be extended to the idea of terminating the archive 
associated with the performance undertaken by the agent. Through an 
invocation of Fuchs, the research places espionage within the framework of 
what is now most often referred to as post-dramatic theatre. This, along with 
the focus of failure, aligns with Sarah Jane Bailes’ work on the poetics of 
failure, in which she investigates the failure of representation. Chapter four 
extends Bailes’ ideas further to a simultaneous investigation of 
representations that fail.  
Drawing the topics of failure and espionage into the 21st century again, 
the chapter moves to a new case-study on Maria Butina, the Russian citizen 
who was charged with failing to register as a foreign agent and ultimately 
deported back to Russia in 2019. Situating Butina as the mirror image of Mata 
Hari, the project advances the exploration of the dialectic of success and 





manifest in espionage during the post-modern era. Most revealing is the trial 
of Butina, which, like Hari’s execution, is rife with theatricality. As is identified, 
the efforts by the United States government amount to an initiative of 
character killing (to borrow from Fuchs). These instances of character 
assassination reveal the United States orientalist approach to foreigners, as 
well as its traditionalist understandings of relationships, used to undermine 
the credibility of Butina. In line with the (re)generative abilities of espionage, 
intelligence agencies capitalize on both success and failure. The chapter 
breaks down instances from the Butina trial to establish how both the Russian 
and United States governments might find success in the failure of the other 
nation. Additionally, the court-room proceedings against Butina are framed by 
Bailes’ work on the failure of representation, particularly when they are 
concerned with the various characters that espionage agents employ. As a 
final area of analysis, the chapter explores how the multiplicity of characters 
that are found within espionage, especially when considering the dialectic of 
failure and success, render the espionage agent a tabula rasa—an empty 
canvas on which people conducting espionage and counter-espionage create 
character. Indeed, those engaging in this work often have their very being 
playing host to more than one character at a time. Althusser’s work is again 
invoked in the conclusion to illustrates how the concepts explored in chapter 
four align with the notion of state domination and control, in this instance 





 With the path forward established, let us begin this discussion with the 
topic of ‘the curtain’. The curtain may be one of the most timeless symbols of 
theatre. It is the in-between of the performance and the spectators. It is the 
part of the theatre where one can hide. It is often built into the theatre 
architecture, and is an object that facilitates the showing of theatre when it is 
drawn back, but is also a barrier. In Act III Scene V of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
the character of Polonius hides himself behind the arras in the chamber of 
Queen Gertrude to spy on the titular character. During the confrontation 
between Hamlet and Gertrude, Polonius cries out for help and Hamlet stabs 
him through fabric, killing him. In many regards this project attempts to draw 
back the curtain shielding espionage from the audience, which is both 
scholarly analysis and public knowledge. But as it is with Polonius, the curtain 
of secrecy, misdirection, and obfuscation are only a barrier, they do not 
guarantee protection. In drawing back the curtain through this dissertation 
espionage is revealed to be governed by a dialectic of success and failure, 
containing parallels between actor training and agent training, reliant on the 











Chapter 1 – A Subversive Invisible Theatre 
 
“This inability to distinguish between the fiction and the reality of the 
intelligence world is ironically appropriate, because that was how it all 
began—in fantasy.”  
 
- Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession. 
 
The Curious Case of Theatre as Espionage 
 In 1978 in Liege, Belgium, Augusto Boal was invited to demonstrate an 
instance of Invisible Theatre for a news network in the city. As a part of the 
process Boal and his performers staged a scene in a supermarket where they 
attempted to challenge the traditional capital-driven exchange of money for 
goods. When Francois, the performer undercover as a shopper, approached 
the register he suggested to the cashier that instead of money he could pay 
with manual labor. While the intention of this Invisible Theatre performance 
was meant to address issues of wealth, distribution, and exchange, the 
manager of the supermarket instead viewed it as an instance of public 
disturbance and called the police. Susana Epstein and Augusto Boal describe 
the next moments in their article for TDR: “The police arrive. Making use of 
their proverbial politeness, they push around those people who bother them, 
maul those who are slowest to follow instructions, and even manage to 
immobilize Francois.”12 In respect to this case study, the charge that the 
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police lay against Francois is irrelevant. What is critical is how the 
performance extended beyond its intended mandate once Francois had been 
detained and brought to the Liege police station.  
 The event staged by Boal and his performers was not only a moment 
of public performance. As was mentioned, it was also a demonstration for a 
television program. As Boal and Epstein explain,  
Annie Declerck, from Flemish TV, had asked to film an 
invisible theatre piece for a program she was preparing on me 
and the theatre of the oppressed. Both my group and I had 
agreed to the program so everything in the supermarket had 
been filmed. Francois had a microphone inside his shirt. The 
sound technician had hidden his equipment among the fruit he 
was carrying in his shopping cart. The camera operator had 
hidden the camera inside a plastic bag which had a small hole 
the exact size of the lens.13  
 
After the arrest, Annie, the television host, and Francois, the actor, were 
brought to the police station where they “continued in their roles. Being such 
good actors, they could keep up their invisible theatre personas without being 
suspected. Eventually, however, the police discovered the truth. Besides 
discovering Francois’ microphone, they found out that he had a job and 
earned a regular salary.”14 What is most remarkable about this situation is that 
through an act that was meant to stimulate social change, the performers, 
who were operating undercover, are assessed by store management as 
being suspicious characters. Then, while possessing technology meant to 
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facilitate an instance of recording and reporting, they are brought into a 
government institution to be interrogated while still documenting the events 
through the technology that has been hidden on their person, effectively 
rendering them infiltrators of the police station. As Boal and Epstein confirm, 
“the fact that television was documenting this event added a new dimension 
to this story.”15 The performance extended beyond the supermarket into the 
sphere of government. The recording of the activities and, in particular, the 
police department changes the entire context of the performance. The act of 
documentation for the television series, while simultaneously being detained, 
transitioned the event into a realm of clandestine activity. Invisible Theatre 
was, and very well may be, a form of espionage. However, before addressing 
the infiltrating nature of the performance, this example of Applied Theatre 
should be further dissected to fully comprehend the stakes and implications of 
such performances.  
 This instance of Boal’s work has not aged particularly well. What is 
happening in this performance is undoubtedly a moment of trickery. It follows 
the definition of deception laid out by Thomas L. Carson in his publication 
Lying and Deception who reasons deception to be as follows: “in order for 
there to be deception it is necessary that the deceiver believes what she 
causes the other person(s) to believe is false.”16 This, as Carson explains, 
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has many iterations. The most common two being what might be termed 
explicit and indirect deception. Explicit deception is in many way synonymous 
with lying. There is an active effort to falsify and misdirect. Conversely, 
indirect deception is through means which hang on the periphery of lying, 
such as allowing incorrect inference to take place. We can qualify the 
performance by Boal and associates within both categories. From one 
perspective, this event can be viewed as a moment of explicit deception. This 
is because the performance in Liege was planned to convince those in the 
grocery store that the actor Francois was a customer with no source of 
income who is proposing an alternative to the more normalized exchange of 
capital for goods – this even though Francois is, from what the text suggests, 
not without income or profession. From another perspective, we might view 
this event as an instance of indirect deception given that when the police 
arrive and question the performers, those participating allow the police to infer 
that what they see is truthful and has no ulterior motive or reality, and is most 
certainly not theatre. 
 The celebration and accolades that Boal received, and continues to 
receive, for his work and concepts are often due to his efforts to undermine 
authoritarian behaviors, to call into question systems that enable oppression, 
and to elevate those who are downtrodden. Many people would see these as 
admirable goals. Yet dabbling in the murky world of deception and betrayal—
a betrayal of trust inherent in public interactions—would have many people, 





scenario. Indeed, in other contexts this line of theatre or performance is highly 
frowned upon or even reviled. For example, the American conservative 
activist James O’Keefe routinely employs techniques echoing Boal’s Invisible 
Theatre to undermine the public personas of what he determines to be left-
leaning/progressive organizations, such as mainstream media groups, 
ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now) and 
Senator Marjorie Landrieu, doing so through his ironically name activist group 
Project Veritas.17 Some might challenge the comparison between Boal and 
O’Keefe since Boal seeks to undermine authoritarianism whereas O’Keefe is 
interested in preserving conservative values and institutions, and even 
dabbles in supporting pseudo-fascist ideology.  
Regardless of which side of the political equation one is on, the 
question that arises, which cannot be ignored, is whether the ends justify the 
means? The issue here is not the audience’s voluntary suspension of 
disbelief as they watch a theatrical production. It is rather the dubious act of 
knowingly misleading, deceiving and duping others under the pretense of 
doing theatre or of pursuing theatre’s presumably higher goals. The point is 
that whether one justifies such moments of deception by calling them 
“theatre,” “Applied Theatre” or anything else, we are still left with a 
fundamental ethical contradiction that can be distilled into the simple question 
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of whether we seriously believe that an unethical process like deceiving the 
public can produce an ethical result.18 Rather than embodying the change that 
one wants to see in the world, Boal’s Invisible Theatre presumes the right to 
embody disingenuousness under the guise of moral and ethical superiority. 
Rather than embodying change, it recasts embodied deceit not as deceit but 
as a promise of change—as a promise of something that is its opposite.    
Boal’s Invisible Theatre is merely one iteration of a means to an end 
that we may admire for its goals but question for its methods. It is a form of 
theatre that dabbles in Richard Schechner’s concept of “dark play”, which he 
describes in Introduction to Performance Studies as involving “fantasy, risk, 
luck, daring, intervention, and deception.” Dark play, Schechner argues, is a 
form of performance that “subverts order, dissolves frames, and break its own 
rules—so much so that the playing itself is in danger of being destroyed, as in 
spying, double-agentry, con games, and stings.”19 Herein lies the crux of 
Invisible Theatre methods: like spying and double-agentry, it is a form of dark 
play subverting order by employing deception and duplicitousness. Indeed, 
the originally intended performance in Liege was thoroughly destroyed by the 
convincing nature of Francois’ performance, a destruction carried to further 
extremes when the police arrived. Through a dark play mode of enactment, 
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Invisible Theatre looks to undermine the audience’s awareness. It is a form of 
duping and a betrayal of the unwritten contract of theatre audiences 
consenting to engaging with the performance. But what is of interest here is 
the way in which the duplicity of Invisible Theatre is in fact quite similar to 
instances of dark play found outside of the theatre/theatrical framing, 
particularly espionage where the stakes are exponentially higher than 
anything Boal thought to achieve in the supermarket in Liege.  
 
The Praxis of Spying: Espionage as Invisible Theatre 
 As any good introductory publication will explain the term “Applied 
Theatre” is broad and, like the definition of espionage, a succinct definition of 
“Applied Theatre” is challenging to pin down. Illustrative of this reality is that a 
variety of names are often used to refer to the same concept. These include 
Applied Drama, Applied Theatre, and even Applied Performance. Helen 
Nicholson explains in her monograph Applied Drama that “because applied 
drama and applied theatre are relatively new terms, there is no real 
consensus about how they are used.”20 This provides a bit of a challenge in 
respect to using it as a mode of analysis for espionage. Understanding a part 
of the history helps circumvent this issue.  
 Applied Theatre, by many accounts, evolved out of the explosion of 
interest in social and political science in the post-WWII era—a period that 
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coincides with the emergence of the Cold War and what are perhaps the most 
iconic images of twentieth century espionage between the East and West. 
Merging with the energized avant-gardist traditions of the time, particularly 
Brechtian theatre, the practice of Applied Theatre quickly became oriented 
towards socio-political commentary and an interest in social activism. Indeed, 
it is difficult to separate that commentary from the ideological battles that were 
being waged against the backdrop of the Cold War, which was itself being 
conducted beneath the broad conceptual umbrella of what we call espionage 
and intelligence. But theatre as a form of social activism is not a new concept 
as Prentki and Preston explain for those studying The Applied Theatre 
Reader. Theatre has routinely been used in social and political intervention 
but the term ‘Applied Theatre’ itself “alludes to a set of hybrid, interdisciplinary 
practices.”21 The same could be said of espionage and intelligence. While 
many critics associate Applied Theatre with the avant-garde wing of political 
art, espionage is part of the avant-garde of most military and conflict efforts. 
Often it is literally the advanced guard. This avant-garde heritage already 
provides a link to espionage practice through the interest in using theatre 
outside its more mainstream framing, and with both practices often being at 
the forefront of their respective endeavors. 
 The current understanding of the practice of Applied Theatre is that it 
is, as Prenki and Preston identify, ‘interventionist’. More specifically, 
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Nicholson suggests that the term Applied Theatre has been used as a kind of 
shorthand to “describe all forms of dramatic activity that primarily exist outside 
of conventional mainstream theatre institutions, and which are specifically 
intended to benefit individuals, communities and societies.”22 These 
‘interventionist’ and ‘outside-the-realm-of-normal-theatre’ qualities are a 
central aspect of Applied Theatre. It presumes that theatre has the capacity to 
facilitate change and/or transformation.23 Moreover, Applied Theatre 
accomplishes this through a blurring of the real and unreal, which as 
Nicholson explains “implies that there are personal and social benefits” for 
those performing and those watching.24 Herein lies two other relationships to 
espionage work: just as theatre can be used to facilitate social change, so too 
can espionage. Furthermore, this is done through a practice that merges 
fiction and reality. Indeed, these have been the mandate and technique of 
espionage practices for centuries. 
 As mentioned, Applied Theatre is indebted to movements from the 
post-WWII era. More specifically, Nicholson identifies three social movements 
in theatre practice that have fed the development of Applied Theatre. Those 
are “theatre of the political Left, which have been variously described as 
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political, radical or alternative; drama and theatre in education; and 
community theatre.”25  As it would seem, not only is Applied Theatre an 
interventionist art form but it is also indebted to socially-oriented causes. It 
might be even more accurate to say that Applied Theatre has become almost 
synonymous with the idea of ‘theatre for social change’, which is 
acknowledged by many authors on the subject. This is critical information to 
be revisited shortly.  
 Beyond the interventionist aspect of Applied Theatre there is a 
significant legacy of its use in educational settings. The heritage of post-WWII 
Brechtian avant-gardism is also not the only influencing factor in the 
conceptualization of contemporary Applied Theatre practice. Applied Theatre 
is equally indebted to the pedagogical musings of Paulo Friere, who 
Nicholson explains was “committed to overturning traditional teaching 
methods based on hierarchical transmission of knowledge, and [whose] work 
has had a profound influence on theatre director Augusto Boal.”26 At the core 
of Friere’s ideas was the notion that dramatic play, improvisation, and role-
play could be used as learning mediums. This concept harkens back to both 
Aristotle and Brecht’s ideas of theatre as a didactic tool and is especially 
relevant for the next chapter of this project, which focuses on the training 
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regimes of espionage agents. But it is also significant for why Augusto Boal 
came to utilize Applied Theatre in his work. 
 As alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, Augusto Boal is perhaps 
best known for his publication Theatre of the Oppressed. Written during a 
period of extreme oppression in South America, Boal was interested in 
expanding on theatre and performance practice he had developed in the early 
part of his career. He sought to establish a theatrical form that would foster 
democracy. Of the various techniques and terms that he is credited with 
developing, Invisible Theatre is among the most important to this study of 
espionage as Applied Theatre practice. As a brief overview; “Boal devised 
invisible theatre as a way to continue stimulating debate on current political 
issues. Staged in public spaces and masquerading as real life, actors 
‘performed’ rehearsed scenes that uncovered social injustices, drawing 
people’s attention and leading to impassioned discussions. The audience, 
never aware that they were watching theatre, were able to transcend, to a 
certain extent, the silencing effect of the ubiquitous ‘cop-in-the-streets.’”27 
While espionage does not necessarily seek to stimulate debate per se, it does 
seek to stimulate change as well as promote an awareness of a need for 
change. Further to this, and evidenced in the case-study cited earlier, 
Invisible Theatre is a form of performance that attempts to fly under the radar 
and is known for having its staged elements remain undetectable. It utilizes, 
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perhaps even exploits, the lack of awareness of those witnessing the event all 
the while relying on an audience being present.  
 To refine this conversation further, it is important to define espionage in 
a more formal capacity. In the modern sense, espionage has become 
synonymous with, perhaps even usurped by the term ‘intelligence’ along with 
its associated studies. Intelligence is a broad term in its own right that 
incorporates a wide variety of undertakings. In the introduction to the edited 
volume The Handbook of Intelligence Studies Loch K. Johnson explains that 
officers within the modern intelligence world would likely propose the 
definition of intelligence to be “the prelude to [Presidential] decision and 
action.”28  Johnson’s description of intelligence is a standard understanding 
that is likely to be accepted by many in the wider public. Regarding this 
chapter, espionage, as is with intelligence, is a precursor to action, or 
intervention. 
Where then does the distinction lie between the broad notion of 
intelligence and the specific activity of espionage? As explained on the 
website of the British intelligence service MI5, espionage is “the process of 
obtaining information that is not normally publicly available, using human 
sources (agents) or technical means (like hacking into computer systems). It 
may also involve seeking to influence decision-makers and opinion-formers to 
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benefit the interests of a foreign power.”29 It might also be suggested that 
espionage is often viewed as the act of obtaining “information some other 
party is trying to deny,” as intelligence scholar Abram N. Shulsky has 
written.30 It is an accessing of information that others desire not to be 
accessed and such “hidden information must be ferreted out of encoded 
communications or stolen from safes and vaults, locked offices, guarded 
military and intelligence installations, and denied areas—a potentially 
dangerous task involving the penetration of the opposition’s camp and its 
concentric circles of defense.”31 Yet, as the website of MI5 identifies, 
espionage is not exclusively concerned with gathering intel, the distinction 
between the broad category of intelligence and the more narrow focus of 
espionage is that espionage is also the undertaking of infiltration and 
influence through clandestine means. Bearing this is mind, we might then 
define espionage as follows: 1. It is concerned with intelligence gathering and 
infiltration. 2. It is meant to be undetectable. 3. It is highly controlled. 4. It can 
be facilitated by almost anyone. 5. It is not only a wartime practice. 6. It is a 
tool used to perpetuate control. Returning to our comparison with Invisible 
Theatre, espionage, like Invisible Theatre, seeks to remain undetected, blurs 
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the fictional and ‘the real’, and utilizes the unawareness of the audience to its 
advantage. Applied Theatre is also, like espionage, tightly controlled. 
 It is worth noting that while it may seem as though Invisible Theatre 
could be a form of performance that is exclusively improvised, it most 
certainly is not. As Boal explains in Theatre of the Oppressed, “Invisible 
Theatre is theatre; it must have a text with a scripted core, which will 
inevitably be modified, according to the circumstances, to suit the 
interventions of the spect-actors.”21 Like espionage there is a plan of action 
and pre-establish goals. Yet, through intensive rehearsal and practice it 
remains flexible and can adapt to new circumstances that befall the 
performers. To execute such work successfully those performing cannot be 
read as earnest, plotting, or fraudulent, they must act as though any of their 
preplanned events are a phenomenon. Boal is explicit about these attributes 
and concludes with the statement that “in the Invisible Theatre, the actors 
must perform just like real actors; that is, they must live.”32 These particular 
aspects echo Sara Schneider’s point on undercover work as an artistic 
performance practice, which she puts forward in her publication Art of 
Darkness: Ingenious Performances by Undercover Operators, Con Men, and 
Others. Schneider writes that in such work there is a distinct necessity for 
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“identity-players” to appear genuine so as to not out themselves.33 As Boal 
suggests, this is in part reliant on the performers adapting to new 
circumstances while they are performing. 
 While Invisible Theatre is not the only form of Applied Theatre it is 
perhaps the only form of Applied Theatre in which the boundary between 
theatre and espionage is so easily burred. More important still, Applied 
Theatre may be the only form of theatre which parallels the goals of 
espionage—the intervention through deception and misdirection. As 
Nicholson explains, Applied Theatre is “interested in working in clearly 
defined contexts with and for specific audiences, and in furthering objectives 
which are not only artistic, but also educational, social and political.”34 These 
ideas are contained in espionage work as well. It could even be stated that by 
shifting just a few words it would be possible to create a definition of 
espionage from this very description. For example, espionage might be 
defined as artistic and interested in working in clearly defined contexts with 
and for specifics audiences, and in furthering objectives which are social and 
political. We can easily add corporate to the objectives of espionage 
alongside the social and political. Nicholson’s citation of education also plays 
a role in espionage. Indeed, the second chapter of this project works through 
some of the pedagogical aspects of espionage training as a significant part of 
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the espionage process in the contemporary age. However, it is the idea of 
intervention that is significant for this introductory chapter. 
 The justification invoked for those engaging in Applied Theatre is that it 
helps facilitate activism and social change, which are typically, if not always, 
anchored by ethical and moral considerations. This establishes a firm 
trajectory for Applied Theatre practice, which is often intended to counter the 
unethical and the immoral. Following this logic, Boal’s Invisible Theatre—a 
sub-category of his Theatre of the Oppressed—is a form of practice which is 
meant to counter oppressive policies and social hierarchies, and elevate the 
disenfranchised. It is governed by the same beliefs as those practices in the 
broader category of Applied Theatre. The issues that arise are the concerns 
identified at the outset of the chapter, namely that Invisible Theatre is not an 
ethical approach to theatre. It undermines the public trust, it relies on 
deception—an extension of lying—and misdirection, and, perhaps most 
conflicting of all, even with these dubious qualities it is still positioned as a 
morally and ethically sound form of theatre practice given its desired 
outcomes, which is a contradictory and even hypocritical positioning.  
Espionage is almost always typified by deception, misdirection, lying, 
and hypocrisy as well, particularly with respect to the assumption that the 
deceptive practices of espionage are ethically justifiable because of the 
underlying so-called ‘noble’ ideological motivations governing and enabling 
their undertaking. Phillip Knightley alludes to this very point in the introduction 





their peacetime existence by promising to provide timely warning of a threat 
to national security.”35 Spy services are allowed to undertake immoral and 
unethical practices because ostensibly they help protect the public. In the 
case of Western Nations this might be extended to protecting their forms of 
democracy. In theocratic states, the protection of the religious ideology 
governing the society. 
 It might be speculated that this form of ethical “doublethink,” 36 the 
Orwellian term employed by Knightley and shared between Invisible Theatre 
and espionage, arose out of the irrational situations of military and political 
conflict. As the history shows, much of the practice of Applied Theatre and 
Invisible Theatre can be traced back to the periods following major military 
and societal upheaval. This is also true of espionage. The intervention at the 
heart of Applied Theatre is rooted in ideas that captivated the interests of 
early Applied Theatre artists and was arguably in response to the casualties 
of war and political oppression. These individuals were interested in pursuing 
political activism through an artistic medium. This activism included, but was 
certainly not limited to, questioning rigid divisions in labor and social 
hierarchies, and furthering civil rights. Some scholars would suggest that 
certain forms of espionage have been at the heart of such social endeavors 
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as well. For example, when we think of espionage conducted by the Allied 
Forces in WWII, the leading principles used to justify allied intervention were 
never far removed from actions taken in the name of civil or human rights and 
countering totalitarian social hierarchies, among other issues. Bearing this 
example in mind, “doublethink”, within both espionage and Invisible Theatre, 
is the noble justification given to ignoble actions. It is the ethical and moral 
dissonance at the heart of both espionage and Applied Theatre practices, 
such as Invisible Theatre, that engage in this form of “dark play”. 
The problem is that unlike many of the socially conscious Applied 
Theatre initiatives so often described by scholars, espionage has also often 
been used to actively perpetuate social and political injustice and to maintain 
unequal civil standing. The point is that if espionage is thought of as an 
Applied Theatre practice, then it becomes obvious that Applied Theatre is not 
by definition benevolent or progressive either. This same point is affirmed by 
Prentki and Preston who write that “as the history tends to suggest, the roots 
of applied theatre grew in soil of progressive, radical people’s movements in 
various places around the world. From this it might be tempting to assume 
that applied theatre is, per se, a left-wing or socialist methodology. This would 
be a false assumption: Applied Theatre is no more or less at the service of a 
particular ideology than any other kind of theatre.”37 James O’Keefe’s use of 
techniques like those developed by Boal illustrates this issue particularly well. 
                                                






Invariably, espionage and Applied Theatre possess the quality of being 
merely a tool for the facilitation of whatever agenda is being undertaken. If it 
is understood that espionage is a form of Applied Theatre then it may be 
viewed as a tool of whomever is seeking to undertake an intervention. It 
should then also be understood that it can be undertaken by anyone who has 
the means to facilitate it. Bearing this in mind, we are left with the issue of 
where these clandestine events take place as a part of its context. 
 In any good review or critical analysis of a theatrical performance the 
location is often one of the first qualities identified. This context is just as 
critical when it comes to Applied Theatre, and perhaps even more-so when 
dealing with espionage. When delving into Applied Theatre and its affect 
Phillip Taylor employs the term Praxis, which he explains is “the manipulation 
of theatre form by leaders to help participants act, reflect, and transform.”38 
He also suggests that Praxis is an “interplay between three elements—
people, passion, and platform” and that these are the core aspects of Applied 
Theatre in the pursuit of the aesthetic. With a view towards recognizing 
espionage as a form of theatre practice, it could be considered that the 
people are those who are facilitating espionage, those undertaking 
espionage, and those who are witnessing the espionage (whether they are 
aware or not). Passion would be defined as the motivations, which might 
range from the benevolent to power-reproducing motivations. It is Platform 
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that would be identified as the final part of this equation and what is perhaps 
the most important in conceptualizing espionage as theatre and performance. 
 A platform has a variety of dimensional possibilities. Taylor cites Boal 
in his explanation and refers to “that marked space, what Boal describes as 
the aesthetic space, where people creating passions live.”39 In the case of 
traditional Applied Theatre this could be the classroom, the forum, the prison, 
or any other place of intervention. In espionage, it might be thought of as the 
location of the operation. This could exist as a macro platform—the Soviet 
Union and nations of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War—or as a micro 
platform—the café in Argentina where an agent is eavesdropping on others.  
 Place or space might be another term that could be substituted for 
platform. Sally Mackey maintains that Applied Theatre and place possess an 
“intimate relationship” and that “Applied Theatre researchers and practitioners 
engage with people in their contexts and locations, and people’s relationship 
to their locus is immanent in our work.”40 This is no different in espionage. An 
undercover performance in a locked space, or a place in which entry is 
exclusive, governs espionage. The context and location, what Taylor calls the 
platform, is a critical component in the development of the espionage 
aesthetic as a form of Applied Theatre. Mackey further explains that, “the 
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fragility and mutability of place has become an increasingly global issue”41 
and such fragility and mutability has a direct effect on the work produced 
through an Applied Theatre methodology. As an example of how place affects 
the means through which Applied Theatre and espionage are viewed, we can 
turn back to the account of Boal’s work. The example depicts a moment 
where an instance of Applied Theatre strays into the realm of clandestine 
work in part because like espionage, Invisible Theatre relies on those not 
engaging with the practice to be unaware of the performance taking place. 
Both also rely on the ability to blur the real and the unreal. Moreover, the 
performance effectively infiltrates the police station where authorities presume 
their right to not be deceived. Invisible Theatre employs the same techniques 
as espionage and was developed with a reliance on duplicitousness. Yes, it is 
connected by a desire to stimulate change, remain undetected, and to appear 
genuine (even though it is not), but it is also deceptive.  As has be noted, 
espionage is artistic and interested in working in clearly defined contexts with 
and for specifics audiences, and with further objectives that are 
contextualized by their social and political orientation. Irrespective of the 
means through which it is done, espionage and Invisible Theatre rely on the 
ability to deceive – to perpetuate a falsity. The deception can be both direct 
and indirect but there must be an audience to experience the deceptive act. 
This is also true in other instances of performance the stray into the realm of 
duplicitous practice, which have been investigated by scholars. 
                                                





Dark Play and Identity Artists: Espionage as Theatre and Performance 
Practice 
It is not difficult to imagine how the underlying logic of espionage is 
linked to theatre and performance, particularly if one likens it to Applied 
Theatre and more specifically Boal’s Invisible Theatre. In broad terms, for 
example, Schneider has demonstrated that undercover work like espionage is 
rife with instances of theatricality and performativity. In Art of Darkness she 
explains that, “Western culture has long dallied with the identity player—the 
spy, the undercover cop, the federally relocated witness, among others—
which has had all to do with the dramatic potential these players have.”42 It is 
easy to understand Schneider’s point. Identity performance is inherently 
linked to acting since these performers present as someone they are not—a 
distinct connection between dark play and theatre. And these threads are 
more entwined still. 
 Some might argue that the most defining aspect of espionage is its 
undetectable nature, which is rooted in mimetic tradition, camouflage, 
deception, lying, and disguise, among many other traits, and is most certainly 
related to Schneider’s identity artists. But what demands focus in the use of 
disguise, or what might be described as the ability of an entity to present or 
perform as one identity, while possessing another identity that remains hidden 
to those watching. This activity is easily placed within the definition of 
                                                






deception laid out by Carson and also has a rich history within explorations of 
sociology and anthropology. For example, in his publication The Mask of 
Medusa, the surrealist intellectual Roger Caillois dissects the distinctions of 
adaptive behavior and classifies them in three capacities: “disguise (fancy 
dress), where the animal passes itself off as belonging to another species; 
camouflage (allocryptic, homochromatic, disruptive colours, homo-types), by 
means of which the animal is able to blend itself into its background; 
intimidation, where the animal paralyses or frightens its enemy (or its prey) 
without this terror being justified by a corresponding danger.”43 The central 
point here is that instances of mimicry—themselves moments of deception—
are distinct from one another, yet rely on the observer believing something 
which is not entirely true. Espionage, it might be said, is most engaged with 
both the first and second categories identified by Caillois—disguise and 
camouflage.44 
  The assertion made by Caillois has also been addressed within theatre 
and performance scholarship. To tease out the principles of camouflage as 
they relate to masquerade and portraiture, alongside the negotiation of space, 
Laura Levin cites Caillois’ position in her monograph, Performing Ground: 
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Space, Camouflage, and the Art of Blending In. She explains that Caillois’ 
categories “help distinguish camouflage from ‘disguise,’ the form of mimicry 
often associate with masquerade” and that “while each type of mimicry 
involves altering one’s external form, camouflage is primarily a special act, a 
negotiation between a body and its immediate setting.”45 But while these 
categories are distinct, they are not exclusive, espionage engages in both 
disguise and camouflage, sometimes in the same moment. For example, an 
agent in a café may disguise themselves as an innocuous bystander to get 
close enough to a target to eavesdrop, effectively employing the space to 
blend into the background through disguise. Likewise, and more relevant to a 
conversation of Applied Theatre as espionage and vice versa, Boal’s 
performers utilize their disguises to blend in as store patrons to record the 
interaction between François and the supermarket manager. As we can also 
understand from the Boal example, camouflage is no guarantee of success, 
which both Caillois and Levin acknowledge. Irrespective of being able to 
disguise oneself effectively or being caught out, at the heart of these events 
are duplicitous activities, which necessitates a return to the ethics of 
espionage and associated art-forms. This is because at the core of the 
distinction between disguise and camouflage is the dubiousness of deceptive 
performance. 
                                                
 






 The idea of camouflage within the work of Boal is alluded to by Claire 
Bishop in her publication Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship. As she describes it, Boal’s work “[operates] by stealth, 
unannounced to the public as works of art.”46 It, as Levin might suggest, 
blends into the background appearing as a part of the public. However, 
Bishop also makes note of the fact that the context, what Taylor identifies as 
a part of the praxis of Applied Theatre, has morphed since the inception of 
Invisible Theatre.47 More to the point, in recent years scholars have critiqued 
undercover and camouflaged art practices for their mistrustful methods which 
perpetuates “the fear that any instance of personal encounter might be being 
manipulated invisibly.”48 Camouflage and invisible practices, while at times 
coping and survival strategies, also breed mistrust. Much like the doublethink 
identified by Knightley, there is a misaligned ethical reasoning in the idea that 
to progress we must lie to people. Regarding espionage, we might liken this 
to a government conducting espionage abroad and then asking the citizenry 
to allow for it to conduct surveillance on the public while making the case that, 
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unlike in the instances of espionage abroad, the information gleaned from the 
public will not be exploited and the public is in fact being protected. 
 In returning to Schneider’s work on identity artists and undercover 
performers, it behooves us to make the distinction that on an ethical level a 
con man or a fugitive or even someone in witness protection is not the same 
as an agent of espionage. All might rely on performances of deception, but 
their engagement of forms of mimicry, identity performance, or camouflage 
are undertaken for varying reasons. A con artist, for example, engages in 
deception for personal gain or for “obtaining money under false pretenses by 
the exercise of fraud and deceit” as Erving Goffman explains in his article “On 
Cooling Out the Mark; Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure.”49 The hallmark 
of this practice is when “the mark becomes con artist as well, believing he’s 
the one duping the con” only to be exploited in the end, as Schneider 
describes.50 The con is defined by the belief of the identity artists undertaking 
the con that the activity and deceptive practice is justified. As one con artist 
explained of their victims in a study cited by Schneider, they’re “just another 
con man too—and it’s your money he wants. What you’re doing is jacking 
each other up and the first guy to get the other’s wallet is the winner.”51 The 
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ethical logic in this is the belief that because ‘the mark’ would otherwise 
victimize people, they are in turn a fair target. This form of identity artistry or 
duplicitous performance is governed by personal gain and indifference to the 
morals of cheating others. Moreover, there is little ideology guiding these 
beliefs and comes from a place of personal advancement.  
Conversely, while witness protection also dabbles in identity 
performance and disguise, the assistance and ‘new’ identities provided to 
those in the program by law enforcement are justified by the belief that 
because they are helping the justice system root out unethical and immoral 
criminals these individuals are entitled to engage in a duplicitous act that is 
arguably less egregious. Unlike the con artist, the protected witness has their 
identity artistry endorsed and supported by the state.52 Refugees likewise, 
engage in forms of identity artistry and disguise, though often out a necessity 
of survival and escape from oppressive conditions. The ethical conundrum of 
their situation being far less abstract since those undertaking the performance 
are often doing so as a last resort and, more often than not, doing so not 
because they have committed crimes but for survival. 
 With espionage, we are presented with a different scenario again. Like 
those in witness protection, espionage engages in a form of identity 
performance that is often endorsed by the state. However, unlike witness 
protection, the justification is more inclined towards the logic used by the con-
                                                
 





artist—which is that if a supporting state is not the first to engage in 
espionage then they are likely to fall victim to those who are conducting 
espionage against them. In a sense espionage is based on a permanent 
paranoia of intelligence insecurity. The target state, with a threat of having 
espionage conducted against it, leaps into action to conduct its own 
intelligence gathering. This infinite loop of justification is used to then 
rationalize the duplicitous work that is being undertaken. Regarding Cold War 
intelligence practices, Knightley summarizes this rational as follows: “The CIA 
need the KGB to justify its own existence; and how would the KGB fare 
without the threat of a CIA?”53 But we are again required to ask, do the ends 
justify the means? As the Cold War depicts all too well, the justifying of 
deceptive and duplicitous behavior does not necessarily solve or mitigate 
conflict, in fact it sometimes perpetuates it. This is evocative of the issue that 
befalls invisible arts practices, where the public become less trusting of 
everyday moments on the street and the arts specifically. Deception is 
inherently unethical and destructive. It allows those who fall victim to the 
deception to justify their own unethical practices, and encourages those who 
have unwittingly been roped into the invisible performance to distrust future 
encounters.  
With Boal, we might argue the same principle. By engaging in a 
duplicitous performance Boal justifies the use of the same techniques by 
those outside of his theatre company. While Invisible Theatre may be 
                                                





positioned as an intervention against oppression, which espionage likewise 
does, it can and may very well enable the justification of oppressive tactics. In 
the article by Boal and Esptein that documents Boal’s activities in Liege they 
write that the following day the police arrive to arrest Boal. The irony is that in 
their effort to arrest Boal the police send plainclothes officers into theatre who 
are undetected by the practitioners—arguably through their ability to blend in 
with the public, or what we would call camouflage. Boal, strangely, seems 
shocked. He explains in the article that he “would have never thought that the 
Belgian police could come in like that.”54 The police, in their efforts to arrest 
the facilitator of an event that they deem to have caused a public disturbance, 
employ the same duplicitous techniques that Boal positions as a method for 
subverting oppressive regimes. In the end Boal successfully barricades 
himself within a room marked “private”, and Belgian law prevents police from 
entering private rooms unauthorized, thus he is saved through laws of the 
state. Like with the CIA and KGB, as well as the con artists, both Boal and the 
Belgium police feel justified in their approach and utilize technique rooted in 
deception. 	
To understand how espionage is undertaken from a practical 
performance standpoint, it is worth noting that espionage has a strong 
relationship with both embodied and somatic practice. The somatic aspects of 
espionage might include the performance of the body as a mode of blending 
                                                






in. As Levin would describe “a camouflage act.”55 This might also be 
described as a moment where the body produces the desired aesthetic. The 
bodily experience in a given moment is informing the thought process. 
Conversely, the embodied aspect of espionage is the ability to mine bodily 
experience to produce the aesthetic and knowledge. This aspect is a little 
more complex. It could be argued that if an agent is undertaking an act of 
deception—pretending to be someone they are not—then it would be 
challenging for them to mine an experience that is not their own to produce an 
aesthetic they have never experienced. This would suggest that the 
embodiment of the surrounding conditions, such as the environment, the 
necessity of remaining undetected, and the intensity of the act, all contribute 
to the production of the aesthetic. Furthermore, the learned cultural 
reproduction, what Marcel Mauss would call “the techniques of the body”56 
would be yet another form of embodied knowledge. In short, espionage can 
be considered as a form of somatic and embodied practice, providing yet 
another entry point into the analysis of espionage through the lens of theatre 
and performance. 
However, the bodily aspects of espionage are only one aspect of the 
larger theatre and performance event that constitutes espionage. Returning to 
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the first section of this chapter momentarily, espionage, like Invisible Theatre, 
fits within the performance category of ‘dark play’. Schechner’s 
conceptualization of dark play is indebted to various scholars, such as Clifford 
Geetz and Erving Goffman, whose concepts of ‘deep play’ and ‘frame 
devices’ are woven into his theorization. Central to this is the issue of danger, 
risk, and total commitment. Unlike performances while under surveillance, or 
the somatic and embodied performance aspects, dark play leans into the 
threats, risks, and potential failures that define espionage as performance. 
This is well illustrated in Boal’s Invisible Theatre as well. The risk in being 
caught-out during the performance in Liege becomes all-too-real for those 
participating in the event. 
Beyond these defining characteristics, at the core of Schechner’s idea 
is the repeatedly cited characteristic of espionage—that it is often meant to be 
undetectable and rooted in deception. As noted earlier, Laura Levin explains 
that the ability to remain undetected, particularly within socio-political 
contexts, directly ties to the idea of camouflage. She cites the work of Roy 
Behrens who explains that camouflage “comes from the French verb 
camoufler, meaning to mask or disguise.”57 The invocation of the mask is an 
interesting addition to the conceptualization of espionage as theatre and 
performance. Often masks are thought of as something manufactured sitting 
atop of the face obscuring what is beneath. As noted in the discussion 
                                                






between Henderson and Tilley in their dialogue for the Canadian Theatre 
Review, in certain forms of theatre reliant on mask-work it is understood that 
a central tenant of the technique is to provide the audience with a generic 
canvass, the mask on the actor’s face, which they can project a character 
onto.58 Furthermore, the use of masks within theatre is an accepted 
convention of the performance. Generally speaking, an audience has no 
problem with not seeing the ‘real faces’ of the performers because they have 
consented to this reality in choosing to engage with the theatrical 
performance. With espionage, however, the audience is unaware that they 
are viewing a masked identity. It has been thrust upon them. The same is true 
of Invisible Theatre. The idea of disguise and mask is easily linked the 
‘dramatic potential’ that Sara Schneider refers to in her publication. But the 
notion of masks, disguise and camouflage are not a perfect explanation for 
the theatrical technique in espionage. We are also required to return to the 
earlier cited idea of deception, because linked to the idea of espionage and 
the association of disguise is the concept of the unwitting audience. 
Schneider identifies this early on in her text explaining that “these identity 
player’s audiences are there—and active.”59 That there is someone bearing 
witness to the moment of deception, and sometimes participating in the 
deception while being deceived.  
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 A remaining area of theatre and performance that should be addressed 
is the concept of mimesis. In one sense mimesis is the theory that ties much 
of this scholarship together due to its addressing of where art and life are 
distinguished from one another. Mimesis governs much of the western world’s 
conceptualization of artistry and the arts, and Matthew Potolsky’s tidy 
publication Mimesis explains this succinctly in the introduction. Potolsky write 
that “[m]imesis is among the oldest terms in literary and artistic theory, and is 
certainly among the most fundamental. It so defines our way of thinking about 
art, literature and representation more generally that we rely on the concept 
even if we have never heard of it or do not know its history.”60 Espionage as it 
relates to mimesis is concerned primarily with representation, and art more 
broadly. Mimesis is the linkage between mask, camouflage, deception, and 
more. By these standards theatrical mimesis is at the heart of spy-work.  
Potolsky breaks down the ideas of representation in the performing 
arts further for his reader and clarifies that theatre is inherently reliant on 
mimesis as the means of production, though they are not synonymous. He 
explains that “the imagery and association of the theatre compromise another 
of the central thematic elements of the theory of mimesis. Theatre is not, 
strictly speaking, identical with mimesis. But theatre and theatricality have 
been so central to the theory since antiquity that it is nearly impossible to 
separate the two ideas.”61 The point is that theatrical mimesis is “a 
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representation for someone, and not only a representation of something 
else.”62 We then might view espionage as a mimetic event due to the fact that 
those engaging in espionage are simultaneously representing what is normal 
and non-suspicious, much in the way that identity-artists are engaging in a 
performance, as suggested by Schneider, but do so for the public and 
organizations they are attempting to infiltrate, entirely within the vein of 
camouflage as articulate by Levin. At the core of this idea is the exchange 
between the presenter/performer and the witness, and a type of roleplaying 
that not only requires someone to be on the receiving end, but in fact always 
presumes such a reality. Espionage pushes this further by relying on the 
absolute believability for the act of deception to take place. This is unlike 
instances of self-presentation or a framed theatrical event in which it is not 
absolutely necessary for everyone to believe everything is real. Whenever 
this does not happen in espionage it, to paraphrase Sara Schneider, cuts the 
viability of the performance short—literally.63 
The benefits and challenges of an analysis of espionage as theatre 
and performance practice is that it is rich in theoretical examples, while 
lacking in accessible data. It is a fascinating case study, yet “raises meaty 
ethical dilemmas and issues.”64 Once drawn out the formulation of espionage 
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as theatre and performance practice, and more specifically as Applied 
Theatre is easily identified. Moreover, certain forms of Applied Theatre can 
even begin to seem like espionage. There is a shared interventionist goal, 
both are theatre outside of the traditional framing, both can remain 
undetected, and both are reliant on the praxis of platform, people, and 
passion, to develop the desired aesthetic. So how does anyone know when 
Applied Theatre is being successfully employed? Taylor poses this question 
directly to his reader when working through the principles of Applied Theatre. 
He asks “what criteria should we draw on as we begin a conversation about 
the effectiveness of applied theatre? Who benefits from an evaluation? To 
what extent does evaluation help improve the quality of the applied theatre? 
What are the most appropriate techniques for discerning information about 
the progress and achievement?”65 These questions can be directly applied to 
espionage practice. However, it may be more important to ask how might this 
be done? How does one go about evaluating these criteria? 
 Arguably, part of the process of determining whether an endeavor in 
Applied Theatre is successful is through evaluation. As Taylor might explain 
it, “evaluation refers to the search for information that indicates effectiveness, 
which can mean a variety of different things based on who actually wants the 
evaluation.”66 In short, it is an assessment of whether the goals of the Applied 
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Theatre undertaking, in this case espionage, have been achieved. To 
illustrate an example of an evaluation or a determination of success we will 
turn to a case study featuring the agent Virginia Hall, who has been declared 
by many as The United States’ greatest female spy.   
 
Who’s Afraid of Virginia Hall?: Measuring success in espionage 
Before analyzing the success of Virginia Hall, it is critical to establish 
who Hall was working for and just how Hall’s success will be measured. 
Virginia Hall was employed by the Special Operations Executive of the British 
Government during the Second World War. This entity was a covert section 
dedicated to clandestine warfare and greenlighted by Winston Churchill 
himself. The organization was famously tasked with “setting Europe ablaze.”67 
Yet many authors have concluded that this did not, in fact, ever really occur. 
Theatre and performance scholar James Harding points out that “its primary 
responsibility was not intelligence-gathering but sabotage and subversion in 
German-occupied territories – the kind of activity that would presumably 
cultivate popular uprisings among the local populations and lay the 
groundwork for a subsequent allied invasion.”68 While certain aspects of 
Harding’s position on the effectiveness of the SOE are up for debate, he is 
absolutely correct about the other endeavors carried out by the organization. 
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They were tasked with collecting intelligence, sabotage, reconnaissance, 
establishing Resistance movements, and rescue operations. Key to this was 
that these tasks would be carried out in secret and undercover. In 
understanding that Hall was a part of this group, how then do we assess her 
outcomes? First, we must refer to the approach of evaluating Applied 
Theatre. 
Taylor proposes that Applied Theatre practice and its success is 
evaluated by assessing where the goals have been met. Espionage poses an 
interesting challenge for this sort of undertaking because even though it is 
used as a tool for smaller clandestine assignments, it is often used in large-
scale offensives as well. Therefore, an assessment of outcomes could be 
undertaken in a variety of manners. For example, Virginia Hall was an agent 
of the Second World War Allies and it could be argued that the very success 
of the Allies over the Axis forces means that the Applied Theatre of espionage 
was a successful endeavor. This would be a macro analysis and although it 
has certain value, what this project is most interested in is the micro analysis 
of the individual efforts of agents. There is one other significant point to make. 
In the case of the Second World War, some may suggest that it is easy to 
identify whether or not an agent was successful merely by looking into if they 
were killed or missing in action.69 As was explained with a citation from 
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Schneider earlier in the chapter; any failure in the undertaking cuts the 
viability of the performance short—literally70. However, merely analyzing the 
death rate of agents would be a gross oversimplification of success and/or 
failure within espionage. A more nuanced analysis is required. Of interest to 
this project are when instances of failure threatened a directive and where 
efforts may have fallen short. A case study of Virginia Hall provides exactly 
this opportunity. 
Described by renowned WWII historian M.R.D. Foot as an “indomitable 
agent with a ‘brass foot’”71 Virginia Hall was nothing short of remarkable. She 
was the only woman who served in the Second World War to win the 
Distinguished Cross Award for “extraordinary heroism in connection with 
military operations against the enemy”72 and her life from Foreign Service 
worker to training by the Allied Forces SOE section is well documented and 
offers substantial insight into a successful agent whose work was integral to 
the success of multiple missions. What is perhaps one of the more intriguing 
aspects of Hall is that her initial work was not for the United States 
government, but for the United Kingdom. As was mentioned earlier, Richard 
Schechner explains that dark play “emphasizes risk, deception, and sheer 
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thrill.”73 This risk and thrill is an excellent description of Hall herself. What is 
slightly unusual is the extent to which she risked her life while serving for 
another nation in a military campaign.  
Born in Baltimore and raised in an upper-class family, Virginia Hall was 
both smart and talented, and she landed a job with the State Department 
while she was still quite young. Throughout the 1930’s she moved from 
embassy to embassy, eventually arriving in Turkey to take up a clerical 
position in a consulate. During a hunting trip with friends she accidently shot 
herself in the foot, doing enough damage that the limb had to be amputated. 
After her recovery in the United States, she returned to Europe, and she 
worked in Venice and Estonia until eventually moving to France. Shortly after 
her arrival in Paris, Nazi Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War 
began. Hall initially worked as an ambulance attendant for the French Amy 
until the fall of Paris, after which she relocated to London via Spain.  
Over the course of her time in London, Hall was recruited by the newly 
formed British Special Operations Executive. As one of the few women to 
even be permitted to enter the initial training regimen of the SOE, she defied 
all odds and successfully achieved a position as a clandestine operative. 
Through this program the SOE “trained her in weapons, communications, 
resistance activities, and security measures," all of which were integral to her 
                                                






coming role as an agent.74 In addition to this instruction she was also taught 
how to develop cover stories and professions—an important part of 
espionage work. 
While the other aspects of the SOE training program were critical in 
preparing operatives with the necessary skills to carry out subversive work, 
the most relatable aspect to theatre work is the latter part i.e. cover stories 
and professions. As Pearson explains in her biography of Hall; “one of the 
most important elements for the agents in the field was their cover story—who 
they were, what they were doing, where they had come from. They couldn’t 
walk a single step in enemy territory without a series of lies that could flow out 
of their mouths as naturally as if they were the truth.”75 This type of work is 
quite clearly in line with Schneider’s “identity artists” and Carson’s idea of 
deception – that one person would be convincing another to believe 
something which they themselves know to be false. So too is this the case for 
the performers in Boal’s Invisible Theatre. So how do we understand whether 
Hall was successful or not in the production of cover stories? 
Success, of course, depends upon the goals one sets, and in Hall’s 
case, the goals were multiple. At the most basic level, the goal was to 
infiltrate and gather intelligence while remaining undetected, and these 
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activities had the aim of gaining wartime advantage and dominance.  
Furthermore, the goals established by the SOE and its creators were explicit 
and clear: “to co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, 
against enemy overseas” and to “set Europe ablaze.”76 Finally, at an 
individual level, there were Hall’s specific goals: to “report on the general 
situation in France”; “to organize a Resistance network that would fight the 
Germans by any means possible”; and to remain undetected and “live a lie for 
months on end.”77 Many of these directives have overlapping goals, and at 
the same time stand on their own as individual details to consider. To 
understand them in a more in-depth manner, they will be worked through 
point by point to demonstrate that overall Hall was a successful agent.  
With respect to the gathering of intelligence and infiltrating occupied 
France and the opposing forces, Hall did very well. She arrived in Vichy 
France via Spain on August 23rd 1941 as “the first woman field agent the SOE 
had sent into France.”78 Within the first four months of her arrival Hall had not 
only publically registered at the official government offices under the guise of 
a reporter, but she had also interviewed government bureaucrats and 
reported this information back to the London headquarters of the SOE.  
Amid these activities, Hall remained undetected with astonishing 
success. Indeed, she was so effective at remaining anonymous that she 
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overstayed the typical six months in the field. In fact, after nearly fifteen 
months in her position, she only returned to London when Allied forces 
pushed the Nazis out of North Africa and the displaced Nazi forces arrived in 
the French State. This long-term stay is itself strong evidence of a successful 
undercover performance. 
The main aspect of Hall’s undercover initiatives was the facilitation of a 
network of resistance operatives and recruiters, while coordinating with the 
Head Quarters of the SOE. Hall’s reputation as a leader preceded her. The 
ability she possessed in controlling information and assets was highly 
regarded by both those in the United Kingdom and those in the French 
Resistance. The success of her initial mission was in part due to her diligence 
and control of information. As Pearson explains, “she was discreet to a fault. 
Several times over the […] year, the feelings of one or another of her 
Resistance members were hurt. They felt they were being excluded from a 
discussion or a mission because she saw them untrustworthy. That was not 
at all the case. Rather, it was because almost all work was done on a ‘need to 
know’ basis.”79 Although Pearson oversimplifies this issue, the point stands 
firm; these two well-executed layers of control between her and London, and 
her operatives in France, was a distinct reason for her overall success. 
In order to position espionage within a framework of Applied Theatre, it 
is critical to consider in this moment how we might see the success of Virginia 
                                                






Hall in comparison to the work of Augusto Boal. A significant critique of Boal 
and his Invisible Theatre has been formulated in this paper. It challenges 
Boal’s belief that the use of deceptive and unethical technique can be justified 
because of the ethical or morally rooted goal that the technique pursues. 
Virginia Hall is engaged in the same practice. The major distinction between 
the two ‘practitioners’ fighting against oppressive forces is that, unlike Boal, 
Hall is operating within the theatre of war, which is clearly a higher stakes 
endeavor. This returns us to the question of whether the end goal justifies the 
means of achieving that goal. If we recall, as an operative of the SOE Hall’s 
mandate was to “set Europe ablaze” and to “co-ordinate all action, by way of 
subversion and sabotage, against enemy overseas.”80 There are no caveats 
within this statement. The totalizing mandate given to the SOE ostensibly 
allowed them to undertake espionage and its associated practices without 
much consequence in pursuit of winning the war. A list of war-crimes (an 
ironic statement in the best of times) does not need to be composed to 
illustrate how unmitigated military and clandestine activities cannot be justified 
even in pursuit of principled and noble goals. Success in espionage, the 
espionage of the Second World War in this case, means an accomplishment 
in techniques of obfuscation, disguise, and camouflage, which enables the 
activities of sabotage and subversion. 
Following this, if Boal’s Invisible Theatre is already considered 
unethical due to the duplicitousness at the heart of the activities, and is further 
                                                





implicated by the cyclical nature of deception that it enables, yet lacks the 
context of physical violence, death, and destruction that defines war-time 
clandestine work, then we must conclude that espionage, which likewise 
employs deceit and enables a cycle of equivalent activities like sabotage, 
deception, and violence, is no more ethical than Invisible Theatre. By many 
accounts, it is more unethical. Therefore, successful espionage—a success in 
deceiving others and providing the opportunity to undertake subversive 
work—proves it a form of Applied Theatre practice that dabbles in the 
destructive and deceitful. Espionage might then be viewed as an unethical 
theatrical practice, which is a perpetuator of the very conflict and oppression 
is seeks to challenge and undermine. 
 Strangely enough, what was perhaps the most significant failure of 
Hall—if it can be described as such—was her inability to achieve Churchill’s 
directive of “setting Europe ablaze”. The argument that the SOE did not in fact 
accomplish anything near to the point of deeming this objective successful is 
succinctly summed up by Foot who writes that “[i]t would be absurd to claim 
for SOE that it could have won the war by itself, or even—on most fronts—
that it was a major battle-winning influence. In a few places its effect was 
critical.”81 It could be that Hall was one of those rare exceptions and her work 
had significant impact, as Foot would describe. This is in fact alluded to in an 
                                                






article for the journal Prologue by National Reconnaissance historian Gerald 
K. Haines who wrote the following concerning Hall: 
Working in a region infested with enemy troops and 
constantly hunted by the Gestapo, with utter disregard for 
her safety and continually at the risk of capture, torture and 
death, she directed the Resistance Forces with 
extraordinary success in acts of sabotage and guerrilla 
warfare against enemy troops, installations and 
communications. Miss Hall displayed rare courage, 
perseverance and ingenuity; her efforts contributed 
materially to the successful operations of the Resistance 
Forces in support of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the 
liberation of France.82 
  
Although the SOE did not set Europe ablaze, Hall herself achieved the other 
dictum laid out by Winston Churchill and “co-ordinated action, by way of 
subversion and sabotage, against enemy overseas.”83 In a sense Hall 
becomes the Invisible Theatre performer bar none. 
 The final three mandates of Virginia Hall are all addressed in the 
previous analysis. Firstly, she submitted regular reports both publicly and 
coded through her journalism as well as through radio relays. Secondly, she 
successfully organized a Resistance network that would fight the Germans by 
any means possible. And while the ring was eventually infiltrated once she 
had left France, during her time as the central agent in the network she 
recruited a significant number of resistance fighters to the Allied cause while 
also facilitating sabotage and the rescue of downed fighters and personnel. 
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Thirdly, and finally, Virginia Hall’s significant success was primarily because 
she was able to remain undetected and, to quote Pearson again “live a lie for 
months on end.”84 Hall effectively engaged in performances of camouflage 
and identity artistry, through a technique of blurring the real and unreal—
similar to how Boal’s Invisible Theatre performers navigated the supermarket 
in Liege. The initial and governing question posed at the beginning of this 
section asked whether Virginia Hall’s work was successful or not. By 
assessing the outcomes of her directives, as per Taylor’s suggestion, we can 
conclude that indeed she was a very successful agent of espionage. But, 
there is more to consider of Hall’s work.  
Not only is the success of her outcomes a measure of her aptitude as 
an espionage agent, but it is also a sign of success in Applied Theatre. This, 
as the logic dictates, also suggests that Hall was also the expert performer of 
deception, or a paramount “identity-artist” in the terms laid out by Schneider. 
The success of Hall and other colleagues helped facilitate an intervention in 
both occupied Europe and the world at large, and the concept of intervention 
is a critical aspect of Applied Theatre practice. The intervention of Hall is in 
moments of rescue, sabotage, and the subversive undermining of the Axis 
forces. Considered from another perspective, Hall’s successful intervention 
falls squarely within the mandate of Boal’s Invisible Theatre. Hall and her 
colleagues were undertaking their work in direct opposition to fascist control 
and in the spirit of democratizing ideals. The very fact that agents like Hall 
                                                





would never publically acknowledge their double identity is also directly in line 
with a central tenant of Invisible Theatre. Indeed, the unaware public that 
were constantly around Hall while she was undercover could arguably be 
thought of as the ‘spect-actors’ that Boal describes. Hall’s work even fits with 
Boal’s assertion that at its core Invisible Theatre must have a scripted 
direction that modifies depending on the circumstances of the performance. 
This, it might be suggested, is central to espionage. There is a distinct plan of 
action that is modified depending on the situation the agents find themselves 
in, whether that be shifting political situations, or disruptions in intelligence 
gathering plans.  
 The other area required for the evaluation of Applied Theatre, which 
espionage also succeeds in, is the aspect of Praxis. In the case of Hall the 
three elements of people, passion, and platform would arguably be the agents 
and the public, the goal of undermining the fascist/axis agenda, and the 
platform of the public sphere, such as the streets, the shops, and the 
government buildings. Espionage easily fulfills the criteria of Applied Theatre 
Praxis and Hall is invariably a paramount example of an Applied Theatre 
practitioner. 
With these points established, it is important to conclude this chapter 
by addressing one remaining issue. While Hall herself was a superb 
espionage agent, one of the best by many accounts, her activities were not 
without flaw or opposition. The Resistance ring established by Hall was 





effort even while Virginia Hall was still operating in Lyon. The efforts of 
opposing forces—the Nazi Germany and Vichy France officials—are equally 
as subversive. Hall’s network was infiltrated by an enemy agent; a clergyman 
born Robert Alesh who used the pseudonym Abbé Ackuin. It was through 
Alesh’s earlier history of aiding a resistance network in his former parish that 
he was able to become a double agent when he moved to Paris to take up a 
position in the then occupied city. 
Alesh was required to achieve many of the same outcomes as Hall. He 
needed to appear as though he was merely a Catholic priest and not an agent 
of Germany and Vichy France, that he was supportive of resistance efforts, 
and that he held no allegiance to the German government. However, his 
mandate provided by the Nazi Government was to expose Resistance 
members. He would be acting a role that was untrue to him and likewise living 
a lie for months on end. He was driven by a mandate and supported by a 
state. Alesh, it might be suggested, mirrors the role of James O’Keefe in our 
comparison of Virginia Hall to Augusto Boal. Alesh employs the deceptive 
techniques of Hall, and by extension Boal, to disguise, camouflage, and 
enable his own mandated subversion. His work as an identity artist is reliant 
on methods that blur the boundary between art and real life, and his 
subsequent success proves the perpetuating reality that befalls those who 
undertake dubious practices to achieve a noble, or in this case a sanctioned, 
goal. Like the Liege police, who use the same methods of identity 





and arrest Boal, O’Keefe and Alesh appropriate the strategy too. It again 
returns us to the concern of whether the ends justify the means, particularly if 
such deceptive practices are normalized and enable the unethical techniques 
they employ. 
 This use of Applied Theatre practice is a critical aspect of espionage 
work and speaks to a point from earlier in the chapter; that applied theatre 
work is in many regards value-neutral and is not inclined towards 
benevolence, altruism or humanitarianism. It is those who wield espionage as 
Applied Theatre tool who dictate to what ends it will be used. This is also 
echoed by Prentki and Preston who wrote that “it might be tempting to 
assume that applied theatre is, per se, a left-wing or socialist methodology. 
This would be a false assumption: applied theatre is no more or less at the 
service of a particular ideology than any other kind of theatre.”85 This too is 
the reality for espionage. The case studies and examples employed in the 
chapter speak directly towards this point. Throughout history many instances 
of espionage could be positioned as well-intentioned undertakings, but it is 
ultimately an issue of subjectivity—who is invested in what outcome. Neither 
Applied Theatre nor espionage has a built-in positive intention. It is at the 
discretion of those utilizing it to make it so. Moreover, we are forced to 
consider the ethical issue raised in the very first part of the chapter, whether 
                                                






duplicitous and deceptive activities can ever be truly impactful in a positive 
manner. Do the ends ever justify the means? 
 
The Wielding of Theatre and Espionage 
When espionage is considered as theatre and performance practice, 
we may be coming to a closer understanding of why Plato banished the poets 
from his republic. To paraphrase Plato, theatre can be used for both 
instances of good and bad. Espionage possess these qualities as well. In 
many respects espionage has no master, it is a tool and it exists outside of 
the dichotomy of good and evil. Each of these professions have been vilified 
throughout history, though admittedly not in the same capacity. With theatre, 
it is the didactic quality that arguably has made it a threat in various cultures, 
that it can be used to teach and spread immoral or unethical thought. 
Espionage on the other hand is a generator of suspicion and used to 
undermine societal structures. Yet when we factor in artistic practices such as 
Invisible Theatre we see these distinctions collapsed. Another shared aspect 
between theatre and espionage is that both disciplines share a strange allure. 
Some individuals view both professions as possessing a nobleness, which we 
might speculate protects them from being dismissed outright. Though only in 
some instances. Perhaps it is merely a problem with marketing and both 
disciplines require a rebranding. Or perhaps what is closer to the truth is that 






By investigating espionage as Applied Theatre practice, we are 
provided with new insights into the process, motivations, and outcomes of the 
work. Firstly, that espionage and its successful execution is reliant on 
deceptive and duplicitous practices that are artistic in nature. Secondly, that 
espionage presents a unique blurring of the real and imagined. Thirdly, that 
espionage and theatre are value-neutral undertakings which can be morphed 
and manipulated by those facilitating them. And fourthly, that espionage is a 
unique instance of Applied Theatre practice and that certain forms of Applied 
Theatre, namely Invisible Theatre, might also be framed as instances of 
espionage.  
In many regards this chapter is meant t9o progress the understanding 
of espionage beyond the political, military, and government connotation that it 
typically possesses. Espionage is at its core an artful practice, much like how 
Schneider describes the work of people who conduct undercover operations. 
As other scholars have alluded to, by its very nature espionage taps into the 
performance process existing in a space between ritual and theatre; the real 
and unreal; the public and the private; the good and the bad; the powerful and 
the weak; the necessary and un-necessary; and the successful and failed. 
We have always known that espionage is an ancient practice, and by 
understanding that it is a form of theatre we are able to trace the idea of 
performance even further in the written record. However, we are still left with 
the following questions: how is espionage facilitated? How does it exist in the 





in a state of failure? Each of these inquiries will be answered in the 













































Chapter 2 - Cultural Camouflage: Acting Identities in World 
War II Espionage 
 
“Never come out of character. By this we mean not only from the 
clothes point of view but from the mental side also.” 
 
- Anonymous, SOE Training Manual: Beaulieu. 
 
Intermixing Theatre and the Clandestine 
The world of espionage, whether political, business, or military-oriented 
is a complicated, secretive entity, which requires intelligence and skill to allow 
an operative the chance of a successful endeavor. Nowhere is this more 
critical than within military or police clandestine operations, where failure can 
bring the consequence of torture, disappearance, and even death. What is 
intriguing, though, is that among all professions in the world, 
acting/performing is, in many respects, one of the most relatable to espionage 
work, even though failure in this profession may only be torturous rather than 
life-threatening. Easily linked by the requirement for both operatives and 
performers to assume new and factitious identities, this connection between 
disciplines is relatively uncharted territory within theatre and performance 
studies barring a few related explorations. Borrowing from theories within 
sociology, history, and performance studies, and utilizing concepts such as 
mimetic realism and camouflage as a performance practice, this chapter is an 
attempt to begin the exploration and questioning of this intersection of 





together in what is perhaps one of the more curious applications of theatre 
and performance.  
Before attempting to further intermix the disciplines of theatre and 
clandestine undertakings it is important to review the definition of ‘espionage’ 
established in the first chapter. As noted, the modern understanding of 
espionage has become synonymous with the term ‘intelligence’, and Loch K. 
Johnson suggests that a broadly accepted definition for the term would be 
“the prelude to [Presidential] decision and action.”86 Johnson’s description of 
intelligence is likely to accepted by many scholars, and he continues on to 
explain that “at a more narrow or tactical level, intelligence refers to events 
and conditions on specific battlefields or theatres of war, what military 
commanders refer to as ‘situational awareness.’”87 In further defining 
espionage Michael Andregg’s explanation of the ‘operator’ might also be 
invoked as the more relevant description of espionage agents being 
examined in this chapter.88 Building on these perspectives it was concluded 
that espionage is in possession of six qualities, which are as follows: 1. It is 
concerned with intelligence gathering and infiltration. 2. It is meant to be 
undetectable. 3. It is highly controlled. 4. It can be facilitated by anyone. 5. It 
is not only a wartime practice. 6. It is a tool used to perpetuate dominance 
                                                
86 Loch K. Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 1. 
 
87 Johnson, 1.  
 
88 Michael Andregg, "Intelligence Ethics: Laying a Foundation for the 
Second Oldest Profession," in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Loch K. 





and advantage. Bearing this definition in mind, we will again turn to the events 
of World War II to set the staging ground for this theatre of war. 
 
Setting the Stage 
During the Second World War the British together with their associated 
allies established the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Within this 
establishment western espionage arguably began its industrial revolution. The 
effort appeared simple: produce agents through a regimented system for 
deployment abroad during conflict. Agents were given a variety of tasks which 
ranged from sabotage, collecting intelligence, aiding other operatives, and 
carrying out secretive and lethal missions. Specific to at least one training 
base, known as a finishing school, was the production of cover stories and 
false identities. Existing records state that in at least one of these finishing 
schools an actor was brought in to guide agents in the practice of camouflage 
as well as in the creation and performance of cover identities. What might be 
termed as cultural camouflage, and what this project defines as the assuming 
and enacting of a strategically created and culturally aware personal 
identity.89 Accompanying this instruction by professionals was a set of 
manuals that would identify specific cultural and societal characteristics and 
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challenges, as well as providing basic training skills that agents might have to 
employ, and were likely engage with and require during their fieldwork. 
For the sake of providing a framework to engage with the intersection 
of espionage and theatre, the nature of ‘culture’ within the context of conflict—
occupied Europe in the 1940’s in this case—and fundamentally, the nature of 
‘culture’ in the context of espionage and the theatrical manifestations of it, 
must be established. In his 1961 publication The Long Revolution Raymond 
Williams identified culture in three strands:  
… first, the ‘ideal’, in which culture is a state or process 
of human perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal 
value. The analysis of culture, if such a definition is accepted 
is essentially the discovery and description, in lives and 
works, of those values which can be seen to compose a 
timeless order, or to have permanent reference to the 
universal human condition. Then, second there is the 
‘documentary’, in which culture is the body of intellectual and 
imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human thought 
and experience are variously recorded… Finally, third, there 
is the ‘social’ definition of culture, in which culture is a 
description of a particular way of life, which expresses 
certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but 
also in institutions and ordinary behavior. The analysis of 
culture, from such a definition, is the clarification of the 
meanings and values implicit and explicit in a particular way 
of life, a particular culture. Such analysis will include the 
historical criticism always referred to, in which intellectual 
and imaginative works are analyzed in relation to particular 
traditions and societies, but will also include analysis of 
elements in the way of life that to followers of the other 
definitions are not ‘culture’ at all: the organization of 
production, the structure of the family, the structure of 
institutions which express or govern social relationships, the 
characteristic forms through which members of the society 
communicate.90 
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It should of course be noted that Williams further explains that the concept of 
culture is not finite, and that there is no true ‘ideal’ definition of culture, which 
individuals can work from — the notion of culture is in flux, constantly 
changing. For the sake of clarity and efficiency these differing aspects are 
considered as ‘the culture of the time’ a period of societal and political 
hypersensitivity and suspicion which operatives must have considered and 
constantly engaged with during their training and missions over the course of 
the Second World War.  
The challenges around the issue of culture are identified by scholars in 
other areas of research as well, for example policing, where similar concerns 
are at play. Within the context of surveillance and law enforcement Nikos 
Passas and Richard Groskin sum up this critical issue of cultural differences 
within surveillance in foreign locations: “Differences in language, customs... 
make single agency, aggressive investigations difficult to mount and sustain 
in foreign…environments.”91 As evidence to this, within one of the training 
manuals of the Beaulieu section of the Special Operations Executive, an 
agent training base which was located in Hampshire in the UK, there is a 
section titled Life of Agent in the Field. In this manual the author writes that, 
“[an agent] must at once familiarize himself with new customs and slang 
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which have arisen…He must particularly avoid English habits, e.g. eating with 
fork alone, leaving knife and fork on plate when finished, eating soup with 
side instead of point of spoon, tipping soup plate forward instead of backward, 
carrying handkerchief in sleeve, etc.”92 These issues are not exclusive to 
clandestine affairs either. Nadine Holdsworth echoes these same aspects in 
her monograph Theatre and Nation, stating that, "throughout history people 
have constructed group formations to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them,’”93 and 
although this is being considered in relation to theatrical institutions it provides 
support to the assertion that Passas and Groskin make, along with the 
observations by the anonymous author of the training manual, which assists 
in initiating the bridging between theatre and military espionage. This well-
investigated notion of ‘difference’ in the context of culture is the critical 
departure point which this chapter seeks to utilize.  
 
Training Methods 
After the establishment of the Special Operations Executive, this 
department in turn began the task of creating training camps to prepare 
agents for subversive work. The archival documentation indicates that there 
were four steps to the training process before arriving in occupied territory. 
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Each of these stages was affiliated with a school, and these schools were 
given the designation of STS (an acronym for Special Training School) and 
were separated by the three stages of subversive training: Preliminary 
School, Paramilitary School and finally Finishing School, the fourth stage was 
a final briefing location— typically London—where agents would receive their 
last orders before being sent into the field. 
Unfortunately, much information surrounding the training programs, 
missions, and results, whether successful or not, is unavailable—an issue 
that is broached in the discussion of archives the third chapter of this project. 
However, as identified by historian Denis Rigden in How To Be A Spy: The 
World War II SOE Training Manual—an edited volume almost entirely 
composed of numerous SOE training manuals gleaned from the National 
Archives, Kew, in London—substantial information on STS103, often referred 
to as ‘Camp X’ and located near present day Whitby, Canada, is available. 
Rigden has incorporated many of these facts, as well as the information 
retrieved from the British National Archives in London into his edition. The 
composition of ‘Camp X’ was unique among overseas training facilities in that 
it provided both preparatory and specialist training regiments which mirrored 
the work that was done within the United Kingdom in multiple locations, while 
at the same time offering a whole program within one specialized facility. 
Each of these schools had specified directives guiding their work. 
Rigden, in his introduction to the book, provides the following synopsis to 





Schools the student’s character and potential for dangerous clandestine work 
were assessed without revealing to them much about what SOE did… [the] 
syllabus covered physical training, weapons handling, unarmed combat, 
elementary demolitions, map reading, field craft, and basic signaling… the 
sort of training that any army recruit might expect to receive.”94 Paramilitary 
schools were a more intensive specialized version of this training, focusing on 
“physical training, silent killing, weapons handling, demolition, map reading 
and compass work, field craft, elementary Morse, and raid tactics.”95 Finally, 
finishing schools were, perhaps, the most important in the process of 
becoming an undercover agent. Having passed basic assessments within 
each of the previous stages potential students were informed about the 
realities of the SOE and what their training was truly preparing them for within 
the context of war. It is in these finishing school’s locations where students 
would begin their focused ‘theatrical’ training. 
The Schools themselves were separated into five departments 
identified with letters ‘A’ through ‘E’ and departments A and B are the most 
relevant to this chapter. ‘A’ was dedicated to the instruction of agent 
technique which included procedures for clandestine life, personal security, 
clandestine organization, communications, as well as the creation and 
maintenance of cover or how to act while under surveillance, and how to 
handle the interrogation process. Department ‘B’ focused on conducting 
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exercises and role playing, which assisted agents in practicing the techniques 
learned in Department A, such as discreet meetings, communication, 
interrogation, etc. Departments ‘C’ to ‘E’ were more specific to the 
understanding of enemy forces, the execution of propaganda, and the use of 
codes and ciphers amongst other areas.  
As Rigden notes, the SOE required many specialists in various training 
areas. When possible agents returning from missions would provide 
information to keep records up to date since experience in the field was 
valued above all else. However, as mentioned before, it is known that at least 
for the instruction of disguises and the execution of cover stories the SOE did 
in fact employ at least one actor to guide instruction – Peter Folis. As Bernie 
Ross identifies in his article for the BBC; “His mantra was, 'When thinking 
disguises don't think false beards, instead make small changes to your 
appearance; wear glasses; part your hair differently; take a different gait.’”96 
Here Folis, an actor, was instructing the trainees in the techniques needed to 
validate a personal performance, and in the art of camouflaging oneself in 
public. 
Following this, what should be considered more in depth are the 
prevailing ideas of camouflage and concealment that are central to this 
examination and the relationship of camouflage to theatrical technique. In her 
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book Performing Ground: Space, Camouflage, and the Art of Blending In 
Laura Levin explores the concept of camouflage as a performance practice. 
Tying together historical notions of mimesis, art, and camouflage she 
provides a background from which to depart. It is her explanation of the 
intertwining of mimesis and camouflage that has most greatly contributed to 
this chapter. Levin writes: “I am drawing my understanding of mimesis from 
philosophers like Caillois […] Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno, who 
treat mimesis as ‘the way an organism adapts itself to its environment.”97 This 
quote from Levin helps tie together the importance of understanding the ways 
in which Folis and his contemporaries instructed agents to adapt to their 
environment or changes of circumstance, and how it relates to theatre and 
performance. 
The manuals were explicit in their belief of how agents should 
conceptualize camouflaging oneself. In the SOE training manual—the section 
of the syllabus concerned with disguises and that Folis likely dealt with—the 
instructors address alterations of physical identity, camouflage and 
concealment and began with the following in their explanation:  
Definition of Disguise. 
 
a) It does not mean covering your face with grease paint and 
hair. 
b) It must have at its basis the art of being and living 
mentally as well as physically in this new role. The important 
thing to remember is to be the person you are portraying 
mentally first and then afterwards physically. Therefore – 
EXTERNAL IMITATING BY ITSELF IS NOT SUFFICIENT. 
By this we mean imitating the external part of a character 
                                                





only i.e. the walk, the voice, the manners and individual 
abilities etc. of the character. External imitation without 
proper mental preparation must mean you speak and do 
things mechanically without fully realizing who you are, 
where you come from, why, what you want, where you are 
going, what you are supposed to be and do when you get 
there, etc. You will therefore be nothing but an external 
caricature and easily caught out.98 
 
The relationship between espionage preparation and actor training can 
already be seen here; instructors were evidently utilizing simple theatre 
terminology within their preparation of students through manuals, requesting 
the agent to go beyond a superficial cloaking of themselves and ‘live’ and ‘be’ 
their identity. Further to this point, within the portion of the training manual 
entitled Points to Be Considered in Your Disguise the very first ‘Golden Rule’ 
as identified by the authors is the statement “Never come out of character. By 
this we mean not only from the clothes point of view but from the mental side 
also, E.g. if you are a workman do not wear a white collar and black tie, have 
clean hands and behave like an educated man.”99 Herein lies another 
connection to world of theatre and performance. The invocation of the term 
‘character’ places these initiatives squarely within the realm of theatre and the 
act of being an identity that is different from one’s own.   
Often the writers of the manuals invoke narratives to emphasize points. 
Of the many anecdotes that are provided in the training manuals to reinforce 
the theories being taught, one of the more well-known followed a lesson that 
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stressed an understanding of cultural and societal differences and changes, 
and was regarding an operative who had recently landed in France. 
Undercover, the agent entered a café and requested a café noir (black coffee) 
as his drink. Through improper preparation and awareness, the agent 
revealed his foreign identity. Milk was being rationed and locals assumed that 
all coffee would be served without milk and only ever requested ‘coffee’.100 It 
is a detailed analysis of the ever-changing culture that agents must have 
conducted in order to be an effective asset in the war effort. Not only did this 
apply to agents who were citizens of unoccupied countries such as the 
British, Canadians, or Americans, but also recent immigrants in unoccupied 
Allied territories, first generation citizens or individuals seeking shelter during 
the conflict such as Dutch, Polish or French citizens. Many individuals chose 
to risk their safety as operatives within their home territories which they had 
left, and the issue of cultural camouflage was just as critical for them as it was 
for an agent who would be imitating a foreign language, culture, and identity.  
Williams’ third notion of culture encompasses a broad range of ‘cultural 
aspects’ from art to everyday events to a particular way of life. If this concept 
is considered in the context of World War II, particularly occupied territories 
within Europe, then the culture of suspicion and scrutiny, a large part of the 
day-to-day existence of these besieged societies, must be a part of this 
definition. This idea then extends to the requirement of a natural citizen of 
                                                
 





occupied nations operating as an agent for the SOE to ‘act’ as though they 
are not a part of clandestine operations. The training supplied by the Allied 
forces was not only appropriate to foreigners of the target nations, but those 
who volunteered to return to their home-nation as agents. 
Unfortunately, little seems to be known about the background of Folis 
and therefore about the details of his theatrical experience. Yet, it is known 
that Folis was heavily involved in the instructional process, and even his 
statements concerning disguises and concealment alone (not to mention 
many others within the archival documents along with their obvious 
appropriation of theatrical terminology) serve to strengthen the inherent 
relationship between the training of espionage agents and theatre 
practitioners. To understand which techniques Folis may have brought to his 
instructional methods it is important to now shift for a moment and delve into 




The period between the First and Second World War was a radical 
time of cultural evolution. As Maggie Gale explains in her publication British 
Theatre Between the Wars, 1918-1939, “The social and economic shifts 
which followed in the wake of the First World War are perceived as having 
greatly affected British society but not necessarily British theatre. Interwar 





reflect the cultural upheavals which surrounded it.”101 What Gale further 
explains is that this perceived conservatism is a short-sighted assessment of 
inter-war theatre in United Kingdom, which, in fact, experienced significant 
upheaval and included new developments in acting technique. More 
importantly Gale points out that the changes that are witnessed in Great 
Britain at this time were intrinsically tied to the flux in social, political and 
artistic endeavors. One way the better ways to understand how the British-led 
espionage efforts were conceived is to focus on the development of acting 
theories that were most prevalent in the United Kingdom in and around the 
Second World War. The goal is that with this short overview, evidence and 
insights will emerge to help identify which acting techniques may have been 
used to train espionage agents in their creation of a new identity for covert 
work. 
 Both actors and instructors (in some instances these are the same 
people) were critical to the developments that took place. What is worth 
noting is that during this period of significant upheaval, the United Kingdom 
experienced an incredible influx of international practitioners arriving in the 
country to, not only present their work, but hone their skills and instruct others 
in their art-forms. Within the overview the we will conduct shortly, brief 
descriptions of some of the pedagogical practices that were being employed 
during this time-period will be provided. Along with the theories behind the 
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instruction this chapter will also look at the format through which they were 
communicated, since both theory and practice are critical to clarifying these 
issues.  
 It must be acknowledged that there is an underlying bias towards the 
early 20th century in the United Kingdom. As stated, this section of the chapter 
is directed towards establishing a brief overview of actor training techniques 
during the inter-war period, but this line of inquiry is entirely dedicated 
towards a western style of acting. Where it is possible, attempts have been 
made to gesture towards other practice that may have influenced these 
‘western-centric’ techniques. While the research to date indicates that the 
actor training employed by the Allied forces originates in the United Kingdom, 
it is entirely possible that this is not the case.  
The period of social and political turbulence following the First World 
War lead to the entrance of new practices into the theatrical market. It is at 
this point that the arrival of some of the more notable practitioners and 
instructors of realistic and naturalistic forms of acting can be identified. 
Indeed, there are many practitioners who could be considered for this paper, 
however, focus will be placed on the following four: Konstantin Stanislavsky, 
Michael Chekhov, Michel Saint-Denis and Joan Littlewood. These 
practitioners have been selected due to their interest in establishing 
instructional systems or processes for achieving a believable and engaging 







Methods and Systems 
Konstantin Stanislavsky—From Stories to Manuals 
Of the four practitioners mentioned Konstantin Stanislavsky may be the 
most well-known. In the anthology Actor Training Sharon Marie Carnicke 
sums up what is perhaps the most famous aspect of this man, that he was 
“the first practitioner in the twentieth century to articulate systemic actor 
training.”102 Stanislavsky’s name is also no stranger in the world of theatre 
publishing, his work is a pivotal moment in the history of acting. Publications 
exploring his work range from the actor training guidebook written and 
published by Stanislavsky himself, entitled An Actor Prepares and first 
published in English in 1936, to countless publications on his work and those 
he has influenced, such as Stanislavsky In Focus also written by Carnicke 
and compiled from personal notes, letters and texts.103 104  
Jean Benedetti, the late Professor and Director of Rose Bruford 
College, dedicated much of his career to documenting the work of 
Stanislavsky and produced an exhaustive selection of works focusing on this 
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legend of theatre such as: Stanislavski; Stanisklavski: An Introduction; and 
Stanislavski and The Actor.105 106 107 These comprehensive investigations into 
the theories Stanislavsky himself developed provide evidence of the influence 
that this practitioner and pedagogue’s ideas have had in the world of both 
theatre and actor training. What Benedetti repeatedly asserts is that 
Stanislavsky’s work is so pronounced that it often forms the central reference 
point during the analysis of other theatre practitioners. Indeed, in his 
publication Art of the Actor Benedetti does exactly this, not only devoting an 
entire chapter to Stanislavsky’s work, but also using him as the reference 
point for his explanation of other practitioners.108  
Yet, what is perhaps most curious about the work of Stanislavsky and 
his connection to the United Kingdom is that the man himself only briefly 
visited Britain a handful of times, but still has had an enormous influence on 
the training of future actors. Further to that, there is a significant portion of 
work of the practitioner-instructor that has been ignored. As Carnicke writes in 
the introduction to her essay in Actor Training; “Our common knowledge 
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generally associates the Stanislavsky System with the twentieth century’s 
infatuation with psychological realism on stage. However, a closer look at the 
full trajectory of his life and work offers much of value. […] For example, his 
long-overlooked interest in Yoga dovetails with current curricula in many 
acting schools, and his holistic view of psychology anticipates ground-
breaking discoveries in cognitive science which impact on acting.”109 This 
perspective echoes the position put forward by Clive Barker: that to 
understand the context of a time-period it is utterly important to understand 
the events preceding it.110 This is imperative in both the effort to understand 
the crossover not only between espionage and theatre, but also between 
iterations of theatre and actor training systems from outside of the Great 
Britain and their influence on countries who composed the Allied Forces of 
WWII. What Carnicke’s research shows is that styles, techniques, and 
approaches were borrowed from across the world to enhance and refine 
acting practices, and Allied espionage agents did this as well. While the 
Second World War was arguably the industrialization of espionage, the First 
World War was in many ways the great learning period of clandestine affairs. 
Moreover, if espionage does indeed borrow readily from theater it was also 
inheriting a system that was willing to explore other methods of approach. 
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This could help explain the seemingly disjointed nature of the training 
manuals that were produced by the SOE, which at points seem to lay out 
contradicting approaches to agent-training. 
Stanislavsky’s instructional technique is by many accounts what brought 
him notoriety. An Actor Prepares employs a unique mode of teaching the 
reader how to employ the strongest methods for training as an actor. 
Carnicke explains; “Stanislavsky’s effort to ‘systemize his art in writing was far 
from easy. Acting, like riding a bicycle, is easier to do than to explain. No 
wonder acting is more effectively taught in classrooms than through 
textbooks. In order to surmount this difficulty, Stanislavsky chose to write his 
manuals as if they were ‘the System in a novel.’”111 As it is identified by 
Carnicke, the mode of disseminating the technique was to produce a piece of 
written text which could be read by anyone. She explains that “He thus 
creates a fictional classroom to portray, rather than explain, the process of 
acting. He introduces characters who struggle to act well, and their teacher 
who struggles to help them. Stanislavsky puts his characters into changing 
contexts which continually challenge their ideas about what it meant to act.”112 
This Socratic technique is partially the reason for the significance of 
Stanislavsky’s far-reaching influence. In addition to that, this particular 
approach to actor training and its well-known success established a standard 
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which all other forms of actor instruction would be compared against, as we 
saw with Benedetti’s work. 
The impact Stanislavsky has had on actor training systems should not 
be ignored or underestimated. Nor can the similarities between the method of 
‘manual-writing’ that both Stanislavsky and the instructors of agent-training 
employed. Not only do these two approaches rely on anecdotal 
communications to drive home the important points, but both employ a 
technique of narrative through publication to instruct others. While the 
narrative used by Stanislavsky was the central focus of his work, the SOE 
employed narrative in its instruction sporadically throughout the manuals. 
Though there are certainly similarities, it should also be noted that there are 
distinct differences. For example, unlike Stanislavsky’s approach the agent 
training methods did not employ a Socratic method in their efforts to further 
central arguments and theories. Likewise, the system of instruction argues 
against improvisation when undertaking field-work whereas Stanislavsky did 
not. What should be understood is that while significant cross-over exists 
between the work of Stanislavsky and those preparing clandestine agents in 
the Second World War, certain divisions exist as well.  
 
Michael Chekhov—Acting as Another 
Unlike Stanislavski, Michael Chekhov was at one point a resident of the 
United Kingdom. As the nephew of the famous author and playwright Anton 





original training lineage is firmly rooted in his experience with Konstantin 
Stanislavsky during his time at the Moscow Art Theatre. His move to the 
United Kingdom was in part due to the rise of Stalin’s power in 1928 (although 
this could have also been due to the collapse of his career in Russia, not 
unrelated to alcoholism). While Chekhov was a supporter of some of 
Stanislavsky’s practices, his admiration ran only so deep. As Benedetti 
explains to his reader in The Art of the Actor; “He did, however, harbor certain 
reservations about Stanislavsky’s methods, in particular that every action 
should be ‘true’ and performed as in life.”113 What Benedetti alludes to is the 
draw of naturalism that kept hold of Chekhov alongside the increasingly 
prominent realism. Likewise, it is a sign of his interest in training methods that 
were not focused on replicating real-life, but instead tapped into actions and 
ideas that were beyond the scope of ‘naturalistic’ acting, such as the ideas of 
‘floating’ and ‘flying’ in physical rehearsal processes. 
After a successful re-birth of his career, a tour of the United States, and 
well-received productions in the United Kingdom, Michael Chekhov was 
invited to join an experimental arts community at Dartington Hall in Devon in 
1936 where he might be able to put into practice his theories on actor training 
while working with students. His divergence from Stanislavsky, while not 
drastic, was substantial enough. In his chapter on Michael Chekhov “Michael 
Chekhov On the Technique of Acting” in Actor Training Franc Chamberlain 
expands on this pointing out that “Chekhov comes out most strongly against 
                                                





Stanislavsky’s use of personal experience and emotion, arguing that this, in 
effect, binds the actor to the habits of the everyday self, which was not the 
way to liberate the actor’s creativity.”114 For Chekhov there was significant 
importance in the creative process informing the establishment of character. 
Another difference that Chamberlain identifies is that “Chekhov argued that 
the emphasis should be on the character’s feelings, not the actor’s […] and 
that this would enable the actor to transform into the character, rather than 
reducing the character to the personality of the actor.”115 Such an 
understanding is insightful for an investigation into instructional techniques in 
acting alongside those for espionage training. This divergence from 
Stanislavsky is an assertion that the character and the performer are not one 
and the same – somewhat of an inversion of the technique Stanislavsky 
advocated for. This position could be seen as a sign of the influential 
developments that psychology was having on actor training as it was being 
devised. A third area where Chekhov diverged from Stanislavsky was him 
embracing of improvisation techniques. While Stanislavsky strongly argued 
against engaging with improvisational training, Chekhov embraced it.  
 Regarding the creation of a system of actor training, Chekhov 
developed approaches that leaned into the exploration of the imagination. 
While his publication To the Actor was written in 1942 (though not published 
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until 1953 in part due to the war) it is well-known that Chekhov had developed 
roughly eighty-seven exercises in the lead up to his original manuscript, which 
was republished in 1991 under the title On the Technique of Acting.116 117 
Chamberlain provide a brief overview of some of the more central ideas and 
exercises, these include topics around “imagination and concentration,” 
“atmosphere,” and “[t]he psychological gesture.”118 Each of these areas was 
meant to address a core issue of actor training through a comprehensive 
explanation and exercises to put theory into practice. 
 Among the most relevant to the exploration of espionage training 
atmosphere and the psychological gesture might be included. As 
Chamberlain further elaborates, “an atmosphere can be considered as the 
dominant tone or mood of, amongst other things, a place a relationship, or an 
artwork. An old ruined castle, for example, has a different atmosphere from a 
busy casualty department, and each atmosphere will have a different effect 
on individual in contact with them.”119 This might easily be extended to the 
idea of cultural context which is hinted at within the training manuals. Indeed, 
it is evocative of the issues that Passas and Groskin acknowledge and can be 
applied further to the cultural context of suspicion during wartime existence. 
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The notion of the psychological gesture also echoes aspects of the training 
manuals developed by the SOE: “The psychological gesture (PG) is a mean 
of expressing the entire character in a condensed form through an intuitive 
grasp of the character’s man desire.”120 There is seemingly little difference 
between what a character might desire in contrast the actor, versus what an 
agent might desire versus their factitious character. Even the terminology 
evoking the idea of ‘acting objectives’ (admittedly shared with Stanislavsky) 
would indicate crossover. Parallels can also be identified in Chekhov’s 
appreciation and encouragement of physical training beyond the everyday 
rituals and routines of the ‘lived reality’, which often define Stanislavsky’s 
work. 
 Clearly though, espionage-training—as much as the evidence points 
outs—does not centralize the idea of imagination. Nor do many of the training 
techniques entirely translate to clandestine affairs. For instance, Chekhov’s 
rumination on the ideas of “Preparation” and “Sustaining” seem to have very 
little cross over with espionage efforts.121 Likewise, the idea of “Composition” 
and “Rhythm” are less likely to find support in clandestine efforts. However, 
like Stanislavsky, the system developed by Michael Chekhov should be 
considered as a possible area from which training techniques could have 
been appropriated. 
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Michel Saint-Denis—French Connection/United Kingdom   
Michel Saint-Denis is the third practitioner, as well as the third ex-patriot, 
featured in this short analysis. Jane Baldwin’s introduction to her book Michel 
Saint-Denis and the Shaping of the Modern Actor paints the picture of an 
influential, larger than life instructor whose theories and techniques have 
proven to be far-reaching and timeless. “At the height of his career, the 
director, teacher, and theatrical reformer Michel Saint-Denis was a leader in 
the field whose work was respected, admired, and closely followed. […] The 
five major theatre schools he founded profoundly affected and improved 
theatre practice, particularly acting.”122 His association with the establishment 
of the London Theatre School, The Old Vic, École surpérieure d’art 
dramatique, The National Theatre School of Canada, and the Julliard Drama 
program, only reinforce this position. However, as Baldwin explains to her 
reader, “[h]e remains a pervasive influence, but an unrecognized one, his 
achievements scarcely remembered except by his few remaining colleagues, 
former students, and scholars of twentieth-century British theatre.”123 His 
pursuit of a technique and mode of instruction to train an actor in a holistic 
model provided students with the opportunity to experiment with various 
forms of performance as a way of developing a well-rounded acting 
technique. 
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His career began while studying under his uncle, the famed theatre 
director and instructor, Jacques Copeau at his celebrated art theatre the 
Vieux-Colombier in Paris. As Baldwin illuminates for us in the edited volume 
Actor Training; “These years with Copeau were critical for Saint-Denis’ artistic 
development. His uncle imbued Saint-Denis with an ideal of theatre, taught 
him the craft of theatre by example, and shared with him his ideas, goals, 
doubts, and the results of his explorations.”124 Such access to an influential 
practitioner/pedagogue quite likely had an impact on Saint-Denis and his 
eventual transition to instructing actors. Moreover, Copeau’s own open-
minded theorizations on actor pedagogy seems to have affected Saint-Denis 
significantly and informed his holistic approach. 
After leaving Copeau’s institution Saint-Denis performed professionally 
before aiding in establishing ‘Copias’, a troupe of performers trained by 
Copeau and based in Burgundy. While Copeau was initially involved in this 
group, his early exit allowed Saint-Denis to fill the void of 
instructor/performer/director in his absence. It is here where scholars assert 
that he began to diverge from his uncle’s way of thinking. Over the next five 
years Michel Saint-Denis toured extensively throughout Europe until the 
disbanding of the Copias in 1929. Upon returning to Pairs Saint-Denis helped 
establish the Compagnie des Quinze, which he directed and toured with over 
the course of another five years. Though the company was unable to draw 
                                                
 





large crowds to their performances in continental Europe, the United Kingdom 
proved different. It was an invitation by Tyrone Guthrie to instruct at a theatre 
school in London that brought Saint-Denis to the United Kingdom in 1935, 
where he would remain for much of his career.  
Saint-Denis was interested in establishing a holistic style of performance 
training. His program encouraged students to explore “gymnastics, 
movement, music, mime, mask work, mask modelling, and improvisation… 
They trained both autonomously and collaboratively. An actor might conceive 
a character and develop it privately before bringing it to the group for 
suggestions and criticism. At other times, a performer or performers 
generated an idea for a group improvisation that all researched and 
rehearsed… This close collaboration resulted in a strong ensemble.”125 While 
an appreciation for the importance of physical training, particularly in respect 
to developing an acting pedagogy, certainly aligned the work of Saint-Denis 
with Chekhov, the distinguishing quality of Saint-Denis’ instructional style is 
that it is not prescriptive to one particular manner of executing work. Herein 
would be another linkage with the training methods of the SOE. The 
instructional tactics provided to Allied espionage agents was a constantly 
evolving process, as new information was gathered it would be incorporated 
into the syllabus. 
While Michel Saint-Denis never produced an instructional manual/guide 
to actor training before the advent of the Second World War, his techniques 
                                                





had been in development long before his publication of Theatre: The 
Rediscovery of Style in 1960. In this publication, Saint-Denis traces through 
his process of instruction and draws on his work at The Old Vic that in turn 
was modelled after his pedagogical practices at The London Theatre School, 
which pre-dates World War 2. He explains that his manner of instruction 
required an initial assessment period of students followed by the introduction 
of the training regime; “the training itself could be divided into three main parts 
– cultural, technical, and a central section which was concerned with 
improvisation and interpretation.”126 Here the potential crossover with SOE 
training methods can be identified. With Saint-Denis, the concern with cultural 
instruction was focused on, among other areas, the “wearing of costumes, 
handling of period properties (for example, swords, fans, snuff boxes), 
movement and dance related to the manners of the period, (for example, 
curtseys, bows, etc.); and music.” 127 This is very similar to the cultural 
awareness and training tactics that would be used by the SOE. Likewise, the 
technical know-how of bodily control and use of instruments was a central 
concern for Saint–Denis and his instructional faculty. Courses on Movement, 
Language, and Improvisation could likewise prove a rich ground for the SOE 
to appropriate techniques of instruction. Indeed, even the initial assessment 
period at the beginning of the tenure is evocative of the training conducted at 
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the Preliminary Training Schools. So too is the decentralized nature of 
instruction. Yet, as is the case with Stanislavsky and Chekhov, it is hard to 
identify Saint-Denis as the exact individual whose system was used to model 
agent-training methods. What an analysis of Satin-Denis provides is a 
broader understanding of the holistic and evolving nature of actor training that 
was beginning to flourish around this time. 
 
Joan Littlewood and Collective Instruction 
A self-described ‘vulgar woman of the people’ Littlewood was born into 
poverty in Southeast London in October of 1914. Having been accepted to 
the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, she was apparently dissatisfied with the 
instruction she was receiving and abruptly quit before completion. Upon 
moving to Manchester she began to work in the repertory system of the 
theatre in United Kingdom. Over the course of her career she journeyed 
between socially engaged theatre groups until establishing a company known 
as ‘The Theatre Workshop’. While the establishment of this company falls 
outside of the scope of this paper, since its inception was not until 1945, the 
development of Littlewood’s career in the lead up to establishing this group 
falls within the studied timeline. More importantly, the development of her 
career through the 1930’s was central to her establishing the mode through 
with she trained performers, and it was in the inter-war period where she 
began to experiment with training techniques, some of which were 





While Littlewood’s influence is understated, but not ignored, she differs 
from the other practitioner/pedagogues by the fact that she never articulated a 
system of actor training, nor did she ever propose to be in search of one. As 
Clive Barker writes, “[t]he unfortunate result of Littlewood’s reluctance to set 
down her working methods and their theoretical backing has been that she 
has been accused of being a dilettante who somehow managed to hit the 
right button on some occasions – which is a long way from the truth.”128 Such 
suggestion seems to stem from both Littlewoods reputation of being a 
communist sympathizer (for which she was banned from the BBC for a 
period) as well as her abrasive and ‘low-class’ demeanor. 
Unlike the previous three practitioner/pedagogues, it is a little more 
difficult to piece together the style or technique Littlewood sought to establish. 
Barker echoes this perspective and points out that “[t]he evidence for 
Littlewood’s theory lies in snippets of statements in interviews and manifestos 
and in the memories and anecdotes of the actors who have worked with her; 
although these documents, which include this chapter, have to be questioned 
carefully, and seen as both idiosyncratic and subjective.”129 Such evidence is 
difficult to find. Not only did Littlewood and her associates evade establishing 
a formula for actor training, their political involvement, pacifist views, and 
concern for social well-being manifested itself in a series of ‘theatre 
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movements’ which they established through manifestos and then quickly 
moved on from. 
What is known is that upon moving to Manchester in the 1930’s. 
Littlewood began to collaborate with Ewan MacColl, an agitprop theatre 
practitioner in Salford. Being an industrial center, trade unions were well 
represented in the audiences for who MacColl and his colleagues performed. 
Their movement titled Theatre of Action sought to engaged with the working 
class audience. They performed scenes and sketches related to the industrial 
work so many of the spectators labored in. Howard Goorney’s The Theatre 
Workshop Story is an insightful guide to anyone interested in the work of Joan 
Littlewood.  In his in first chapter ‘1929-1936 The Grassroots’ he quotes the 
Manifesto of the Theatre of Action, which stats that “[t]he theatre, if it is to live, 
must of necessity reflect the spirit of the age. This spirit is found in the social 
conflicts which dominate world history today.”130 What is apparent in 
Goorney’s publication is the central concern the group had with reaching a 
wider audience through their work in the 1930’s. Such interests pushed their 
performance into the realm of realism and naturalism to increase 
communication and spectatorship, which is arguably the manner of actor 
training that the SOE would be most interested in. By 1936, and with 
Littlewood leading the effort, the Theatre of Action had transformed into the 
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Theatre Union—a more politically engage organization that at its core 
advocated an egalitarianism; a significant aspect of her instructional style. 
 Much like Saint-Denis, Littlewood was not particularly interested in 
establishing a singular form of instruction or actor training. The source 
material used by both she and her colleagues was global and came from the 
United Kingdom, continental Europe, North America, and Asia. As Barker 
notes, “they took in the concepts of the ensemble, as the creative instrument 
of making theatre, and the concept of the research theatre company. 
Companies such as those led by Copeau, Stanislavsky and Meyerhold 
consistently researched the history of theatre practice from whatever sources 
were obtainable and through practical recreations and experimentation.”131 
The interest Littlewood possessed regarding performer accessibility was 
consistent with her interest in social access. It also centered on her belief that 
performer training required a variety of approaches. 
 More intriguing still is the manner through which such information was 
disseminated amongst group members. “Each actor was allocated a period or 
style, being expected to produce papers and lectures, to communicate his or 
her understanding to the others. All this apart from the personal research of 
Littlewood and MacColl.”132 Such methods are a distinct departure from 
previous pedagogues. While each of the preceding practitioners in was 
interested in instructing others, none were seemingly as interested in taking 
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instruction. Here lies the major distinction of Joan Littlewood from 
Stanislavsky, Chekhov, or Saint-Denis: an open-minded humility that enabled 
her instruction to continuously evolve. No artist’s technique was off-limits, 
Stanislavsky, Chekhov, and Saint-Denis were all investigated and instructed. 
While there are certainly similarities between the work of Littlewood 
and the SOE, there are also many signs that her work was unlikely to have 
had significant impact on the Allied efforts. For example, the fact that 
Littlewood’s approach to actor training wasn’t formally cemented until 1945 
would indicate that her techniques were not broadly known in the lead up to 
the war. Likewise, her connection to communist activists would likely have 
raised suspicions with the top brass of the SOE. Yet while doubts do exist, 
Littlewood should not be completely disregarded. As noted earlier, 
Littlewood’s work in the years leading up to WWII was already beginning to 
have impact in theatre circles and it is entirely plausible that some of her 
methods were adopted by individuals like Peter Folis. The greatest crossover 
between Littlewood’s work and the efforts of the SOE seem to be the broad 
approach to work, and the ability to incorporate other training and cultural 
perspectives. Rosalie Williams evidences this in her reflection on her time 
with Littlewood: “I was interested in movement, having studied dance as a 
child, and on my first day, Joan introduced me to Laban’s theories of 
movement, something I’d never heard of.”133 The similarities being training 
programs also exist in the adaptability of the curriculum put forward by both 
                                                





Littlewood and the SOE. On a final note, knowledge Littlewood’s impact is 
increasing and points to her influence being much more pronounced than 
previously thought. This alone warrants future investigation. 
 
Conservatism Revisited 
 In working through just four of the practitioners of this time-period it 
would be safe to say that there are easily identified similarities between acting 
pedagogy of the 1930’s and the agent-training methods of the Allied Forces. It 
also suggests that Gale’s assessment of British theatre during the inter-war 
period is accurate; and while it has “traditionally been seen as conservative 
and as somehow failing to reflect the cultural upheavals which surrounded it,” 
this is certainly not the case.134 Even if this assessment were deemed to be 
true in its regard to the dramatic literature of the time, the development of 
acting techniques between the First and Second World War were dynamic 
and revolutionary. The landscape of British theatre at the time aids in the 
development of actor training methods and the possibility of cross-pollination 
with the efforts of the SOE. With the passing of the First World War British 
society was desperate for a new form of theatre. Due to the influx of people 
entering the country, the theatre scene was ripe for the development of new 
styles of performance and performer training. And with these open borders 
came influences from abroad.  From Konstantin Stanislavsky to Joan 
                                                
 





Littlewood, the pedagogical practices for communicating such techniques 
have had a long-lasting influence in the world of theatre. Yet these brief 
overviews of actor-training methods do not serve this chapter fully. It is critical 
to consider the theatre of the time more broadly, and to simultaneously 
conduct a more in-depth side-by-side analysis of an actor-training technique 
and the SOE agent-training technique to illustrate these points further. 
 
The Theatre of the Time 
Throughout the reading, training, and seminars delivered by the SOE, 
authors and lecturers provided constant reminders about the necessity of 
preparing a character/cover story in the most in-depth manner possible, as 
the earlier quotation regarding disguises demonstrated. In a particular portion 
of one training manual the author presents an anecdote on the failure to 
remain ‘living mentally and physically as the character entirely’. The author 
writes:  
The assumed name must be learnt thoroughly and be 
so ingrained that the Agent responds automatically to it and 
NOT to his real name. He must also sedulously practice his 
factitious signature. A most experienced Agent in France, 
arriving late and very tired at an hotel, filled in the usual 
arrival form at the Bureau and went straight to bed. Just 
before going to sleep he suddenly became aware that, 
although he had printed his assumed name in block capitals 
at the head of the form, he had inadvertently signed his real 
signature at the foot. As he had the foresight to ascertain at 
what time the Police collected the registrations in the 
morning, he was able to get away before they arrived.”135  
 
                                                





Such evidence corroborates the requirement that living as authentically as 
possible was clearly essential in the work being undertaken by operatives. 
Certainly, an understanding of the tenets of realism was of primary 
significance both for espionage instructors and their agent trainees. It meshed 
with the notion of mimesis as part of the working definition of camouflage. 
The idea of mimesis critically aligns the efforts of artistic work with 
other disciplines. Cited in the first chapter of this project, Potolsky’s Mimesis 
provides a condensed and informative view on the subject and as he clearly 
establishes within his introduction “Mimesis describes the relationship 
between artistic images and reality: art is a copy of the real.”136 In this 
undercover case, the ‘image’ can be understood as the attempted character, 
which the agent establishes, along with the identity they assume. Operatives 
would invent a version of the ‘real’ to perform for the society they intended to 
infiltrate including the political establishment in power. Levin in Performing 
Ground makes a similar allusion equating camouflage to scenic practices. 
She asserts that, “[it draws] together the complex strands of this developing 
interdisciplinary conversation, [and] makes an argument for reading 
camouflage as a performance strategy, as a theoretical frame for analysing 
contemporary performance practices and the performance of self in everyday 
life.”137 Following this, camouflage considered as performance practice is 
                                                
 
136 Potolsky, Mimesis, 1. 
 





easily tied to work like espionage and aids in blurring the distinctions between 
art and life.  
With theatricality as an inherent aspect of camouflage, the context of 
mimesis within theatre traditions is even more important. If we recall from the 
first chapter, Potolsky writes the following about mimesis as it applies to 
theatre: “Theatrical metaphors […] figure mimesis as a representation for 
someone, and not only, a representation of something else. They highlight 
what theorists have called the ‘performative’ quality of mimesis, its explicit 
address to or dependence upon an audience.”138 Thus it seems that the 
production of performance in everyday life, of a realistic character by an 
agent, and intended for viewing by the infiltrated society, the audience, is 
fulfilling exactly these requirements. The urgency of maintaining a quality 
‘performance’ by an agent was governed by the hyper-suspicious attitudes of 
the political office in power, and subsequently the public at large. In this 
context, Levin and Potolsky’s writings offer us a useful framework and 
reinforce the distinction that imitation is not the same as replication.  
The Special Operations Executive archival evidence strengthens this 
position and, as quoted earlier, states that mere imitation was an 
unacceptable method to utilize; only through living and being the ‘character’ 
could one truly be an effective agent and convince others of one’s (false) 
intentions. Potolsky links these ideas of mimesis and performance to acts 
                                                
 





within everyday life, and cites the influential work of Erving Goffman. 
“Goffman argues that all social interactions are akin to performances, based 
on a fundamental division between actor and audience, and between a self 
that potentially knows it is acting and the character it plays. The aim of these 
performances is to engender ‘the impression of reality’, to persuade an 
audience that the act is sincere. No less than for stage acting, the aim of 
social acting is mimesis. Failure to play a role, or playing it poorly, will come 
across as a breach of decorum.”139 While agents were not playing 
‘themselves’ in a subconscious manner, as in the case of Goffman’s 
research, they were straddling a barrier in which they must appear to be 
totally natural, while being fully conscious of the significance of their actions at 
all times. To do otherwise would have been catastrophic for an agent.  
Knowing that the SOE were working towards a systematic training of 
operatives, who would live as the characters they created, and that 
preparations for agents were taking place within the late 1930s suggests an 
historical commonality with the writing of any number of the earlier mentioned 
practitioners, as well as others who were not identified in the brief overview. 
Following this, it is worth speculating that the origins of the training 
approaches utilized by the SOE could have been found in aspects of any 
number of writings provided by practitioners/pedagogues. To push forward 
the argument about such similarities and crossover, the work of Konstantin 
Stanislavsky will be used. Yet, before touching on some of the commonalities 
                                                





between the SOE agent training methods and Stanislavsky’s actor training 
theories, it should be noted again that at present there is little evidence to 
support that Stanislavsky’s system was the direct model which the SOE 
utilized in their training methods. With the understanding that Stanislavsky’s 
famed publication An Actor Prepares had been translated and published in 
London by 1938 it is conceivable that Peter Folis and his contemporaries 
could have been introduced to this work preceding WWII and employed 
Stanislavsky’s techniques in their instruction. But at present this must remain 
speculative.140 
Stanislavsky, as is well known, sought to establish a process through 
which he could instruct and prepare actors for their roles onstage. Although 
moving on to explore other areas of artistic expression and investigation, it 
was this ‘process’ so sought after for which he became most well-known. In 
her essay “Stanislavsky’s System” Carnicke sums up the primary 
philosophical positions of Stanislavsky.  Those which demonstrate a close 
relationship to agent training include the following: the Psychophysical, "the 
belief that mind and body represent a psychophysical continuum.”141 As 
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Stanislavsky asserted; “In every physical action there is something 
psychological, and in the psychological, something physical.”142 Immediacy 
of Performance, “However well-rehearsed, Stanislavskian actors remain 
essentially dynamic and improvisatory during ‘performance ’” and yet the 
performer must “…[exist] fully within the immediate moment […]He describes 
this state as […] when the actor is seized by the role. The Russian word 
carries many different nuances amongst them ‘to experience’[…] ‘to live 
through.’”143 144 Communication, “For Stanislavsky, there can be no ‘drama’ 
without interaction… Words are one vehicle for such interaction… but hidden 
beneath words is subtext… Actors communicate subtext through non-verbal 
means (body language, the cast of eyes, intonations and pauses).”145 The 
Method of Physical Actions, “In this method, the actor discovers and then 
performs the logical sequence of physical actions necessary to carry out the 
inner, purposeful actions of the scene.”146 Included in this is “The score of 
physical actions, [which] includes many external moves and strategies that 
the actor needs to carry out the overarching purposeful action (events of the 
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scene).”147 And finally, Active Analysis, “In active analysis, actors grasp a 
play’s anatomy before memorising lines. To do so, they read a play as if it 
were a system of clues that imply potential performance… Stanislavsky calls 
these clues the facts to which actors accommodate performance.”148 
These aspects of the far larger and more complex method that 
Stanislavsky proposed are each replicated in some capacity by the 
instructional manual of ‘Section A’ within the SOE finishing school. What can 
already be identified, even during a cursory reading of archival documents, is 
how these concepts would fall into the process of training an agent for the 
creation and execution of a character. However, the question remains, what 
particulars existed within the training manuals and their relationship to the 
sections of Stanislavsky training referred to above?  
 
Manuals of Instruction 
In the process of instructing an operative on the manner of creating an 
identity the SOE provided a fairly formulaic approach as an excerpt from the 
instruction manual provided by the SOE to agents suggests: “Your cover is 
the life which you outwardly lead in order to conceal the real purpose of your 
presence and the explanation which you give of your past and present. It is 
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best considered under the heads: Past, Link between Past and Present, 
Present, and ‘Alibis’ [sic].”149 
‘Past’ was divided into the categories of: a) Identity, b) History, c) 
Documents d) Clothes and Effects, e) Change of Appearance, and f) Final 
Search.150 The subsection of Identity was split into sections each of which 
had their advantages and disadvantages identified for the agent. The three 
choices of approach to establishing an identity were: i) Your Own ii) That of a 
Real Person, Distant or Dead, iii) Wholly Fictitious.151 The manual from 
Beaulieu Camp further explains these ideas within the description of ‘General 
Cover’; “An agent can adopt one of three identities… The probabilities are 
that it will be the latter, despite the danger of carrying Identity papers which, 
however perfect in form, are not recorded at their alleged place of origin… 
This danger can sometimes be averted by choosing a place of origin where 
the archives are known to have been destroyed.”152 
The second subsection of ‘Past’ was History and this emphasized the 
need for realism and strategy in the establishment of the character by the 
agent; “Whatever your identity, your story must be plausible and not indicate 
any connection with subversive activity.”153 The manual further suggests that 
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any of the three approaches to identity should be based on personal history 
and facts as much as possible. 
‘Documents’ can easily be equated with ‘Props’ from the stage and as 
a category “documents” was the third subsection of ‘Past’. These items 
reaffirmed the previous two aspects of identity for any investigating force. The 
manual recognizes that for each of the previous identity categories (Own, 
Real Person, Fictitious), documents would provide certain obstacles and 
benefits, such as accurately forging an identity card for a totally fictitious 
individual.154 
Clothes and Effects, much like the aforementioned ‘documents’, 
emphasized the need to utilize only appropriate clothing for the role being 
enacted, and should support the history of the character in question.155 
Similar to the way a member of the creative team of a theatrical production 
would work to establish appropriate attire or costume for a performer, so 
would the operative. And if circumstance allowed it, their supervisory officer 
would also work to make choices to support their new persona. The 
subsection heading, Change of Appearance raised the issue of ‘looking the 
part’, while differentiating this from Clothes and Effects by emphasizing the 
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need to keep supporting features consistent, such as rough hands for an 
individual posing as a workman.156 
Lastly, Final Search identified the necessity of maintaining the façade 
of a character whenever circumstances change, such as the event of 
changing one’s cover story or concealing recent covert activity.157 This is 
reminiscent of Stanislavsky’s belief, mentioned earlier, that even in living as a 
character, the performer will constantly be required to be able to improvise 
within the guise of their identity, but adjusting to the circumstances in which 
they might find themselves. 
Under the secondary aspect of establishing a cover story ‘Past to 
Present’ was condensed into a fairly self-explanatory area of instruction. This 
was the act of tracing a believable line from the cover story/character ‘Past’ to 
‘Present’.158 This included the research required to have knowledge about a 
particular region, possess items from other locations used within backstory, 
and “build up your present cover background by innocent and inconspicuous 
actions to which reference can be made later… make innocent 
acquaintances, etc.”159 
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The ‘Present’ was defined as “the life which you lead and the ‘story’ 
which you will tell about that life to account for your presence.”160 Operatives 
were not always provided with assistance in preparing such a cover story, for 
instance, when evading detection after having their cover blown and revealed 
to be an agent. In these moments, the clandestine performers were required 
to manufacture another identity through their own initiative. What was 
fundamental to all agents was that “[their] ostensible present must be 
consistent with [their] alleged past.”161 
 The ’Present’ was divided into three sections to consider a) 
Maintenance of Cover further separated into: i) Name described as “Signing 
correctly and responding immediately,”; ii) Consistency which was clarified 
as “Your personality and general conduct must fit your cover story […] 
Documents, clothing possessions, etc. must be suitable. Manners tastes, 
bearing, accent, education and knowledge must accord with your ostensible 
personality,” a reemphasis of the realism that this work required); and iii) 
Concealment: “Avoid foreign words, tunes, manners, etc. Avoid slang which 
has developed among your countrymen in Britain. Avoid showing knowledge 
or expressing views acquired in Britain. Conform with all new conditions 
which have arisen, observe new customs and acquire the language which 
have developed in your country.”162  The SOE provided another useful and 
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demonstrative anecdote to re-emphasize these rigid orders of concealment in 
the following: “An agent landed in an occupied country made himself 
undesirably conspicuous through asking a farmer, carrying milk to the 
neighboring town, on the first morning of his arrival, for a drink, in a locality in 
which the disposal of milk had recently been absolutely prohibited except 
through a licensed dairy to the holder of a ration card.”163 The last two 
aspects of ‘Present’ were b) Cover Occupation where again it was 
emphasized that consistencies must be taken into consideration when 
choosing an occupation; and c) Conclusion – a warning to the operative on 
just how complex creating an effective cover story and character were. 
The final area of instruction regarding the creation of a cover story was 
the process for manufacturing an Alibi. Creating a successful Alibi was crucial 
to the maintenance of a cover story/character. Although this process was 
dependent on the circumstances that the agents found themselves within, the 
SOE provided a strategy for guiding the process. This consisted of two 
aspects, the nature and construction of the Alibi. Nature was explained as 
follows: “In addition to your cover background, you must have an explanation 
ready for every subversive act, however small e.g. conversation, journey, etc. 
Such alibis are more important than your background cover, if they are good 
no further enquiries will be made.”164 The Construction of the Alibi was 
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itself divided into eight aspects: Plausibility, Detail, Self-Consistency, Cover 
Background, Truth (emphasizing that this area should be as close to truth as 
possible) Dead End (projecting a sense of finality), Consistency with Other, 
and Discreditable Story.165 What should be emerging is that the relationships 
between these briefly introduced elements of the instruction manual and 
theatrical training of Stanislavsky, ,and more importantly the quest for realism 
in clandestine work, are immensely suggestive of SOE operations having 
theatrical roots.  
The following are just a few instances where there is considerable 
crossover between the methods being instructed by the Special Operations 
Executive and the approach which Stanislavsky sought to establish. 
Psychophysical, as was introduced earlier in the chapter, was present within 
the first stages of instruction at the Preliminary Schools in that students were 
assessed for their psychological and physical states. Secondly, through 
observation students would be gauged on their ability to work within the field. 
Thirdly, in the paramilitary schools students were trained in hand-to-hand 
combat and routinely put through the rigors of physical interaction, altercation 
and retaliation—all governed by yet more psychological assessment. 
Fourthly, within Section B of the Finishing schools, operatives were exposed 
to mocked up circumstances intended to assess their mental reaction and 
application of training to staged interrogation, compromising circumstances, 
                                                
 





and routine stops by police and military. Regarding Immediacy of 
Performance, the SOE stressed that students must prepare in advance for 
changing scenarios depending on which clandestine work they were engaged 
with, on whether their cover was blown and when they had to create a new 
identity for themselves. Communication is seen in the emphasis on the 
plausibility of the event, and the effective communication required to achieve 
and maintain the façade. We can view the addressing of Physical Actions in 
the identification of agents needing to eradicate their natural movements and 
actions and re-articulate themselves with the actions and movements of the 
new identity. Lastly, Active Analysis was present in the active event of 
identifying, dissecting, constructing and acting of identities, and covert tasks. 
 As noted repeatedly, Stanislavsky is not the only acting pedagogue 
whose work can be related to techniques used by the SOE. It could be 
argued there is more in common with Michael Chekhov’s ideas working well 
with his assertions that an actor should not be portraying how ‘they’ would 
react to dramatic events, but how the character would experience the 
world.166 Furthermore, the emphasis that Chekhov places on ‘atmosphere’ of 
situation and location, as a consideration any performer should make, relates 
well to both Williams earlier explanation of culture, and the SOE declaration 
that agents must familiarize themselves with the cultural state of the occupied 
territory they will be infiltrating.167 Certainly Chekhov’s presence in the United 
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Kingdom at Dartington Hall, beginning in 1936, along with his already well-
established international presence makes a case to consider his work as one 
of the possible foundations for agent training.168 
 Although British mainstream theatre had always been suspicious of 
foreign influences, and existing schools of actor training tended to preserve 
many of the verities of 19th century theatrical practices, by the 
commencement of World War Two British actors had become aware of new 
training methods available to them and audiences had been exposed to new 
artistic directions even in the production of works by Shakespeare. Michel St. 
Denis formed his London Theatre Studio in 1936 almost exactly at the same 
time as Michael Chekhov’s studio. He too was very familiar with the work of 
Stanislavsky. Nonetheless any direct connection between the work of these 
studios and SOE training methods must remain speculative. Indeed, such 
speculation might also investigate the possible input of Basil Dean who, after 
a theatrical career and as a film producer and a founder of Ealing Studios, 
had been appointed head of Entertainments National Service Association 
(ENSA) from 1939. He was fully conversant with the value of propaganda. 
This, however, calls for further investigation especially of the competing 
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systems of actor training and their relationship to the archival documentation 





Chapter 3 - The Archive: A Methodological Challenge 
 
“The spy obtaining intelligence occupies a position symmetrical 
to that of the archivist (or, increasingly, the artist) retrieving archived 
material.” 
 
- Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “Intel”   
 
Assessing the Archive 
My experience in the archives researching materials for this project 
was in many ways an average experience. However, this is not how I 
envisioned it unfolding. When I first entered the United Kingdom’s National 
Archives to begin my archival research on espionage I expected any number 
of events to take place. I thought I might be stopped, turned away, or possibly 
brought into a back room where I would be questioned before being led out of 
a hidden exit into a waiting government car and then taken off to some 
unknown room to be interrogated. This, I can assure you, did not happen. Yet 
even so, through the process of visiting and returning to the archives it slowly 
dawned on me that I was beginning to engage in a repeat, or perhaps better 
described as durational, performance. My techniques of research were 
transformed in the process of searching for materials that had been 
deliberately hidden or destroyed, and whose hiding and destruction had been 
officially sanctioned. I became aware of my inclination to disguise my 
investigation, to craft my inquiries so as not to arouse suspicion, to view 





opportunities of access to present themselves, and to cobble together shrewd 
methods for gaining access to materials. My research techniques became a 
performance that replicated the undercover practices I was searching for. It 
was scholastic inquiry transformed into clandestine undertaking. It was the 
romanticism of espionage infecting my academic search, and an assumption 
about the archive and the ability to gain access to it. It was the aura of 
espionage transferred to the archive.  
I will start this chapter off with three questions. What does it mean to 
go into an archive looking for something? How does one know when they 
have found something of relevance? And how does one know when they 
have encountered a roadblock? Regarding other areas of study, these 
questions have been broached by countless scholars whose work is perhaps 
far more reliant on the accessing of archives than my own research project—
or at least accessing ‘archives’ in a traditional sense of the word. Elizabeth 
Yale’s article “The History of Archives: The State of the Discipline” succinctly 
explains the history of archives and works through the speculated origins in 
agrarian societies requiring records for grain stores, and concludes with 
contemporary perspectives on archival practices. Her suggestion that “rulers 
accruing power through their control over resources invented the archive as a 
mechanism for consolidating and reinforcing that power”169 directly aligns 
archives with the identified goals of espionage. But more relevant to this 
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project is her suggestion that “the fracturing of archives in war and violence 
inserts them into the national histories—the stories a nation tells itself about 
who it is—in new ways.”170 Espionage employs violence. This was established 
in the first chapter and I would suggest is intuitive for most people. The 
theatrical techniques appropriated by espionage enable such violence. If 
espionage is viewed as a form of theatre, then we might view theatre to be 
violent as well. I am not writing about stage violence in a theatrical production, 
although that is clearly violence in its own right. What I am describing is the 
violence used to upend trust, ethics, and morals. This violence can be 
physical, insinuated, psychological, and even metaphorical. If we take what 
Yale says to be true, that violence and war insert themselves into the archive, 
we can suppose that espionage likely does as well. This makes Yale’s later 
statement all the more eerie. She writes that “though information masters […] 
might have wished them so, archives [are] not transparent windows onto the 
past.”171 In the way that espionage inserts itself into the narrative, so too are 
its techniques of obfuscation, opacity, deception, violence, misdirection, and 
more, inserted into the narratives communicated in the archive. They also find 
their way into the practices of archiving and accessing the archive.  
A central tenant in any archival research process is that materials 
cannot assumed to be truthful, that they are merely information. This is no 
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different for espionage materials. What is found in the espionage archive is 
only information. But information about what? In espionage and other 
intelligence practices information is typically referred to as ‘intel’. Where this 
intersects with Yale’s suggestion, that war and violence, and by extension 
espionage, are inserted into the archive, is how we frame the information or 
intel found in the archive and how we must go about accessing it. In his 
chapter “Intel” Geoffrey Winthrop-Young identifies that “the conditions under 
which we speak of information in terms of intel involve conflict, subterfuge, 
secrecy, betrayal, treason, and espionage.”172 We cannot divorce the intel 
collected from archives by scholars, journalist, and historians from its role in 
intelligence and espionage practices, and its associated violence and 
deception. As Winthrop-Young would identify, there is no neutrality in this 
information, even though we might wish there to be. Likening it to the 
neutrality of Switzerland, which is dependent on the storage of money and the 
production of arms for its political neutrality, “both of which inevitably find their 
way to wars abroad,”173 Winthrop-Young argues that so too does espionage 
intelligence and information, and by extension its archive, return us back to 
espionage techniques. He adds that  “as [intel] crosses boundaries of 
secrecy, enmity, and public accessibility, some formerly classified intel may 
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be converted into news while other portions end up as archival material.”174 
And this, as the quote at the beginning of the chapter indicates, aligns the spy 
with the role of an archivist, and perhaps even an artist.175 If we conclude that 
espionage and its spy-archivist-artists are governed by acts of subterfuge, 
deception, misdirection, and more, then we must also conclude that 
accessing the archive of espionage is also governed by such qualities.  
In my own experience of accessing the archive, I had no identifiable 
problems. I entered and exited like every other researcher. My presumption 
going into the archives, which I imagined is shared by those first looking at 
intelligence archives, was that if I were ‘on to something’ I would only know it 
when I ran into roadblocks. My belief was that a researcher of espionage 
does not know if they have found important information until other people start 
paying attention. The romanticism was again infiltrating my understanding of 
the archive and my investigation. I imagined that I might be intercepted at the 
entrance to the archives one day, or perhaps two people would appear beside 
me and ask me to come with them to some other part of the building. Less 
nefarious, I imagined I might receive an email issuing a cease and desist, or a 
statement from an anonymous government official who had determined that I 
was looking at classified materials and that I should discontinue my research. 
Like with my gaining access to the archives, this did not happen.  
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But does my ease of access indicate that there is transparency from 
governments when concerning intelligence materials? Not likely. As Hughes 
and Scott explain in their chapter “Knowledge is never too dear: Exploring 
intelligence archives,” beyond the usual limitations and challenges of archival 
research, intelligence archives pose a secondary problem to the researcher 
due to “the inherent secrecy of the activity of intelligence.”176 The issue is that 
at times intelligence agencies, recognizing their own reliance on archives and 
information, and indeed being an archive and archivists themselves, block 
access, deny that materials exist, retroactively reclassify materials, and even 
manipulate the archive that they made accessible to the public. These are the 
very techniques of espionage used against those who wish to learn more 
about the practices. They are repeated acts of violence committed against the 
public and its institutions. Compounding the issue is the problem addressed 
by Matthew Connelly in his subchapter “State Secrecy, Archival Negligence, 
and the End of History as We Know It”. In his text, Connelly illuminates the 
crises befalling the National Archives of the United States and their attempts 
to act as a repository for government materials, all while negotiating issues of 
transparency, material volume, and public indifference. As Connelly describes 
it, the issue is a “collapse in funding for declassification and the growth in the 
number of classified documents that require review [that] have had a 
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predictable impact on the amount of information released to the public.”177 
This degrading of oversight and financial support has a serious impact on 
public accessibility, which is an extension and indicator of democratic 
practices. More importantly for a study of espionage, this reality enables the 
duplicitous techniques of espionage that infiltrate the archive to flourish due to 
a lack of scrutiny and oversight. How then, some might ask, do these issues 
manifest? 
Let us first consider the issue of blocking information and the bizarre 
process of retroactive classification. As Jonathan Abel explains in his article 
“Do You Have to Keep Secrets? Retroactively Classified Documents, The 
First Amendment, And the Power to Make Secrets Out of The Public Record,” 
through retroactive classification the government of the United States can 
initially release “information in a non-classified form and only later decide to 
classify it.”178 In these instances the government opens a part of their archive 
to the public for access, only to intervene in the public archive later, and 
subsequently appropriate and transfer materials back into their classified and 
exclusive domain. The compounding absurdity of this is that in the digital age, 
this has been undertaken even when materials have been widely distributed 
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on the internet. Not only has this technique been used to stymie both 
journalists and scholars, but members of the United States Congress have 
also been affected by these practices—even when their role is ostensibly to 
conduct oversight of intelligence agencies.179 At certain points in recent 
history, files have literally been transferred to the National Archives, copied by 
researches, and then removed and returned to Intelligence archives, with 
researchers being informed that they are now in possession of confidential 
intel.180 In fact, Abel cites statistics that document the retroactive classification 
of 25,000 National Archives materials between 1996 and 2006.181 In this 
regard, researching the intelligence archive comes with the distinct possibility 
of locating relevant documents one day, and the next day being denied 
access. Or as the sleight-of-hand performance phrase goes, and as Abel 
quotes, “Now you see it. Now you don’t.”182 In this sense, some of my 
concerns about the archive seem to be founded, since the intelligence archive 
is liable to be a continuously disappearing and reappearing repository. I could 
one day enter the archive and my materials would no longer be provided to 
me for an indefinite period. 
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Even though I was provided with my materials each time I requested 
them at every archive I visited, and even though the materials I sought were 
never subjected to retroactive classification, I still encountered other 
roadblocks and small acts of violence unique to the intelligence archive. For 
example, I am still skeptical about the historical accuracy of the materials I 
have found. This suspicion is not unwarranted. As Hughes and Scott note, the 
historian Richard Aldrich has demonstrated “how a generation of British 
historians was manipulated to conceal crucial aspects of wartime British 
intelligence and provide a distorted and misleading portrayal of the Allied 
conduct of the Second World War.”183 To put this another way, the British 
Government and its intelligence agencies employed a theatrical technique of 
deception in manipulating the archive to rewrite history. This deliberate and 
strategic corruption of the intelligence archive instills suspicion into research 
and archival investigation. Is what I am seeing real? Or am I being 
manipulated here? 
Yet another issue of the intelligence archive is the blocking of access. 
While mechanisms of access such as Freedom of Information Acts certainly 
exist, there are also problems. For example, as Murphy and Lomas address 
in their article “Return to Neverland? Freedom of Information and the History 
of British Intelligence” the relatively new UK Freedom of Information Act, 
passed in the year 2000, allows researchers to “cast further light upon British 
                                                






intelligence and security history, despite the exemption of the agencies 
themselves from the provisions.”184 Yet even with the glimmers of information 
that are released, the process effectively constitutes the “equivalent of Oliver 
Twist, asking for more of the same; that is, more of the documents that will be 
processed-selected, reviewed, summarized — prior to their release,” and 
always in the hands of the authorities, as Murphy and Lomas acknowledge.185 
This situation is likely familiar to many intelligence scholars working in 
democratic nations. This discretion, left to intelligence institutions, is often 
abused. As Connelly notes, in the United States “the CIA is also notorious for 
blocking the release of documents by other departments and agencies, but it 
is not the only one. The Department of Energy, for instance, has broad 
powers to keep documents classified if they might contain information related 
to nuclear weapons. It requires page-by-page review, and it double-checks 
the work of other departments.”186 This also relates back to Connelly’s central 
point, that there is inadequate support for both declassifying, and challenging 
unnecessary classified status.  
Even when materials are shared due to freedom of information 
requests being granted, there is also the strong possibility that many 
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materials are redacted or ‘sanitized’ for security reasons. An excellent 
example of this is the fact that the documents concerning Kim Philby held by 
the FBI remain redacted. This even though Philby is long-dead and numerous 
books and films concerning his life and work have been produced, including a 
dubious autobiography written by Philby himself after he defected. A perfect 
example of the classified status issues identified by Abel, as well as the 
strange reality that befalls classification practices in the digital era, are found 
in a document detailing an exchange between W. A. Branigan and W.C. 
Sullivan in the Philby archive. Branigan, a specialist in Russian Intelligence, 
corresponds with Sullivan, the FBI director of domestic intelligence operations 
from 1961 to 1971, about the parallels of the Philby case and the narrative 
contained in the novel Shadow of a Spy (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Correspondence between W. A. Branigan and W. C. Sullivan.187 
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In the correspondence Branigan identifies the author of the novel as E. H. 
Cookridge. Yet the FBI have elected to blackout the authors true name, 
evidently deciding that this information needed to be protected. While this 
letter was written and redacted circa 1968, a quick internet search will show 
that E. H. Cookridge was the pseudonym for Edward Spiro. And this 
potentially remains classified information even today and its dissemination 
would possibly be illegal. 
This issue is not limited to official paper archives either. If we broaden 
our understanding of archives, which we often do in theatre and performance 
studies, we can include any location that hosts past materials of espionage 
practices. We might, for instance, include Bletchley Park as an archive that 
has been emptied of its contents to foil snooping historians, scholars, and 
members of the public. In returning to the questions raised at the beginning of 
this introduction, when we think about the espionage archive we can begin to 
assume that a lack of materials means that we are on to something. In a 
sense the roadblock is the indicator of success. What a study of espionage 
exemplifies within the archival research world is the following: if we know 
nothing about a subject then that is the direction we must head in. The 
challenge of the archives of espionage is that they are curated by state 








secrets, which in democratic nations are supposed to balance their secrecy 
with their obligations to the public.  
Consider the following example as a tying together of the issues raised 
in this introduction. In September of 2017 I convinced a friend to join me on a 
drive to visit the former SOE training base located outside of Toronto, 
Canada, known as Camp X during WWII and now named Intrepid Park. It was 
a bright sunny day as we made our way out of the city, driving along with the 
traffic until we came to Stephenson drive and exited the highway. Our search 
for the park was more challenging than we first thought it would be and the 
lack of signage was noticeable. After a few wrong turns and consulting maps 
on our cellphones we finally arrived. There was no designated parking 
available, so we decided to leave our vehicle in a vacant space outside of the 
rough looking office building that hosts the local trade union chapter for 
Unifor. We began our walk and made our way towards a sign upon which was 
a map, listing several parks in the area and a brief explanation of the location 
and its historical significance. The sign read “In 1941, a spy training camp 
was established on this site by Sir William Stephenson (1896-1989) ‘the Man 
Called Intrepid’, the Director of British Security Coordination. Many secret 
agents were trained at the camp for spy missions in Europe during the 
Second World War. Among those was Ian Fleming, author of the James Bond 
spy novels.” Clearly there is, or at least was, an interest in elevating the status 
and memory of this place while capitalizing on people’s knowledge of James 





difficulty in finding this place, the spotty signage, the inability to park, seemed 
intentional. It is as if an attempt has been made to prevent people from finding 
this location. The park itself and its associated history seemed almost erased, 
which is exactly what the Canadian Government attempted to accomplish 
when they destroyed the training camp in the late 1960’s. 
This park is a covert landscape and in turn a site of performance and a 
performance in and of itself. By definition, we may also view it as an archive, 
like we did with Bletchley Park. It is an archive of past methods for training 
espionage agents, and an archive of the destruction the Government of 
Canada consciously undertook to eliminate the site because it was involved in 
classified/secret training. Its existence has been obscured in the interest of 
national security. This destruction is a form of redaction and leaves a black 
mark across the historical landscape. It is what we may call landscape 
redaction, and what is true of the landscape is also true of the archive—it is 
full of gaps, things that did not make it in, and pieces ostensibly destroyed or 
hidden away. These are performances of destruction, obfuscation, and 
manipulation. They entrench control, which we might surmise is to keep 
secrets intact and keep those who wish to expose such secrets away or 
unable to access intel. But we can also read performance. We can 
understand that there is a message to be gleaned. These performances of 






In order to research materials for this project I was obligated to engage 
in an almost paradoxical process. A search for the things that would never be 
there to begin with. This is because the most informative materials of the 
espionage archive are the materials that have actively been eliminated from 
the archive or blocked from view. Moreover, the process of accessing the 
materials that do exist requires a navigation of the gate-keeping systems of 
both the archiving process and the counter-intelligence/counter-espionage 
systems that have infiltrated the archive. To conduct my research, I was 
required to have a mind-set that treated official claims with skepticism—a 
process that at times pushed the limits of accepted practice and would allow 
me to gather materials surreptitiously. I found myself questioning the motives 
of those researching beside me in the archive, deflecting questions at border 
crossings, and excavating the left-over sites of past physical archives. I 
looked for the information that was omitted, stared down the black lines 
looking to see the text underneath, and dwelled on the pages of historical 
training manuals that had large slashes of ink and lead drawn across them on 
the diagonal with the words “DESTROYED ON AUTH” with whatever 
authorizing code following, indicating their sanctioned destruction.188  
Although I may have imagined that my status at times was ‘persona non 
grata’ and that my questions or presence were met with suspicion, the very 
nature of the espionage archive employing espionage tactics legitimizes my 
perception. The changes in research technique began to extend to my digital 
                                                





investigations. My queries morphed, I began closing all other websites to 
conduct internet searches, and I would avoid work while transiting in public 
spaces. Often it felt as though I was an infiltrator of the archives in which I 
was working, a scholar rendered agent. The challenge of research on 
espionage is infiltrating and accessing the archive, an archive that has been 
erased, hidden, manipulated, closed, and redacted. An archive that demands 




Infiltration of an espionage service is an infiltration of the archive. All 
information that an intelligence organization uses is contained within 
repositories to help plan for clandestine activities. These archives are so 
valued, and deemed so important and exclusive, that whole sections of 
counter-intelligence branches are devoted to the prevention of access and 
detection of external threats. In simple terms, there are traditionally two 
manners of accessing archival information. The first is when an external 
threat accesses the archive from the outside in. The second, and perhaps the 
more difficult to prevent, is from the inside out, where someone who has 
authorized access to the archive begins to share the information externally. 
This individual is what is often referred to as a ‘mole’. A mole is an inherent 
threat to an intelligence service because they undermine the exclusive control 





also be viewed as a positive sign by intelligence work. This is because the 
presence of a mole indicates that the intelligence agency is in possession of 
desirable information. Nonetheless, the mole needs to be ferreted out and 
disposed of to protect the integrity of the archive. There may be no case of a 
molehunt more famous than the actions of James Jesus Angleton of the CIA. 
Following a series of defections and arrests on both sides of the Cold 
War in the 1960’s, the assertion was made by a deserter from the KGB, 
Anatoliy Golitsyn, that the CIA had a mole within it. The person charged with 
the task of identifying and removing the mole was Angleton. A former counter-
intelligence operative for the Italian theatre during the Second World War, 
Angleton rose through the ranks of the CIA until he was appointed as the 
head of counter-intelligence by Allen Dulles. As a part of his counter-
intelligence efforts, and in response to Golitsyn’s information, Angleton helped 
establish the Special Investigation Group (SIG) to weed out any infiltrators. In 
1964, the molehunt began through an initiative partly designed by Angleton 
and with supervision shared by the CIA and FBI. The fervor and paranoia that 
came out of this initiative and gripped Angleton has gone down in infamy. 
Such was Angleton’s desire to identify the mole that between 1964 and 1965 
the FBI “seemed to follow more suspect CIA officers in the United States than 
they were following KGB agents.”189 This obsession of Angleton serves as a 
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reminder of the sheer amount of resources that counter-intelligence branches 
of espionage agencies have at their disposal. It also demonstrates how 
protected the archive is by those who rely on its information to plan their 
activities. Of the forty senior CIA officers that were suspects, fourteen were 
“examined closely.”190 But the protection of the archive can come at a cost, as 
identified by the Angleton case-study. After nearly a decade searching for a 
mole Angleton was let go by then-director William Colby due in part to the 
implosion he was causing within the CIA.  
Careers had been destroyed, and no moles found. Angleton’s reliance 
on a single defector—Golitsyn—was viewed as naïve and conspiratorial, 
bordering on crack-pot by many. Divisions began to emerge within the CIA 
establishment, and problems became so apparent that Angleton himself was 
accused of being the mole because of the destruction that was taking place. 
As one chief of the SIS remarked to author Philip Knightley about the 
“Angleton sickness […] If one considers the dissension Golitsyn sowed in the 
CIA then one could theoretically conclude that he was the most effective 
agent the KGB even had.”191 What should be understood from this is that the 
archive and access to it has great implications for the functioning of 
espionage and counter-espionage practices. As does its protection. Perhaps 
most curious of all is that the legacy of protection by individuals like Angleton 
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persist even after they are gone and thus affects any sort of academic 
research. For scholarship on espionage to proceed, the archive must once 
again be accessed. Yet suspicion, paranoia, and resistance to access are all 
built into the bureaucracy that creates barriers for individuals studying 
intelligence work. In many regards, this casts the scholar as a kind of 
infiltrator attempting to get hold of information to disseminate, and likens the 
scholar to an espionage operative. To understand how the archive affects 
espionage more broadly the chapter will turn to one of the most infamous 
case-studies of espionage and counter-espionage, an instance of infiltration 
that allegedly influenced Angleton and set him down his long path—the case 
of Kim Philby. 
 
A Master Archival Manipulator 
In early 1963, the British intelligence officer Harold Adrian Russell 'Kim' 
Philby, an SIS agent working as a journalist in Beruit, disappeared. Whether 
he left aboard a ship via the Black Sea, or travelled through Syria to Armenia, 
is debated by historians. But what is known is that on July 1st of that year it 
was confirmed that Philby had defected to the Soviet Union and set in motion 
the final reveal of what is perhaps the most infamous case of espionage and 
mole-work in the 20th century.  A member of the Cambridge Five, Philby was 
the last of a group of British intelligence officers who were outed as Soviet 
operatives after being deeply imbedded in Western intelligence communities. 





autobiography that “there never was a spy like him, and now, with the cold 
war over, there never will be.”192 This is arguably even more true with the 
advent of the digital age. Spy work of the analog era has changed. However, 
Philby’s story and actions are still relevant to considerations of espionage as 
theatre and performance; particularly what an understanding of ‘The Archive’ 
brings to discussions on both theatre and performance, and espionage. 
Philby was born in 1912 in British India to Harry St John Bridger Philby 
and Dora Johnston. A graduate of Cambridge University, evidence suggests 
that he was recruited by the Soviet Union in approximately 1934. Throughout 
the Spanish Civil War, he acted as a journalist for The Times, a role he would 
play again immediately before his defection to the USSR. In 1940, he was 
recruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service or SIS (what then became 
MI6) and in three years had become the head of the anti-Soviet section, all 
while maintaining his ties to the Soviet intelligence services. As Knightly puts 
it; “so the man running British operations against the Russians was actually 
working for the Russians himself. No wonder so few British plans worked. No 
wonder so many Western agents who slipped behind the Iron Curtain were 
never heard of again.”193 Undoubtedly Philby was a master deceiver whose 
success lay in his ability to maneuver undetected. His employment of 
theatrical and performative processes enabled him to do so. 
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Philby’s rise through the ranks of the British intelligence services was 
itself an impressive feat of shrewd performance of allegiance and deception, 
but also due to an immense amount of privilege and class distinction that, 
even with his sympathies to communist ideology, provided him access to the 
intelligences services. Philby’s deception was also not limited to impacting 
British intelligence services exclusively. In the late 1940’s he was promoted to 
the position of liaison between the British SIS and Washington’s CIA, which 
provided him with access to countless Western ally documents and plans. 
“The result: at the height of the Cold War, every move the West made against 
the Communist bloc was betrayed by Philby before it even began.”194 It was 
here where Philby could execute some of his most duplicitous acts, both 
towards Western allies but also fellow Soviet agents.  
As it stands, historians are unsure as to how much information Philby 
and his fellow agents provided to the Soviet Union. What is clear is that “the 
only saving grace for the British is that the Cambridge spies were not fully 
exploited by Moscow Centre, simply because they appeared too good to be 
true. The Soviets were suspicious of the British secret services and wondered 
if Philby, Burgess, Maclean, and Blunt were actually SIS double agents intent 
on penetrating NKVD. None of the priceless intelligence they sent to Moscow 
was accepted at face value, unless confirmed by another source.”195 What 
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can be understood from this is that in so many ways suspicion is the great 
inhibitor of effective espionage work. The inability to discern who is who they 
say they are, is a critical problem. Moreover, when we are unsure of who 
someone is, or whose interests they represent, all information provided by 
these individuals is questioned.  
Philby’s downfall came with the FBI interception of encrypted Soviet 
messages between Moscow and New York. In an effort to protect comrades, 
Philby tipped off agents who would be found out through the decoding of the 
messages, allowing for Maclean and Burgess, follow Cambridge University 
graduates, to defect. However, while he warned some within his circle of 
espionage, he also allowed others to fall—this allegedly included Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg. While Philby was not outed entirely during the crackdown 
by the CIA and SIS, the defection of the British spies, particularly Burgess, 
cast a shadow over Philby and he never regained a position as prominent as 
before. The suspicion of Philby as a third agent was too great for him to be 
trusted again. In the late 1950’s, and again under the cover of being a 
reporter, he was sent to Lebanon to conduct work for the SIS. With the 
defection of various Soviet agents to Western nations over the next four years 
Philby’s cover was blown, and in 1963 he made the escape to Moscow.  
 
The Espionage Archive 
 It has been well-established that the creation of ‘the archive’ is an 





reproducing of the archive. Furthermore, each act of access, (re)creation, and 
articulation by an individual or group produces more material for the figurative 
and, in many instances, real archive. This very notion is the core concept put 
forward by Diana Taylor in The Archive and The Repertoire who identifies that 
“[p]erformances function as vital acts of transfer, transmitting social 
knowledge, memory, and a sense of identity through reiterated, or what 
Richard Schechner has called ‘twice-behaved behavior.’”196 Working through 
the fundamentals of performance and these acts of transfer, Taylor suggests 
that at its core performance—within the broadest sense of the term—is 
governed by the archive and the repertoire: “the archive of supposedly 
enduring materials (i.e., texts, documents, buildings, bones) and the so-called 
ephemeral repertoire of embodied practice/knowledge (i.e., spoken language, 
dance, sports, ritual).”197 The central point that Taylor puts forward is that the 
archive and the repertoire work in tandem fueling both new and re-executed 
performances—the repertoire informs the archive and the archive informs the 
repertoire. Archives might also inform archives as could repertoires inform 
repertoires. When taken outside of mainstream instances of theatre and 
performance studies, to, say, espionage, we can see that this dialectic quality 
of performance continues to exist. 
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 Bearing Taylor’s position in mind, we should simultaneously consider 
how Michael Andregg’s classification of intelligence workers within five areas-
-Collectors who gather information; Analysts who process information; 
Operators who “go places and do things” to get, and act on, information; 
Managers who organize the work; and Policy Makers who make decisions 
about intelligence work198—might be viewed as builders of the archive. 
Because at its core the idea of intelligence work is really the gathering of 
information. Furthermore, Andregg’s identification of intelligence roles can 
help us understand how, when considered through the lens established by 
Taylor, these individuals are performing a role and thus engaging with the 
archive and the repertoire. Of course, it would be short-sighted to suggest 
that each of these individuals engage exclusively with one area of work. It can 
be easily understood that there is a good potential for overlap in any of the 
endeavors. For instance, operators may need to act as collectors and 
analysts in their efforts, just as a manager might also fulfill the role of policy 
maker. In short, these performances do not exist in a vacuum and the mode 
in which these individuals engage with the archive and repertoire is worth 
exploring.  
Operators are the people most often thought of as spies. They are the 
Kim Philbys of the world who are going to places, doing things, and 
generating/acting upon information or intel. Their performance is primarily 
                                                






thought of as active intervention, but is also at times inactive or observational. 
As an example, and forgetting for a moment that Kim Philby was a double 
agent, Philby was sent to neutral Spain during the Second World War “on the 
basis of his knowledge of Franco’s Spain, an important battled ground in the 
intelligence war,” as Phillip Knightly documents in his biography on Philby.199 
In the previous decade Philby had served as a columnist (and intelligence 
operative of the Soviet Union) during the Spanish Civil War. His task of 
helping run the WWII counter-intelligence desk for the SIS, known then as 
‘Section 5’, fits well within the parameters of an Operator. He was there to 
help facilitate the doing of things. What historians are fairly certain of is that in 
the process of doing and performing the role of counter-intelligence operator 
Philby impacted the archive of the SIS and in turn the repertoire of both the 
SIS and its agents. In a sense, he would act as a gate-keeper making choices 
about how to act on archived intelligence gathered through clandestine 
efforts. The manner through which this was done was in a constant state of 
being established and re-established by the British Intelligence Offices, along 
with their allies. This would include when to act on intelligence obtained from 
sources within the German military operating throughout Spain, and when to 
sit back and collect more information. Most relevant to this chapter would be 
the choice to intervene or to wait. These are choices concerned with how the 
archive might be impacted and acted upon. Each action or lack of action 
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results in a series of events that add to the archive in a different capacity, 
which in turn affects the repertoire, and so on, and so forth. But to exclusively 
frame Philby as an Operator would be a limited understanding of his work, he 
also engaged with the roles of Collector and Analyst. 
 The Collectors and Analysts, as Andregg identifies the roles, are in 
many respects what we might call the curators of the espionage archive. One, 
the Collector, takes the information obtained and places it within the 
repository of intel, while the other, the Analyst, investigates the information to 
assess its value and what else might be learned, eventually entering new 
information into the archive as well. Here the constative generating quality of 
archives and repertoires identified by Taylor can be seen in action, since the 
act of analyzing produces new information which in turn will be analyzed, and 
so on. So too do Managers and Policy Makers act in a curatorial manner. For 
instance, managerial oversight dictates focus on what to analyze and what to 
collect, a more indirect affecting of the archive, but still impactful. Policy 
Makers, which Andregg suggests are mostly politicians (some with secret 
clearance some without; some with intelligence work backgrounds, some not) 
and are similar to Managers in that they establish the prerogative of 
intelligence operations.200 As it is with Managers, Policy Makers are often 
indirectly affecting the curatorial practices of the archive. It should also not be 
assumed that instances of curatorship within intelligence archives is a one-
way system and that materials are exclusively obtained and condemned to 
                                                





secrecy for eternity. The very nature of archives also requires that at some 
point they are weeded or have their collection refreshed. This can occur in at 
least two ways: in one capacity information that is no longer deemed viable or 
accurate might be terminated. In another manner, once information within the 
archive is not considered relevant and/or does not require secret treatment 
and is not necessary to protect, it might be made public—a sort of transition 
from one archive to another, i.e. private to public. I will return to this issue of 
secrecy and access shortly. What is more critical at this juncture is to see the 
theories in practice. 
 Arguably, any case of espionage that is revealed publically can provide 
some insight into how Operators, Collectors, Analysts, Managers and Policy 
Makers work, and how the efforts of any of these performers might stray into 
the realm of another individual’s mandate. Philip Knightley provides a series 
of cases that illustrate how Philby proved his value to the British SIS during 
his stint in Spain over the course of the Second World War, which was shared 
by Philby to Knightley through a several interviews conducted in the months 
before his death. In one narrative, entitled “The case of Admiral Canaris”, 
Philby recounts the planning of a potential assassination attempt that was to 
be carried out against the head of the Abwehr (the Nazi-Germany military 
intelligence unit), Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. Philby explains that he was 
provided with intel that indicated Admiral Canaris would be travelling from 
Madrid to Seville, with a stop overnight in the small town of Manzanares—a 





War. Because of his knowledge of the town—what we might term as his 
personal archive—Philby surmised that Canaris would stay at the Parador, a 
small but relatively upscale old-world hotel. The suggestion was put forward 
to the head of the SIS, General Sir Stewart Menzies (often referred to as “C”), 
to assassinate Canaris by lobbing two grenades into his bedroom. As Philby 
explained to Knightley “Cowgill [then head of Section 5] approved and sent 
my memo on up to ‘C’. Cowgill showed me the reply a couple of days later. 
Menzies had written: ‘I want no action whatsoever taken against the Admiral’. 
Sometime later I had the occasion to see ‘C’ and I remembered the memo 
and raised it with him. I said ‘Chief, I was puzzled by your decision over this. 
Surely it was worth a go?’ Menzies smiled and said: ‘I’ve always thought we 
could do something with the Admiral’. It was only later that I learnt he was in 
touch with Canaris via a cut-out in Sweden.”201 Herein lies an excellent 
example of how the various classes of operatives can be seen within the work 
of just a few agents. Furthermore, it serves as an excellent illustration of how 
the functioning of the archive and repertoire intersect with intelligence and 
counter-intelligence work. 
 The decision by Philby to approach Menzies via Cowgill, is a decision 
based on intel, which is an engagement of the archive. The archival 
knowledge at the center of this event is in direct relation to the repertoire of 
clandestine-oriented travel that Admiral Canaris will be undertaking in his 
performance as the head of the Abwehr. The role that Philby assumes is 
                                                





within the vein of operator since he is coordinating tasks and choices based 
on archival information. Yet, through his actions he also performs the role of 
collector, in accumulating information to add to the archive, and analyst, in his 
assessment of the intelligence to inform his choices as an operator. Philby’s 
superior Cowgill, in a similar manner engages with multiple roles—collector, 
analyst, operator, manager—as does Menzies—collector, analyst, manager, 
and potentially, policy maker. Each of these individuals performs a role that 
impacts the archive. The orders executed by Menzies to forbid the 
assassination of Canaris alters the performance of both Philby and Cowgill 
(and any operatives working under them). In effect, what transpires is that the 
repertoire of action affects the archive and results in a changed future 
performance. How does this transpire? Let us no longer ignore that Philby 
was a double agent. 
 Having been tasked with infiltrating the British intelligence service 
since shortly after his recruitment by the Soviet Union, the moment that Philby 
was accepted to a position in the British SIS was the moment he began his 
slow, deep penetration of the intelligence services. His acceptance to the 
counterintelligence branch in Spain during WWII was merely one step in this 
process. The unique aspect of this situation was that the shared goals of 
stymieing German encroachment, by both the British and Soviet Union, in 
effect offered Philby a first-rate opportunity to not only prove his worth to the 
British, but also serve as the perfect cover for his work for the Soviet Union. 





explains, “Menzies revelation that he was protecting Admiral Canaris, and the 
discovery that he was in touch with him via neutral Sweden came as a shock 
to Philby. What could be the reason for such a contact? Philby decided that 
Canaris must be in touch with anti-Hitler elements in Germany and that 
Menzies wanted to keep a line open to them. Philby told his Russian control 
and was instructed to remain alert for any developments in this area.”202 What 
is described in this passage should be considered from at least two 
perspectives. Firstly, the actions of everyone involved in choosing not to 
assassinate Canaris affects the future archive and, in turn, the repertoire of 
Canaris’ actions altering his performance. As has been noted both in 
Knightley’s writing and by other historians, Canaris led a strong resistance 
effort from within the German military. An assassination by the Allies would 
not only eliminate Canaris, but render the repertoire of other members of the 
resistance movement in Germany moot, especially without the lead performer 
to guide them. However, and more importantly still, we see how these events 
provided Philby an opportunity to raid the archive for information to pass on to 
his superiors in the Soviet Union. 
 Espionage, unlike many other areas of work, provides a unique case-
study to analyze instances where performance is not only defined by the 
archive and repertoire, but also relies on the access of other archives to 
inform the repertoire of the future, as well as relying on preventing access to 
the archive. As was noted in the first half of the Canaris-story, Philby in his 
                                                





role as counter-intelligence is able to glimpse archival information held by the 
British due to the intervention preventing the assassination of Canaris. Philby 
inferred that Canaris was an important person for the SIS. Subsequently, 
Philby’s continued performance as informed and successful counter-
intelligence agent and operator allows him to confirm these suspicions directly 
with Menzies, which in turn he would pass on to the Soviet intelligence units. 
In effect Philby performs the role of loyal and effective SIS agent, informed by 
the associated—and deeply necessary for success—archive and repertoire of 
the performance of Operator. Simultaneously, Philby also engages with the 
similar process of tapping the tandem archive and repertoire though his 
performing of the role of imbedded agent of the Soviet Union. Two archives 
and two repertoires informing these two performances. Yet, in a third sense, 
Philby was also accessing the archive of the British SIS to transfer to the 
archive of the Soviet Union, which in turn affects that repertoire and thus 
performance initiatives of the NKVD and associated KGB. This is to say that 
infiltrating, accessing, and raiding the archive is a central aspect of the 
performance of an espionage agent, and especially of a mole.  
 When it comes to espionage, the challenging aspect of accessing and 
gleaning information from archives is that often these archives are secret 
and/or heavily protected. This is not only true when it comes to analogue 
archives that hold tangible materials, for instance reports printed on paper, 
but also embodied archives—the information that people possess internally, 





Danish scholar Gunhild Borggreen writes on the ideas of secrets and 
confessions as they relate to archives and makes note that “secrecy is 
important to any society because it is closely linked to identity, and 
contributes to the formation and maintenance of human autonomy. Identity is 
linked to power, and power emerges from the ability to control flows of 
information—in this case an individual’s power to give or withhold information, 
and to control who are included or excluded from the secret.”203 While the 
case-study employed by Borggreen is concerned with personal and familial 
secrets, the same power dynamics apply to espionage. Philby’s power, and 
by extension the power of the Soviet Union, rests on Philby’s secrecy, which 
is directly related to his identity performance. Moreover, when we put this 
context of power and information control in dialogue with Diana Taylor’s 
archive and repertoire, we are presented with a dynamic instance of how the 
engagement of secret archives is at the root of espionage as performance, 
solidly establishing a link to the power structures that espionage is 
formulating, enabling, and sometimes, challenging. When we consider the 
case of Philby, who worked for both the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union, we see how in one sense his work as an agent is meant to challenge 
the power of Germany, as a part of the Allied efforts, while at the same time 
Britain is utilizing its secret archives to enact performances that will also 
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challenge dominance by the Soviet Union in the post-war era. Indeed, 
Knightley identifies that part of the efforts underlying the collaboration 
between the German resistance operatives and the British government was to 
end the war to then “cope with the threat of communism.”204 The Soviet Union 
was all too aware of the issues that would be posed if the British and 
Germans reached a truce. Their use of agents such as Philby were a 
performative undertaking to challenge the powers of the British and 
associated allies. 
 The idea of secret archives is, in some ways, a paradoxical and 
confounding idea that runs against our normalized conceptualization of 
archives as being public and accessible, albeit confusing and hard to navigate 
at times. But clearly this is not the case, as was explained at the beginning of 
the chapter. Secrecy is merely once instance, in addition to many others, of 
built-in gate-keeping in these repositories—much like private archives of 
academic institutions, religious groups, and corporations, or historical issues 
around literacy, class or any other number of factors—that have been used to 
prevent individuals from accessing information, and in turn maintaining power 
structures. What we can understand from the secrecy of archives is that it 
contextualizes clandestine efforts, and that secrecy itself is a performative 
event. As Sissela Bok explains, secrets are “kept intentionally hidden, set 
apart in the mind of its keeper as requiring concealment.”205 This would 
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include the individual who initially determines that a secret must be enacted, 
and any individual who is given access to that secret. In considering Bok’s 
definition alongside Richard Schechner’s terms of performance, we can infer 
that at times the act of secrecy is imbued with ritualistic notions of 
performance via their transformational qualities. Making something secret 
transforms that which is open and not hidden to something closed off.  It also 
exists within the “showing-doing”206 framework established by Schechner, in 
that secrets by their very nature are meant to transform individuals into those 
who do and those who do not know information, while also displaying an aura 
of concealment and/or protection. A final parameter established by Schechner 
that secrecy falls within is its fulfilling of twice-behaved behavior207—the act of 
sharing a secret with someone, who in turn must keep that secret, and 
replicates its own terms of existence by perpetuating control. Secrecy as 
performative event also aligns with other scholarship on performance as well. 
In respect to the position put forward by Diana Taylor, we might even 
extend the performative idea of secrecy further to suggest that secrecy is a 
part of a repertoire with no accessible archive, or is a repertoire that is intent 
on accessing the closed-off archive. While agents like Philby are not the focus 
of Borggreen’s earlier cited analysis, they are concerned with the realities of 
identity as they pertain to infiltrating spaces and places in a subversive 
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manner. Their repertoire informing the performance is driven by the very idea 
of accessing the archive from which they are locked-out. For example, Philby 
performs the role of ‘loyal British agent’ to access the archive of the British 
SIS and their work to establish ties with the German resistance movement. 
What is also suggested when we understand that the idea of secrecy is both 
performative and tied to identity and power, alongside an understanding that 
the repertoire can exist to access the archive, is that the very nature of 
accessing the archive can be the undoing of the performance. An agent being 
‘outed’ is the moment when they lose control of the performance event. The 
risk that is undertaken by an operative like Philby is that the British might 
access the secret archive of the Soviet Union—the one that Philby contributes 
intel to—and learn that the performance undertaken by Philby is theatrical in 
nature, theatrical in the sense that is rooted in artifice. In essence, the secret 
archives at the core of espionage-as-performance are key to withholding 
information and govern the success of the performance. To access the 
archive might in fact result in the undoing of the performance. The power that 
Philby exercises in dabbling with modes of secrecy is not only control over 
sensitive information, but also control over the narrative and his own 
performance, while simultaneously risking the successful performance. 
In other regards, the act of secrecy is reliant upon the hindrance of the 
archive informing the repertoire. This is well evidence by the fact that Philby, 
upon informing the Soviet Union about the ongoing dialogue between 





wherever possible, to work actively to frustrate them.”208 What is suggested 
here is that espionage is not only concerned with accessing the archive, but it 
is also interested in corrupting it when necessary. As Knightley notes, “Philby 
did not disappoint the Russians.”209 The example Knightley provides is an 
instance where Philby actively intervenes in the production of archival 
content. In late 1942, a report was produced by SIS analysts who put forward 
the case for an armistice with Germany. By many accounts the paper was 
well-received. However, because the individual who would be negotiating 
such an agreement required neutral ground to conduct their discussions with 
the Germans, the paper was shown to Philby because he had jurisdiction 
over intelligence efforts in neutral Spain and Portugal. “To everyone’s 
surprise, Philby resolutely blocked the paper, arguing that it was 
‘speculative’.”210 Outwardly, Philby’s performance was one that identified the 
risk of collaborating with the Germans as being too great for the war-effort. 
Yet, secretly, Philby’s rationale, as Knightley identifies, was that “[t]he 
German anti-nazis did not want to stop the war against Russia. They wanted 
to eliminate Hitler, make peace with the Allies, and then complete the 
invasion of the Soviet Union in which they stood on the brink of success. 
Philby could not run the risk that this might prove attractive to some elements 
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in Britain so he used his power to deal with it.”211 The power being employed 
here are the powers of espionage, secrecy, and archival manipulation, all tied 
to performance. In this instance Philby uses his performance as British SIS 
agent—informed by a repertoire and archive—to block the enactment of the 
repertoire in relation to archival documents i.e. the report condoning an 
armistice. Following this logic, Philby’s performance is based on a repertoire 
of intervention.  
The corruption of the archive is hardly the only dynamic at play within 
espionage. The archive can also be repurposed to trigger a repertoire and 
performance that is ill-informed. The most infamous example of this might be 
Operation Mincemeat from the Second World War. In this military 
undertaking, documents were planted on a deceased man and then left in 
Axis sympathetic territory (Spain) to be found. The goal of this effort was to 
convince the Abwehr that the Allied Forces intended to invade Greece and 
Sardinia and that their preparations for invading Sicily were being used to 
distract from their ‘real intentions’. In reality, the Allied Forces fully intended 
on invading Sicily, which they would then use as a stepping stone towards 
invading the remainder of Italy. The Operation Mincemeat documents were a 
ruse meant to misdirect the Axis Forces—a sort of double bluff or, in theatre 
terms, a play-within-a-play. In one sense, the performance that is taking place 
is a performance of archive materials. Similar to the theatrical performance of 
loyalty to the British that Philby puts on, the documents that were left with the 
                                                





body were governed by artifice. So too was the creation of the alternate 
persona for the homeless man’s body that they were using—Major William 
Martin. The precision of selecting an individual who appeared as though they 
died at sea, the tailoring of his uniform, the inspection of the already 
decomposing body, and the arrangement of the documents were all done to 
“ensure that it was suitably outfitted to achieve its secret goal.”212 What is 
evident through an analysis of Operation Mincemeat is that a manipulated 
archive results in an entirely different performance from what a non-
manipulated archive would produce. In this instance, the repertoire engaged 
by the Germans was very different from what would have occurred if this act 
of deception had not taken place. Moreover, the theatrical endeavor of 
manipulating the archive is an entirely different performance that takes place 
within the larger performance of espionage that is ongoing between the Allies 
and the Axis. A small performative episode in the larger theatre of war.  
The implementation of Operation Mincemeat also serves to remind us 
that espionage is inherently associated with acts of misdirection along with 
deception. The case-study also shows us that the archive is not always 
representative of ‘Truth’. As Randolph Starn notes, “we tend to use archives 
without thinking much about them as institutions and, at the end of the day, 
remain committed to archives as a source of historical truth, despite having 
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good reason to know that their truth-value is questionable.”213 In addition to 
Starn’s suggestion, it could be suggested that not only do we not think about 
archives as institutions, but also as extensions of other institutions i.e. the 
archives of the intelligence organizations. This could be further extended to a 
performance paradigm. For example, in documentary theatre such as Anna 
Deavere Smith’s Notes from the Field, we are presented with instances of 
verbatim performance that cannot be confirmed as verbatim entirely—what is 
said onstage is directly from the archive, but it is a challenge to verify that 
what is in the archive was actually said. 
Noting that archives are not pure nor perfect accounts of past events, 
Starn’s position is an echo of Taylor’s skeptical observation of archives as 
supposedly enduring materials. He cites that archives are subject to what the 
“record-keepers choose to admit, archives are partial in all senses of the 
word. They are subject to dismemberment, damage, and destruction; in some 
times and places, archival fraud has been a kind of tradition.”214 What then 
does this mean for performance? If we take what Taylor says to be true—that 
performance is governed by the interaction of the archive and the repertoire—
then surely an archive that is partially, or even fully, altered in a deliberate 
manner would result in an altered performance. If we cannot assume that 
archives are ‘Truthful’ all the time, then we must conclude that neither are 
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performances. Any employment of an archive that is possibly altered, 
corrupted, or deceptive within the execution of performance would in turn 
suggest that the performance would be affected similarly.  
Yet, what both the work of Philby and Operation Mincemeat show is 
that there is also a possibility of small Truths within larger events that are not 
Truthful. Philby’s untruthful work for the SIS, which was supporting the Soviet 
Union and undermining the British efforts against Stalin, also are Truthful in 
the shared endeavor of resisting the goals of Hitler. Operation Mincemeat 
capitalizes on the Truth that an invasion by the allies will take place, just not 
on the island that is suggested through their act of misdirection. The reality is 
that an understanding of truth is subjective to the view or position taken when 
giving it consideration. Moreover, these case-studies show that Truth can be 
wielded in efforts to misdirect and deceive. Each of the instances cited in this 
paragraph are moments of truth that are turned against their targets—Philby 
is indeed a spy, just not always for the British, and the Allied Forces will 
invade continental Europe through the Mediterranean, but not through 
Greece.  
 What then does this mean for how we conceptualize espionage as 
theatre and performance? One of the most significant consequences that 
scholars might face when we understand that the archive can be misdirected, 
corrupted, or manipulated is that it is a challenge to decipher which materials 
within the archive are accurate and which are not. This is particularly true 





acknowledged—a point that will be revisited in the next chapter. If we cannot 
confirm or deny that what is in the archive is absolutely true, we can then only 
assume that there might be an element of truth to be found. Furthermore, 
these issues around archives being raided, altered, and manipulated 
suggests that we cannot guarantee that a performance is entirely true. This 
can easily be seen with the work of Philby. There is truth in the fact that Kim 
Philby was an agent for the British SIS, but his performance as an agent was 
one of deception that relied on, and had the goal of, accessing and 
manipulating an archive that would enable falsity and provide a cover for his 
work as a Soviet Agent. Added to this is the fact that his actions of raiding and 
altering the archive resulted in misinformed performances by other’s in the 
intelligence services. What is meant by this is that the archive that informed 
the repertoire of the Operators, Collectors, Analysts, Managers, and Policy 
Makers working with Philby was corrupted, and therefore their intended 
performances would be corrupted. Furthermore, with a lack of awareness 
towards what was happening to the archive informing their repertoire, their 
performances become complicit in the non-truth of Philby’s performance, 
perhaps even untruthful in their own right. In short, the accessing, raiding, 
manipulation, and altering of the archives by individuals has serious 
consequences for the repertoire and thus performances of others. It is a ripple 
effect. And this issue around falsity and truth and accessing the archive is not 
only limited to the analogue world of espionage. It makes a serious impact in 





Hidden Sites of Performance 
Up until this point the chapter has focused exclusively on an analysis 
of espionage as it concerns the analog world. But intelligence operations 
continue to thrive in the postmodern age, especially through digital platforms 
and networks. Consequently, more care must be given to how espionage has 
morphed from entering locked rooms and throwing grenades, to accessing 
servers and launching cyberattacks. The central case study of this second 
half will focus on current concerns surrounding the company Huawei, and 
how espionage undertaken by digitally-oriented companies share techniques 
with the analogue world. To draw such comparisons, I will routinely refer to 
Kim Philby’s work as an agent while exploring case-studies of Huawei and 
other companies. Of particular importance in this section is the topic of 
camouflaged archives and repertoires—a subject that is very pronounced in 
the 21st century. Furthermore, the concerns raised about Huawei are a good 
indicator of how espionage and its fears are playing out at this very moment. 
To respond to these issues the chapter will begin with an exploration of the 
idea of digital espionage along with its theatrical and performative qualities.  
To begin analyzing contemporary espionage we should again look 
back to how intelligence work has been conceptualized historically. In Spy 
and Counter-Spy Richard Wilmer Rowan explains to his reader that 
espionage has a well-documented history and that modern espionage is, in a 
sense, unchanged. “We are accustomed to such progressive improvements 





discarded as defective and obsolete by the next. Yet never, with all the 
changes in the art of making war, has the spy been substantially improved or 
altered.”215 Written in 1928 this position often went unchallenged by scholars 
for many years, but perspective has shifted recently. The digital age has 
brought about new techniques and hurdles that espionage practices must 
overcome, and can also employ. Rowan’s position also shows that the 
archive of espionage remains a site of contestation, even in scholarly circles. 
The digital age only complicates this further.  
The advent of the internet has presented new mechanisms for the 
facilitation of espionage work. It might even be suggested that the tools of the 
trade have so substantially evolved that espionage itself has changed. These 
changes are alluded to by former NSA employee Joel Brenner in America 
The Vulnerable: Inside the New Matrix of Digital Espionage who writes that “in 
the last ten years [espionage] has changed in fundamental ways. First, it is no 
longer a game played only with human spies and electronic bugs in 
government offices […] If you steal terabytes of sensitive information 
electronically, from the comfort of a computer terminal thousands of miles 
away, perhaps you don’t need a spy. The second recent change […] is the 
target set into the private sector, particularly in companies that are not 
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working for the Defense Department of the ministerial equivalents.”216 These 
new methods identified by Brenner demand new considerations of espionage 
practice, and theatre and performance offers useful insight. This is especially 
true with thinking through the raison d’etre behind the ability of these 
practices to remain undetected. If espionage itself has changed and moved 
away from being exclusively oriented around government work and now 
includes private industry, then by extension the archive and repertoire of 
espionage will have evolved as well. This point will be revisited later when 
working through the central case-study of Huawei. 
The thesis of this research project is that the work of a spy is one of 
performance and is imbued with theatricality. While in previous instances it 
has been suggested that espionage is a form of acting, one could argue that 
newer forms of clandestine work are in line with what theatre and 
performance scholar Laura Levin refers to as ‘embeddedness’ or the act of 
blending oneself into the surrounding space.217 This conceptualization 
challenges the theatrical and performative qualities that we are often used in 
analysis, that there is a demonstrative event taking place that is either 
depictive, such as an actor, or transformative/transportative, in the Schechner 
sense of performance—both iterations typically being public or broadly 
                                                
216 Joel Brenner. America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix 
of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare (New York, USA: Penguin Press, 
2011), 52. 
 






recognized as ‘real’ or physically transpiring. This idea of physicality is key. In 
support of Levin’s position, digital espionage fulfills the criteria of 
embeddedness and in many regards utilizes camouflage as a performative 
strategy to remain hidden—a performance that remains unseen. The lack of 
the same tangible physical qualities that we usually attribute to espionage 
practice allows digital espionage to happen almost instantaneously, as well as 
to be delocalized, nebulous, and unseen. 
This perspective of espionage as camouflaged, dislocated, and 
immediate is indeed suggested by scholars who work in the field of 
intelligence studies.  With the advent of the digital age and its associated form 
of espionage there is not necessarily a need for an embodied presence in the 
work of an agent. As Jonathan Lord explains, “[i]n a digital world […] cover 
identities and tradecraft manufactured for an analog environment can quickly 
become ineffective and potentially dangerous to those who continue to use 
them.”218 Our traditional operators and collectors have their distinct roles 
collapsed and now conduct their work at a distance and infiltrate servers, 
networks, repositories, and virtual spaces, all through digital techniques. As 
Brenner explains it: “your spy’s job is no longer stealing information but 
planting malicious software from the inside to enable a remote cyberthief to 
snatch information later […] Your ideal mole may no longer be the ministers 
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private secretary but rather the ministry’s chief technical officer.”219 Part of the 
challenge of preventing espionage is the context of the digital world, which 
demands that information be easily located and accessed. This proves to be 
a significant vulnerability for those attempting to protect the archive of 
information from a Philby-like access and raid. The ease of access in which 
society trades in information provides opportunity for multiple points of 
infiltration, with the acts occurring within a large range of locales, sites and 
platforms. Changes to entering materials into the archive invariably shifts the 
way that espionage is performed. 
In a sense, past analogue espionage could be considered more in line 
with what we might identify as site specific work—there was a particular 
space that the espionage performance took place in to infiltrate and obtained 
information from the archive held in this place. Drawing on theories proposed 
by Bernard Tschumi, practitioner and scholar Mike Pearson suggests that 
site-specific performance, defined partly by its relationship between action 
and space, can reciprocate, be indifferent towards, or in conflict with space. 
And that it can also be any combination of these three.220 The historical 
understanding of espionage would suggest that a successful performance of 
analogue espionage is reciprocal with the site in which the espionage is 
taking place. For example, in Philby’s efforts to infiltrate the British SIS his 
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performance needed to have a reciprocal relationship with the sites specific to 
the Intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom so that he would remain 
undetected. However, Philby’s repertoire of action was also indifferent the 
sites of the British SIS, which draws another link to the site-specific nature of 
espionage. Furthermore, Philby’s infiltration of the archive is in direct conflict 
with its status as a locked and protected space—a third connection with 
Pearson’s site-specific ideas. What this suggests is that espionage is a sort of 
site-specific performance that is not exclusively reciprocal, indifferent or in 
conflict, but in fact can be all three. This is the same for digital espionage. 
While people no longer need to be present in a physical location, the 
performance has instead transferred to a digital site and accessed it through 
a disembodied performance taking place in a digital space. 
 
The Blurring of Corporations and Governments 
Unlike the war-time exploits of Philby, the realities of contemporary 
espionage between private enterprises treats the archive as a for-profit 
repository that can be raided. As addressed earlier, one of the current and 
most salient examples of this issue is that of Chinese technology company 
Huawei. As has been reported repeatedly throughout recent years; “[at] the 
moment the member nations of the Five Eyes, an international alliance 
between the United States, Canada, The United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand, are conducting reviews on the vulnerability of their 5G 





participating in the construction of this infrastructure.”221 The underlying fear 
that initiated this strategic review is that the Chinese government has written 
into law a requirement that independent companies may be forced to provide 
data to Beijing when requested and, more specifically, forced to participate in 
the acts of espionage and surveillance. While not exclusively corporate 
espionage, it is an excellent indicator of the sort of espionage that can and is 
undertaken by corporations. Added to this is the routine accusations that 
Huawei has endured throughout the years accusing it of stealing the 
intellectual property from other corporations. While robust scholarship 
investigating these accusations is lacking (partly due to the real-time 
developments of the issues surrounding Huawei) what is suggested here is a 
blurring of the distinction between corporations and governments—a point 
that will be covered momentarily. 
With respect to the concerns of the Five Eyes, the alleged fear is that 
Huawei’s technology will masquerade as infrastructure while in fact operating 
as a surrogate of the Chinese government intelligence organizations, helping 
them facilitate the transmission of state-secrets and civilian information from 
western nations. The spyware would effectively be an invisible performance 
hidden in plain sight. As Laura Levin might identify it, the invisible quality not 
only constitutes a form of camouflage but is the very essence of her notion of 
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embeddedness—where this performative act is seen as a participant being 
able to “strategically position themselves inside a particular environment or 
group.”222 If we consider this from the perspective of the Five Eyes Alliance, 
Huawei’s technology positions itself as infrastructure in a nation. In thinking 
through Levin’s suggestion of camouflage as embedded performance, when 
we consider digital espionage in this sense and as a performance practice, 
we see a form of disembodied performance within the digital realm. This is a 
form of performance that is based on algorithms and programming, that is 
manufactured, and one which will perform in whatever role it is ‘cast’ into 
during its creation. This further serves the theory that digital espionage, unlike 
analogue espionage, is definable as a high speed, insidious, delocalized 
iteration of spy-work. Placed in dialogue with an understanding of the archive 
as it relates to espionage, the repertoire serves to further entrench the 
secrecy of established espionage work as a form of state-sponsored 
intelligence, much in the way it was identified in the first chapter but now in a 
digital capacity. 
What this suggests is that an intriguing performance is taking place. 
One in which the Huawei technology acts as infrastructure that is meant to 
transmit information while really existing for the collection of information—a 
sort of collapse in the distinction between Andregg’s Operator and Collector 
where that which is ‘doing things’ is also collecting intel. In a sense, it would 
be similar to a highway that is built to let cars drive down the road, but 
                                                





sometimes reroutes cars so they can be sold off, raided for parts, or 
repurposed. Legitimizing the theory that Huawei’s technology in engaged in a 
dual performance is Naomi Stead’s view on the performance of objects in her 
article “Performing Objecthood; Museums, Architecture and the play of 
Artefactuality”. Stead writes that objects have “always had an audience, but it 
has most often been an audience unconscious of the performance.”223 We 
can extend this further with digital espionage in that the technological 
platforms provided by Huawei act in a manner beyond what is most obvious 
i.e. not only are they an information transit way as they are viewed by their 
public audience, but also a collection point for the archive as viewed by those 
facilitating the espionage. It is most assuredly an instance where an ulterior 
performance of deception and misdirection, but also infiltration and 
intelligence gathering could be taking place.  
Of further interest is that this is unlike the traditional concept of an 
operative identified in the earlier part of the chapter, where their ability to 
blend in renders them relatively inert to the day-to-day aspects of society. 
With Huawei, the digital operative and their networks serve to benefit day-to-
day society, in this case as digital infrastructure. We might even view it as an 
inversion of the role of a mole. More interesting still is that this position would 
indicate that the facilitation of espionage is not very different from the very 
structures put in place by society to enhance its functioning. This issue is 
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alluded to by Mayer-Schönberg and Cukier in their publication Big Data: A 
Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think where they 
note that many technology companies, such a Google, Facebook or LinkedIn 
serve not only their advertised intention, but also to collect data for their 
archive. The line is so blurred between the mandate of a digital company, and 
the process of collecting information from users, that they are one in the 
same.  
This is especially true when structures of communication are 
prearranged and/or programmed to facilitate espionage. In a recently 
released journal article entitled “The Huawei Affair and China's Technology 
Ambitions” Nigel Inkster addresses the ongoing Huawei dispute as it relates 
to national security concerns in the United Sates. Inkster writes that “[t]he US 
in particular has long had reservations about companies such as Huawei, 
based on twin beliefs: that much of the company’s initial success came from 
the theft of US technology that was then used to undercut US companies, and 
that Huawei equipment might contain so-called back doors that could be used 
for espionage or sabotage.”224 Inkster is not alone in his perspective. George 
Patterson Mannon III explains that “this focus on information dominance is 
[…] a specifically anti-American strategy, proceeding from the PLA 
leadership’s assessment that the Chinese military cannot defeat the U.S. 
military in a conventional scenario, given the United States’ technological 
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advantages and extensive experience in prosecuting such conflicts.”225 The 
argument put forward by ‘The Five Eyes’ is that Huawei’s technology, which 
would be critical to 5G infrastructure, would be a form of this dual 
spy/facilitation. What both Inkster and Mannon’s positons suggest is that in 
the capital-driven system of globalization, government espionage efforts have 
been appropriated by, and in some instance outright given to, companies to 
utilize in both their corporate espionage and also in their efforts to help 
respective governments beef up their archive for a future performance of 
military intervention. There might be no greater example of this than the 
revelations made concerning Wikileaks, which revealed the systemic 
domestic espionage being conducted against the United States public in an 
alleged effort to counter domestic-terrorism. 
The strange reality of digital espionage as a performance is that there 
is a blurring between the dualities of the truthful and untruthful. It is 
reminiscent of the situation in which Philby was a spy both for and against the 
British. As a parallel, Huawei’s infrastructure contributions would arguably 
help enhance society, while also allegedly posing a risk to national security. In 
considering this perspective we must also look at the motivations for opposing 
Huawei’s contributions to national infrastructure projects. In a world with 
protectionist-America leading security decisions, and understanding that 
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corporations are at times aided by governments in their attempts to obtain 
corporate intelligence and information from competitors, it could be reasoned 
that, in fact, Huawei’s technology poses a greater threat to corporate America 
than the government or populace. Or is there even a distinction between the 
two? Indeed, Inkster raises this exact issue in his article explaining that “[t]he 
US now sees China’s designs on becoming a peer competitor in advanced 
technologies as an existential threat to a presumption of American dominance 
in all aspects of technology.”226 The word “all” almost assuredly includes 
economic dominance. It is yet another iteration of Derrida’s assertion that 
control of the archive is the paragon of institutional domination. Following this, 
the performance of digital espionage, one that has developed out a blurring of 
both corporate and government practices, is the reinforcement of institutional 
domination. Moreover, like with Philby there are a series of performances 
taking place layered on top of each other. These include the performance of 
infrastructure as both technological highway and collection point for the 
archive, the performance of corporations serving as both purveyors of 
technological infrastructure and as extensions of the government, and the 
performance of the governments concerned with espionage conducted 
against their citizens, while in fact raiding the personal archives of the 
citizenry. 
The anxiety that arises from the threat of espionage by Huawei is 
substantial, and the concerns are deemed so important by members of the 
                                                





United States government that there has been an ultimatum hinted at, which 
strongly urges allies of the United States to bar Huawei from building 
technological infrastructure or risk being deemed untrustworthy to share 
intelligence with. As one official explained in respect to the potentially 
compromising quality of the technology, “if a country adopts this [technology] 
and puts it in some of their critical information systems, we won’t be able to 
share information with them, we won’t be able to work alongside them.”227 
What should now be considered is whether it is the western governments 
performing ‘national security concerns’ on behalf of domestic corporations, or 
if it is Huawei and its interest in business enterprise performing as a vessel of 
the Chinese government? As noted, these multiple motivations only raise the 
stakes further still and add to the dubiousness of the motivations for these 
performances. Perhaps though, like Philby, there is no one answer and both 
scenarios are true. That digital infrastructure enables espionage irrespective 
of who is selling it, and both China and Western nations are eager to control 
these technological thoroughfares to accumulate information for their 
respective archives and economic advancement. To address this issue, we 





                                                





Big Data Requires Supersized Performances 
Every time we ‘Google’ a phrase, watch a film on YouTube, or make a 
purchase with a credit card we produce information ready to be stored by the 
respective company offering us the platform to follow through with such 
actions. In each instance, small bits of data are carted away to a repository, 
most likely a server, to provide nuanced perspective for the companies about 
the use of their platform by members of society. We would like to think it 
would stop there, but it does not. This data is also used to profile individuals 
and can be sold, shared and, at points, even stolen. While small impulse 
purchases on a Visa card by many people may not seem like significant 
performative engagements, the archival information produced out of these 
events and accumulated by companies has come to be known as ‘Big Data’, 
and it is very valuable. Brenner addresses this very idea at the beginning of 
his publication: “Data is a commodity, and the market for it is measured in 
billions of dollars—trillions if we include electronic banking and credit card 
issuers.”228 This value is certainly a motivating factor for both companies and 
respective governments. To obtain data for resale profit and to gain financially 
by facilitating the flow of information is a lucrative endeavor. To lose control of 
the flow of data, which we might call the making of the archive, is to lose 
financially.  
                                                






Data is not the only profit-generating aspect of these day-to-day 
performances that individuals engage with. As Joseph W. Jerome explains, 
“Today, privacy has become a commodity that can be bought and sold. While 
many would view privacy as a constitutional right or even a fundamental 
human right, our age of big data has reduced privacy to a dollar figure.”229 
This, we might conclude, is yet another motivating factor in the desire to 
control digital infrastructure. Jerome continues: 
‘Monetizing privacy’ has become something of a holy 
grail in today's data economy. We have seen efforts to 
establish social networks where users join for a fee and the 
rise of reputation vendors that protect users' privacy online, 
but these services are luxuries. And when it comes to our 
privacy, price sensitivity often dictates individual privacy 
choices. Because the "price" an individual assigns to protect 
a piece of information is very different from the price she 
assigns to sell that same piece of information, individuals 
may have a difficult time protecting their privacy." Privacy 
clearly has financial value, but in the end there are fewer 
people in a position to pay to secure their privacy than there 
are individuals willing to sell it for anything it's worth.230  
 
Not only is big data sold to organizations, but the protection of such data has 
become a lucrative industry in and of itself. It is a commodification of counter-
espionage. Here again we see institutional control of the archive. However, 
we have moved beyond governmental or societal control and find the battle 
for dominance of controlling the archive emerging between corporations.  
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With this perspective, and looking back to the case-study of Huawei, it 
could be concluded that western companies are more concerned about their 
loss of controlling the archive and have spurred on the government to protect 
their interests under the guise of national security. This perspective is parsed 
out by Kaska, Beckvard, and Minárik in their article “Huawei, 5G and China as 
a Security Threat” where they write that “[t]he current US China trade dispute 
is something that cannot be overlooked. Yet it should not be overplayed as 
the sole driving reason. The restriction of Huawei technology has a long 
history and did not begin with the current US administration. […] To the 
contrary – many countries are eager to launch 5G networks due to the 
expected quality and innovative services, and a decision to rely on 
competitors would at the current stage certainly delay deployment.”231 In other 
words, while the United States and its allies purport that the Chinese 
company embodies a risk to national security this might not actually be the 
case. As Joseph Campbell, a former assistant director of criminal 
investigations at the FBI explains, "we don't know as private citizens all the 
intelligence information the US and its allies have gathered relative to China 
and Huawei… but... there's no doubt China is a significant threat for the 
United States, they are committed to becoming a lead economic and military 
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power in the world.”232 Intriguingly this situation depicts an instance where the 
distinctions between corporate and government espionage are again blurred. 
With the advent of the digital age it could be reasoned that espionage has 
mutated so much that different forms are now indistinguishable from each 
other. Archives informing repertoires have merged. 
With the integration of different archives into a singular iteration of 
espionage we are looking beyond siloed forms of power and control to the 
threat of one singular institutional power. If we agree with Derrida’s position 
that the control of the archive is to maintain institutional dominance, then we 
might extend this to suggest that control of Data is similarly equated to power. 
Following the same logic as infrastructure objects engaging in a double 
performance of infrastructure/espionage-tool, the desires of corporate 
America perform as national security concerns for the United States and by 
extension the Western world. Unlike many other societal issues, when it 
comes to ‘Big Data’ the government may feel the need to step in even if only 
to protect domestic industry from foreign encroachment. Big data is an 
archive that is constantly put to use and required to perform. Financial 
success is dependent on controlling and limiting access to the archive, much 
like how the British controlled and limited access to their archives in the case 
of Philby. So just how does data come in to the equation of digital espionage? 
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Espionage for Capital Gain: Corporations and the Public 
 The relationship between the United States and China is, at the best of 
times, tense. Their geographic size, large economies, and importance in the 
political sphere could position them as the great facilitators of technological 
progress. As Yuxiao and Lu explain in the edited volume China and 
Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, “due 
to lack of mutual trust and the inconsistency of network regulation 
mechanisms, thus far China and the United States have not had effective 
communication or cooperation with respect to cybersecurity issues.”233 The 
lack of cooperation in cybersecurity is only one concern. “China and the 
United States suspect each other of committing major cyberattacks against 
their domestic networks.”234 As the authors point out, these attacks could in 
fact be the work of other entities, such as non-aligned political entities and 
capitalist enterprises. Indeed, corporations acting outside their jurisdiction 
against governments is not new or surprising. In fact, in recent years we have 
seen corporations harnessing the archive to interfere not only in the affairs of 
other corporations, but also the internal affairs of nations and the populace. 
If the votes and subsequent fallout from the 2016 United States 
presidential election or the 2016 Brexit referendum are any indication, digital 
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data and information—the archive—is a highly prized and ever increasing 
commodity pursued by national and multinational businesses, irrespective of 
the ethical breaches that may occur when in pursuit. As Jeffery Rosen 
suggests, “[on] the Internet, every Web site we visit, every store we browse 
in, every magazine we skim, and the amount of time we spend skimming it, 
create electronic footprints that increasingly can be traced back to us, 
revealing detailed patterns about our tastes, preferences, and intimate 
thoughts."235 This, as was suspected and recently confirmed in the earlier 
mentioned events, has been occurring without permission in a form of 
espionage undertaken by corporations against the populace. A form of 
information siphoning and collating that is often identified as dataveillance, 
what we might think of as a raiding of the archive. Unlike Philby, who raided 
the archive of the British SIS to enable military and intelligence service 
maneuvers of the Soviet Union, information from the contemporary archive is 
then shared, sold, or traded between entities in an effort to generate profit. 
 Yet, another central concern with dataveillance is that it is not only 
used for corporate profits but for other undertakings as well. As Sara Degli 
Esposti explains, “[d]ataveillance, a concept originally forged by Roger Clarke 
(1988), refers to the systematic monitoring of people or groups, by means of 
personal data systems, in order to regulate or govern their behavior.”236 This 
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governing of behavior adds yet another element into the equation of digital 
espionage. The performance of digital espionage enables a controlling of the 
everyday performances of the populace. It is again evocative of Derrida’s 
assertion that the control of the archive is a wielding of institutional power and 
an example of how the performance of espionage evokes qualities of 
Althusser’s Repressive State Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatuses. 
Instead of theatre as a formulation of an ISA, as is usually the case, it is 
functioning as a part of the RSA. Bearing this in mind, we might conclude that 
the fear from the American government and its western allies, in areas that 
concern data-siphoning/archive raiding, is less about a fear of losing profits 
but more-so a fear of losing control—to no longer dominate and coerce in the 
way that is desired.  
 The extent of this exploitation and manipulation is certainly cause for 
concern, but perhaps even more shocking is the extent to which this 
information is used to cajole, misdirect, and manipulate users and providers 
of such data in what Marcy Peek refers to as “web-lining” or “online 
steering.237” Often at the basis of such puppeteering by corporations are 
identity markers, such as race, sex, and age, that are exploited and preyed 
upon in acts of discrimination undermining the once utopic view that the 
internet would be a domain of equality. As Peek explains, “‘steering’ refers to 
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the practice of companies directing individuals to or away from marketing 
messages or offers based on predetermined identity characteristics; online 
steering refers to these discriminatory practices taking place online.”238 This 
‘free-market’ technique has concerning characteristics that echo clandestine 
activity in warfare – specifically the use of archival information to manipulate 
the populace and sow division in a discriminatory way. The espionage now 
taking place is one that is exploitative, with corporations deceptively 
masquerading as providing a service whilst in fact leeching data from 
unsuspecting cliental to manipulate their behavior. It is also an instance 
where the performers have now taken on the roles of directors in the theatre 
production of espionage. This, along with the discriminatory practices at the 
heart of this exploitation, pushes this technique beyond dubious ethical 
practices into a practice of systemic oppression. 
 Likewise, online-steering through dataveillance can also be easily 
positioned within the realm of Althusser’s RSA/ISA bind. A reproducing cycle 
that is hard to break from, “devices proliferate as effective data gathering 
tools. They strongly contribute to data accumulation […] Once data are 
created and organized into databases, they can be analyzed in search of 
patterns. The knowledge generated from data analysis informs the creation of 
policies and procedures, which quite often are intended to orientate people’s 
behavior.”239 As is clear, this performance and direction is a well-oiled 
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machine facilitating control; “[t]he end of each cycle represents the beginning 
of a new cycle: after some recommendation is implemented, new information 
is collected, analysed and transformed into new recommendations.”240 Esposti 
illustrates this cycle for her reader (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Relationship among the four categories of actions of 
dataveillance.241  
 
Intriguingly, and because of few controls being offered by the government and 
judicial system, Peek proposes a subversive response to this issue “that , 
where data marketing and steering activities by commercial entities engender 
the marginalization of certain groups of individuals, technological techniques 
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of resistance and counterespionage-namely ‘identity passing’-should be 
implemented by marginalized persons to counteract online profiling.”242 She 
explains further in the article that identity passing is harnessing the 
awareness of intersectional identities, something that the technologies 
analyzing our data are unable to compute. More specifically, “an online 
consumer can simply "pass" by "expressing" to the decision makers that she 
is, for example, whoever she wants the data collectors and profilers to think 
she is.”243 What Peek proposes is a harnessing of theatrical technique along 
with a re-imagining of counter-intelligence practices, which effectively attempt 
to deceive the deceiver through a performance of intersectionality. As Peek 
herself puts it, it is “an example of wielding the "master's tools" in order to 
"dismantle the master's house.”244  
Instead of hiding identities and attempting to maneuver ‘incognito’, 
which we might equate to the embedded quality of camouflage as 
performance that Levin describes, Peek suggests that members of society 
exploit the lack of nuance of the technologies employed by the corporations to 
inform their way of engaging in the digital world. There is no pretense in what 
Peek proposes. She suggests that civilians employ a form of theatricality to 
throw technology and algorithms off their scent, to adapt and then adopt a 
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new persona to employ. Peek predicts that this approach might be criticized 
by some groups due to a perceived embracing of identity markers as a sort of 
caricatured performance of identity. However, she argues that such a 
performance is not embracing such identity extremes but instead in line with 
the ideas of Antoni Gramsci subverting a capitalist domination and 
normalization of these Goffman-esque ‘sign-vehicles’. 
 
The Digital Direction 
 Peek proposes a disruption that occurs at the identification stage of the 
cycle as described by Esposti, a re-purposing of the camouflage that Levin 
identifies and in line with the understanding that group homogeneity can be 
tooled in such a manner as to avoid detection. An act that Levin identifies as 
the “art of blending in”245 when oriented around group dynamics and “situating 
the self”246 when concerned with individual consciousness. To subvert the 
espionage practices taking place we must appropriate the techniques of 
espionage and counter-perform. We might see this re-articulation of identities 
as another instance of performance that is similar to the avatars we see in 
online gaming, where players create personas that are not necessarily 
accurate depictions of their ‘real-life’ identities. 
While this suggestion begs the question as to if we should consider 
these counter-espionage practices necessary skills for the digital age, it also 
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demands that we question if such subversive techniques are in fact being 
employed and applied to the scenario of Huawei. Is there a possibility that this 
idea of counter-performance is already being used? This could in fact be what 
is occurring with the dialogue surrounding Huawei. What is happening is a 
dual performance of intention—establishing digital infrastructure—about a 
dual use of technology—helpful infrastructure as espionage tools. In this 
regard, the populous is being deceived by the performances of global players, 
whether governmental or corporate, giving these organization continued 
access to personal archives. As in the case of Philby, the multilayered 
performances obfuscate what the successes, failures, challenges, and 
ultimate goals of digital espionage are. 
 
The Archive of Espionage 
While Philby may be the master-deceiver of the 20th century, the digital 
age has brought about significant changes in the way society conceptualizes 
espionage and repositions the master-deceivers to those of corporations and 
their infrastructure. Theatre and performance offers us not only a way to 
frame these new instances of espionage practice, but techniques to 
undermine, challenge and subvert the dominating qualities that they employ 
and perpetuate. Furthermore, by employing an approach of subversion, 
especially through the performance of ‘fictional identities’, members of society 
embed their own avatars within the system to disrupt the flow of the 





This chapter has been concerned with the realities of espionage work 
as it relates to the archive, and the influence and role that archives play in the 
execution of espionage work, or any other work related to espionage, such as 
research. By working through the accessibility of materials by researchers 
and agents, the role of the archive in spy work and spy-work in the archive, 
the accessing of the archive in the event of a security breech or for study, and 
the corruptibility of materials as they relate to acts of deception, the archive is 
proven to be central to both the efforts of espionage as a target and an 
integral part of contextualizing spy-work as a phenomenon. Moreover, in the 
digital era espionage has capitalized on the archive and exploited the control 
of ‘data’ to expand beyond government to government/corporate espionage 
work. The value of the archive has moved into a realm where the information 
contained within it is highly valued and sought after. The integral nature of the 
archive cannot be understated in an analysis of espionage-come-
performance. Its influence is far-reaching and efficacious. It governs those 
who undertake espionage, those who are targets of intelligence work, and 
those who wish to explore clandestine practices. The archive feeds 
performance and remains as evidence of past performance events. It is used 
to misdirect and deceive, as well as enable and corrupt. The transformative 
power of the archive allows the defining characteristics of espionage to reach 
out from beyond the grave and affect other endeavors and people with the 






Chapter 4 – Espionage as Poetic Failure 
 
“She was a creation from beginning to end, a character in a play that 
she continuously rescripted.” 
 
- Pat Shipman, Femme Fatale   
 
The State of Failure 
It may shock historians to know that following her execution by a firing 
squad—indeed, directly after a ‘doctor had pronounced her lifeless’—Mata 
Hari ‘raised her hand to her forehead’.  Well, perhaps not Mata Hari herself 
but the actor Marissa Mell who was cast as the infamous spy in the ill-fated 
1960s musical Mata Hari. Mell’s raised hand was just one of the many bizarre 
mistakes and failures that, according to theatre critic Bill Henry, plagued the 
preview of the show that he attended. Failures that were so numerous that 
Henry asserted that “the whole thing began to look like something planned by 
Mack Sennett” of Keystone Cops fame.247 The failure was so anticipated that 
when it ran that night in Washington D.C. producer David Merrick warned the 
audience beforehand that the show was “just a rehearsal”248—and it was, but 
not in the sense that Merrick anticipated. This was never going to be a dry-run 
for an ultimately successful show on Broadway. It was a rehearsal for the 
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future failures of the show that in the end could not escape the so-called 
‘Keystone Cops’ aesthetic, as it was described by Henry in his deliciously 
descriptive critique. What transpired over the next year was one of the biggest 
flops in the history of Broadway musicals. Closed early due to disastrous 
reviews and results in Washington during the pre-Broadway tour, the show 
was revamped and given the new title of Ballad for a Firing Squad. Yet, as is 
noted by critics such as Henry and contemporary Sam Zolotow, even the 
revamped songs and title could not save Mata Hari from fated failure. 
It seems that failure often requires a description to contextualize that 
which has failed. Yet more general definitions locate failure as a category of 
performance. In Failure (The Art of Living), Colin Feltham, for example, writes 
that “[Failure] refers to some sort of breakdown, some malfunctioning or 
underperformance.”249 And this description certainly accounts for what 
happened with Mata Hari. The scenery falling, the clothes coming undone, 
the ‘dead’ character coming back to life: these events were not meant to 
happen in the tightly controlled environment of the musical. Yet Henry’s 
description, as an articulation of the points raised by Feltham, reveals an 
intriguing aspect about failure: that it requires context. It could be argued that 
the failure of Mata Hari was not the poor performers, set, or costumes, but the 
lack of control and discipline on the part of management or directing. It could 
also be suggested that there was a failure to properly set expectations for 
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what was about to be watched at the National Theatre in Washington that 
evening. In another reality—where Mata Hari was meant to be a comedy—
these events of ‘failure’ might have been intended. In such an instance it 
might be argued that these failures were in fact successes in their attempt to 
illustrate failure along the lines of Mack Sennett’s ‘Keystone Cops slapstick 
aesthetic’. Failure is at times hard to identify and even harder to define. And 
the world of theatre and performance is no stranger to this issue. 
In theatre we speak about the failure of a show, an installation, or a 
piece of work. We make work about failure, and about the failure of making 
work about failure. Evocative of Marvin Carlson’s assertion of theatre 
productions being ghosted by the past, failure haunts theatre and 
performance both as lived reality and as subject matter.250 This can easily be 
extended to the production of Mata Hari. For what was that musical if not a 
failed theatrical production haunted by the case of failed espionage that was 
the real-life Mata Hari? Even more strange is that the failure that haunts a 
production or lived-reality seems to be able to transcend the performance 
event to affect people. It has been suggested that the demise of the career of 
Austrian actress Marissa Mell can, in part, be traced to the very noted and 
infamous failure of the musical Mata Hari. Cruelly coincidental is the fact that, 
like Mata Hari, Mell’s career began to seriously decline when she was no 
longer seen as the beautiful young woman that she used to be. Her last 
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productions strayed into the realm of soft-core pornography much in the way 
that Mata Hari resorted to prostitution and love-affairs to maintain her 
success, while her career as a dancer and performer collapsed and failed.  
Yet failure not only haunts an undertaking but also governs it. How an 
individual rates or categorizes failure is equally based on their ability to 
identify and eschew the phenomenon. And this is as much about reality as it 
is about perception. Consider this next narrative: On the 25th of July, 1917, a 
woman arrived in Vincennes, France, on what was then the outskirts of Paris. 
She was dressed in stockings and a blouse, which accented a dark outfit 
lined with fur, “on her head a felt hat and her shoes were ankle boots.”251 As 
she walked to the parade ground, thirteen men stood at a distance watching. 
Offered a blindfold, she declined; as she did when it was suggested that she 
be tied to the stake now between her and the wall behind, or when she was 
offered a last confession by a priest. The sentence of death was read out and 
upon the final word the sergeant in command called his troops to attention. 
He brought his sword up and, after a moment’s pause, drew the sword down 
shouting ‘tirez’.  
Unlike Mell’s performance, Mata Hari did not lift her hand and rest it 
against her forehead. The sets did not come undone, dresses did not fall 
apart, scenery did not lift into the air while the other half remained on the 
ground, and no one was laughing. This was no Keystone Cops aesthetic. As 
                                                






the British reporter Henry Wales wrote. “She did not die as actors and moving 
picture stars would have us believe that people die when they are shot. She 
did not throw up her hands nor did she plunge straight forward or straight 
back. Instead she seemed to collapse. Slowly, inertly, she settled to her 
knees, her head up always, and without the slightest change of expression on 
her face.”252 What transpired was a scene of both success and failure. 
Success in execution, but failure in living. From Wales’s description Mata Hari 
continued to watch her executioners as she slowly fell backwards, her legs 
twisted beneath her. “She lay prone, motionless, with her face turned towards 
the sky. A non-commissioned officer, who accompanied a lieutenant, drew his 
revolver from the big, black holster strapped about his waist. Bending over, he 
placed the muzzle of the revolver almost—but not quite—against the left 
temple of the spy. He pulled the trigger, and the bullet tore into the brain of 
the woman.”253 Unlike the dramatic and inaccurate performance by Marissa 
Mell, these were the final moments of the real-life Mata Hari. Yet, it is here in 
such a moment of finality that the analysis of failure must begin. Indeed, as it 
will become clear, in espionage final moments are often the moments of 
departure and (re)generation. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation the analysis was dedicated to the 
identification and contextualization of success, with a specific focus on 
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espionage as applied theatre practice. As has been acknowledged, this 
chapter is concerned with the idea of failure. Throughout this final portion, the 
project will draw parallels between failure as it is demonstrated, produced, 
and identified by theatre and performance, alongside instances of failure in 
espionage. To articulate these findings, the chapter will employ two case 
studies. Those of the Dutch agent Mata Hari as well as the Russian operative 
Maria Butina, a woman who supposedly gained access to the upper echelons 
of the National Rifle Association and to prominent members of the United 
States Republican Party. Not only will parallels be drawn between the two 
case studies, but in drawing such parallels a comparison and contrasting will 
be made between these two examples with instances of failure in theatre and 
performance, providing insight into the structural issues and techniques of 
espionage, particularly when considered through a theatre and performance 
studies lens. 
 
The Mata Hari Case: A Failure 
A complicated history, the story of Mata Hari is one the great stories of 
espionage. Born in the Dutch city of Leeowarden in 1876 Mata Hari is 
perhaps one of the most infamous female spies in the 20th century. This 
cannot be overstated. Indeed, as Rosie White explains “the infamous spy 





accounts of women and espionage.”254 But it is not merely that to consider 
women and espionage is to be obliged to understand the story of Mata Hari. 
This Dutch spy also presents a unique opportunity to examine the relation of 
espionage to theatre and performance because Hari was a performer before 
and while she was a spy. But the fact that she was also, at times, a prostitute 
and mistress of high powered men cannot be ignored if only because this 
aspect of her life plays into widely circulated—and indeed, problematic—
cultural assumptions that society makes about the kind of women who work in 
the theatre and in espionage. Those cultural assumptions imply that female 
actors and spies are cut from the same cloth and at some level, the cultural 
assumption is that this cloth is woven from the fabric of moral failure. As tragic 
as the story of Mata Hari is, there is thus something particularly special about 
having a case study which features an individual who participates in the 
oldest and second-oldest professions simultaneously, especially since acting 
is sometimes offered as an alternative to the notion that espionage is the 
world’s second oldest profession. 
 Women have a long and relatively well-documented role in espionage 
history. From antiquity to modern day, across culture, and in both 
governmental and industrial instances, women feature well. We see this in the 
narrative of Delilah, arguably the mythological precursor to Mata Hari; “Delilah 
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shines as leading lady; shamelessly seductive, she is the quintessential 
femme fatale.”255 As a synopsis, Delilah was the lover of the Biblical figure 
Sampson and was employed by the Philistines to identify the source of 
Sampson’s god-like strength. Through a series of duplicitous and theatrical 
exchanges—some of which seem to hint at early instances of sexual and 
consensual BDSM256—Delilah discovers it is Sampson’s hair which gives him 
his power. Only Mata Hari might present as a worthy challenger for the title of 
most infamous femme fatale. She and Delilah are both employed by 
government officials to gather intelligence. They are also both often described 
as sexually voracious and immoral, their stories governed by acts of deceit, 
sexual liaisons, and descriptions of striking beauty, all wound into a caricature 
of the femme fatale. Such a determination governs the reception not only of 
the history of people like Mata Hari and Delilah, but their reception during the 
time in which they lived. 
The femme fatale, while more famous for the portrayals in literature, 
film, theatre, and art more broadly, exists beyond the artistic representation 
and is found throughout narratives of real-life as a cultural construct. As 
Hanson and O’Rawe write, “[t]he femme fatale is thus read simultaneously as 
both entrenched cultural stereotype and yet never quite fully known: she is 
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always beyond definition.”257 And entrenched they are. So much so that the 
case of Hari cannot be analyzed without this consideration. The idea of the 
femme fatale is historically rife throughout espionage history and beyond “the 
idea of the femme fatale is ‘as old as Eve’, or indeed as old as Lilith, Adam’s 
first wife, turned demon and succubus, the femme fatale, at least in Western 
literature and art, ‘is only formulated as a clear and recognizable ‘type’ in the 
late nineteenth century.’”258 To put it simply, the context that surrounds the 
Mata Hari-femme fatale story is governed by centuries-old misogynistic 
framing, which is its own kind of moral failure. But so too is it part of the 
context that imbues the notion of failure and success by those who engage 
with Mata Hari. The challenge is to not only understand the failure of her 
endeavors in espionage, but to also consider the failures in the context of the 
gendered construction of womanhood that governs the notion of femme 
fatale. These constructions of womanhood always bring a new aspect to 
espionage, much like in any other male-dominated and controlled endeavor. 
The same is true of Mata Hari’s intermittent profession as a prostitute. 
It governed perception of her in the time she was alive, during her trial and 
execution, and has continued to do so since her death. Her sex, gender and 
her liberal notions of sexual interaction contextualized her perception by 
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others; particularly those in government agencies. Her failure to ‘act’ chastely 
in the eyes of others affected her throughout her life as a mother, lover, 
performer, and public figure. More pressingly, this supposed failure influenced 
her trial and led in part to her conviction. In France during the early 1900’s the 
common perception was that ‘loose women’ were more likely to partake in 
illegal work. In her monograph, Femme Fatale: Love, Lies, and the Unknown 
Life of Mata Hari, Pat Shipman provides a quote sourced from Mata Hari’s 
interrogator that sums up this belief amongst French society perfectly: “Her 
long stories left us skeptical. This woman set herself up as a sort of Messalina 
[the sexually voracious wife of Claudius I], dragging a throng of adorers 
behind her chariot, on the triumphant road of the theatrical success…. It was 
not possible that the enemy, who searched the five parts of the world to find 
agents, would leave untouched one with these exceptional qualities and 
when, after two years of war, the woman Zelle entered into the office of 
Captain Ladoux, it was certain that she was no virgin in espionage 
matters.”259 Terms such as “coquettish” and “successive liaisons” pepper the 
report that lead to the charges against Mata Hari. The determined deviant 
behavior of Hari was a sign of moral failure in French society during the early 
20th century, and thus a failure of a performance of everyday life that allowed 
for the charges to stand.  
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However, Mata Hari’s supposed deviant behavior and moral failings 
can also be read as personal successes. Indeed, it was her utilization of such 
subversive and ‘immoral’ behavior that allowed her to succeed in a world 
where men were typically the ones who established moralities, ran 
intelligences agencies, served as military officers, and held the positions of 
judge, jury, and executioner. The trouble, as Mary Craig notes in her book 
Tangled Web: Mata Hari Dancer, Courtesan, Spy, was that Mata Hari was 
particularly fond of men with power. “She actively sought out her lovers. She 
had several, sometimes seeing more than one on the same day. She was 
particularly fond of military men; a dangerous preference in wartime, 
compounded by the fact that she collected lovers from several nationalities. 
And, probably most damning of all, Mata Hari appeared to like sex.”260 Such 
active pursuit served her well in establishing a life that was financially stable 
from shortly after her second arrival in Paris to the weeks before she was 
arrested. She rebelled against social convention, her success in surviving an 
unfair world, but her failing and downfall as well. It was the perception and 
context of deviance and womanhood that, in so many ways, exacerbated the 
speed at which Mata Hari was tried, and influenced the judgement rendered: 
execution. It is her execution that helps tease out how failure exists in 
espionage, particularly when viewed through a theatre and performance lens. 
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Executions themselves are imbued with performativity and theatricality. 
They are “awesome rituals of human sacrifice through which the state 
dramatizes its absolute power and monopoly on violence,”261 Dwight 
Conquergood suggests in his article “Lethal Theatre: Performance, 
Punishment, and the Death Penalty.” This is just as true for the United States 
in the present day as it was for France in the early 20th century. An execution 
is a demonstration of state power through the refined and trained movements 
of the military personnel firing their weapons, just as it is for the offers of a last 
confession. The citation that Conquergood makes at the beginning of his 
article is of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison. In this 
publication, Foucault ties the ritual of state execution to the domination of the 
human body by the state. The question that arises is: to what end? This 
question is in many ways challenging to answer, but if we consider this from 
the perspective of Althusser the domination of the human body by the state is 
ultimately a redistribution and reaffirmation of power for the state to continue 
its domination. The cyclical dialectic of power and tactics of retaining power.  
This retaining and reaffirmation of power is enabled through various 
aspects of the ritual of execution. This would include the judicial 
pronouncement of the death sentence that was read immediately before Mata 
Hari was shot; the location of the execution at the barracks of Caserne de 
Vincennes, which limited public access and helped maintain the opaque lens 
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through which Mata Hari was viewed; or the use of eleven shots from twelve 
soldiers, a theatrical technique that is reminiscent of bad sleight-of-hand 
absolving them of any guilt for participating and taking someone’s life, also 
often called the ‘conscience round’. The shooting is particularly rife with 
theatrical or performative tactics that enables state domination. Consider the 
actions that the officer and Lieutenant take after Mata Hari is fusilladed. He 
walks up to the lifeless body and shoots her again at close range in the head. 
The “coup de grâce” or “blow of mercy,” as it is often referred to, is a 
particularly gruesome performative act that blurs the line between humane 
action and the desecration of a body. This action also serves to perform 
finality and to communicate simultaneously a domination of state over body, 
native over foreigner, man over woman, normalcy over deviance, and, as the 
French would have people believe, ally over enemy. Yet just as the execution 
is a ritual event of state power, particularly when viewed from the perspective 
of the state itself, so too is there theatricality and performativity within the 
execution from the vantage point of the executed. 
 In the case of Mata Hari, those who witnessed the execution were 
captivated by the manner in which she approached the execution grounds 
and held herself through the whole ordeal. Her choice to proceed without 
blindfold turns the power of spectatorship, which is a part of the state’s 
domineering, on its head. The executors become the watched performers 
through an act of obstinacy and self-determination. Her failure to submit is a 





the quote from Wales. It is Mata Hari’s understanding that the blindfold is part 
of the costume of dominance; a tactic that enables the French military and 
political machinery to advance. The same determination can be used to 
describe her refusal of last confession. The rejection of the mainstream 
religious last-right offered by the dominant religion in a country whose identity 
has been so closely linked to such a religion, is yet another act of defiance 
rupturing a part of the execution ritual employed to dominate her as an 
extension of the populace. 
  In some sense, each of these instances are forms of failure. And while 
it could be argued that the execution of Mata Hari is a success from the 
standpoint of the French, the lack of ability to control the execution in totality 
also signifies a failure on their end. Simultaneously this is where Mata Hari 
succeeds in her final moments. Consider these examples again as I draw out 
how one such instance constitutes both failure and success. In the first 
example I addressed the theatricality that is viewed in the execution. When 
the execution is considered as performative ritual the success or 
transformative result ultimately lies in the destruction of an individual. Yet, 
when Mata Hari intervenes, or miss-executes the role of the prisoner, she 
disrupts the ritual aspect of the execution. Yes, Mata Hari still dies, but the 
ritual power that rests in the execution has been chipped away at. She has 
called into question, or at least provided an alternate interpretation of, or 
transformative result for, the ritual for those watching. This rests on her failure 





turning down the use of a blindfold is a capitalization of spectatorship while 
also a failure on the part of the state and its agents to exercise total control.  
 What should be apparent is that failure is not a finite singularity within a 
given instance. To put this more succinctly I turn back to Colin Feltham who 
explains that beyond the lack of performance or underperformance, failure 
also “logically implies antecedent non-failure: all was apparently running 
smoothly or looking perfect, as expected, before this negative event. It is as if 
we hold a belief, perhaps a fantasy, that things should always function without 
fail.”262 But this is not always true, as Feltham explains. And the analysis of 
Mata Hari’s execution seems to suggest that Feltham is correct. Not 
everything should or can always function perfectly. By the admission of many 
artists in history, the processes of creation, composition, and execution (the 
doing kind, not the terminal kind) are not flawless. They are messy, organic, 
and ever-changing. To echo Feltham further, failure exists on a spectrum of 
unsuccessful attempts and executions, and manifests in all the earlier 
identified categories that I listed in the previous paragraph. Part of the 
consideration of failure is contextually based, as I hinted at earlier. 
 Much like any analytical consideration, an understanding of failure is 
dependent on the vantage point from which an analysis is undertaken or 
perspective through which it is conducted. Consider again the context of Mata 
Hari. In some instances we might consider the execution to be her failure as a 
spy. She was caught and thus executed. We can also consider this to be a 
                                                





success on the part of the French government, the military, and the 
intelligence services. Yet it could also be that Mata Hari fulfilled her objectives 
and was only caught afterwards, this would then mean that in some capacity 
she was successful, while the French military and its allies failed. Further still, 
there is strong historical case to be made that Mata Hari was in fact never a 
spy. This would then mean that the French intelligence services failed in their 
apprehending of an agent and, more ethically dubious, in their justified 
execution of a human being.  
Another perspective on the success-failure dichotomy relates to an 
instance when Mata Hari was attempting to travel back to the Netherlands. 
On this journey the British “mistakenly identified her as a woman called Clara 
Benedix, who, like Mata Hari, was suspect and on the intelligence services’ 
list of those to be watched.”263 Like the situations teased apart earlier, this 
instance can be read in a multitude of manners. Let us assume that author 
Mary Craig’s inference is correct and that Mata Hari was mistakenly identified 
as someone else. This would suggest that the British and French not only 
failed in their efforts to identify Mata Hari as an agent, but also to detain Clara 
Benedix—who was clearly a person of interest. On the other hand, Mata 
Hari’s brief detention was enough to have her flagged and reported to the 
French authorities, who in turn identified her as a person of interest that the 
British should keep tabs on. This would then suggest that Mata Hari failed in 
her attempts to move through Europe undetected. A third possible reading of 
                                                





this situation is that Mata Hari was, in fact, Clara Benedix—an agent who has 
never been fully identified by historians—and was not caught by the British 
and the French and thus succeeds in shielding her alter ego while the Allies 
fail in their attempts to detain Benedix. The possible reading of whether an 
undertaking or instance constitutes failure or success is incredibly varied. Part 
of the reason that this is the case is because the denotation of success and 
failure is dependent on the perspective and context of a given undertaking. It 
is also the case because of how espionage has been conceived of and 
framed throughout history. 
 
The Blurring of Success and Failure 
 Up until this point the analysis of the Mata Hari has been an exercise in 
understanding both perspectives of failure and success in any given moment. 
It is in many ways a demonstration of the potential multitudinous reality that 
an undertaking in espionage can be identified as having. The trouble with the 
analysis so far is that it does nothing to challenge the assumption that 
endeavors in espionage are isolated instances that have not been pre-
calculated. And this is most certainly not the case. The blurring, or perhaps I 
should title it ‘lack of distinction’, between success and failure is not only an 
issue of analytical positioning, but is in fact built into the constructs of 
espionage and any intelligence efforts. Support for intelligence initiatives is 
predicated on the position that through such support a nation, or even 





In the case of Mata Hari the support for the French Intelligence 
Services ‘La Deuxiéme Bureau’ as it was called then, was due to a belief that 
through such support the French, and by extension the Allies, would obtain 
the upper hand in the conflict with the Central Powers of WWI. Mary Craig 
documents the efforts made by Georges Ladoux, the head of La Deuxiéme 
Bureau during the First World War, to convince the upper ranks of the French 
government to support intelligence work. “By September 1915, France and 
her allies had suffered several military defeats. The war had changed and the 
national mood was ugly. General Joffre was out of favour with the 
government and a culture of blame was starting to develop. It was at that 
moment that Ladoux stressed again the role of espionage, both in generating 
military intelligence and thwarting enemy agents.”264 As it was believed, 
success in obtaining intelligence from the Central Powers as well as 
countering intelligence efforts by these nations would translate to success in 
the military campaign. But if only necessary in conflict situations, why then 
when the conflict eventually ended did the intelligence agencies continue to 
exist? 
This question drives to the heart of how success and failure can co-
mingle within espionage efforts. As Knightley wrote in his book The Second 
Oldest Profession, espionage agencies are difficult to get rid of once 
established because “the agencies justify their peacetime existence by 
                                                






promising to provide timely warning of a threat to national security. It does not 
matter to them whether that threat is real or imaginary, and agencies have 
shown themselves quite capable of inventing a theatre when none have 
existed.”265 The term ‘theatre’ used by Knightley is no accident. This term in 
military and intelligence parlance, borrowed from the artistic undertakings, 
has direct connotations to how an event is framed. In the case of espionage, 
the distinct framed performance taking place, or proposed to potentially take 
place, is a narrative of conflict between adversaries. In this sense espionage 
is not only performative and theatrical, but also dramatic, and in this respect 
both the success and failure of espionage ultimately has to do with its 
success or failure as performance, theatre and/or drama.    
Dramatic structure can also be applied to other instances within 
espionage, including the tactics used by intelligences agencies to persuade 
governments and corporations to undertake clandestine work. If we consider 
the trial of Mata Hari within this framework it has strong echoes of what 
Richard Harbinger would refer to as “Trial by Drama.”266 (177). This could 
further be extended to Mata Hari’s execution, which not only reads as 
performative but also dramatic. In both instances the event is defined by the 
adversarial core structure identified by Harbinger.267 The same realities 
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govern the methods through which espionage agencies justify their existence; 
there is an adversary external to the agencies and the institutions they are 
affiliated with. Due to this ‘reality’ espionage is necessary for successfully 
deterring such an adversary. Parallel to this, the execution of Mata Hari is a 
theatrical event that communicates successful intelligence work: an agent of 
the adversary was apprehended through successful intelligence work and her 
capture is proof of the success. But just as success exists within a particular 
context or event, failure also reads in a given scenario. In more plain terms, 
the success also hints at what might have been potential failure. 
  Capitalizing on this, espionage bureaus have developed a strong 
ability to conjure up success out of nothing and perpetuate a state of action 
and self-justification. This self-justification is based on three principles, 
according to Knightley, and these three principles “ensure survival”.268 He 
writes; “The first is that in the secret world it may be impossible to distinguish 
success from failure. A timely warning of attack allows the intended victim to 
prepare. This causes the aggressor to change his mind; the warning then 
appears to have been wrong. The second proposition is that failure can be 
due to incorrect analysis of the agencies accurate information—the warning 
was there but the government failed to heed it […] The third proposition is that 
the agency could have offered timely warning had it not been starved of 
funds.”269 Herein lies the perplexing, yet rich reality of espionage. These 
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justifications are rooted in a sort of theatrically based persuasion. Intelligence 
agencies have the ability to convince organizations, whether governmental or 
corporate, that there is an adversary that is posing a threat—even if one does 
not exist. Following this the agencies determine that the adversary should be 
stopped and to do so will requirement efforts in intelligence work. Then, if an 
adversary does not appear they are able to justify their role by asserting that 
the absence of the adversary is proof of their effective work. Whereas if an 
adversary does appear the agency is able to utilize such an instance as proof 
yet again that intelligence efforts are required. In effect, intelligence agencies 
justify their existence irrespective of the reality because of their self-justifying 
reasoning. Moreover, intelligence efforts not only serve as a form of 
Repressive State Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatus, as was 
identified in the introduction and reaffirmed in the analysis of the execution of 
Mata Hari, but such efforts also occupy a place where failure is transformed 
into success and new life. Espionage is (re)generative, and failure is thus a 
necessary prerequisite for espionage’s continued existence. Every failure is 
nothing short of a justification for further and more extensive and broader 
espionage.  
What Knightley lays out for his reader almost seems as if it could have 
been taken from the playbook of La Deuxiéme Beureau in the lead up to Mata 
Hari’s execution. As historians have identified, the likely scenario that befell 
Mata Hari is that she was used as a sacrificial lamb in an effort to shore up 





galvanize support from the French public more broadly. Likewise, the 
Germans exploited her by allowing her sacrifice to take place to “distract 
attention from other agents.”270 The strongest evidence that supports this 
position is that by the time Mata Hari was employed by the Allied forces, the 
French had already begun to intercept coded German broadcasts, which the 
Germans were aware of but continued to send anyway in manner that easily 
identified Mata Hari as an agent of theirs. The speculation that arises from 
this is that the Germans used Hari as a distraction to allow agents like Clara 
Benedix more maneuverability in their work. Concerning the French, “Ladoux 
testified that he had never employed her as an agent for France, but had 
merely pretended to do so in order to entrap her.”271 Herein lies yet another 
strange reality found in espionage; that shared success can be found for both 
opposing parties within a failed event. This is particularly pronounced in the 
fast-moving pace of immediate conflict such as war, but is likewise the case 
within less intensive periods such as in corporate espionage. This ability to 
generate success out of failure is an intriguing aspect of espionage. Indeed, it 
runs against the very notion of success and failure as finite instances. But this 
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The Death of Character is Poetic Failure  
Before progressing any further I will now take this moment to kill off 
Mata Hari. Who remains is the woman Margaretha Zelle McLeod. The reason 
that I can, and will, undertake such a terminal act is because the character 
created by Zelle McLeod is just that, a character—a construct of a woman 
who is performing a role. The richness in this case-study is that Margaretha 
Zelle McLeod was at various points navigating upwards of three, perhaps 
even four, identities within a given instance. These included her original birth 
identity, her identity of exotic dancer, as well as her identities as both German 
and French agents. The most famous persona—her character as the exotic 
dancer—was formed out of both the necessity to survive after arriving in 
Paris, and due to her artistic success. It was, as Mary Craig notes, “a shrewd 
move, blurring the lines even more about her origins.”272 This was a 
performance that tapped into the exoticism at the center of the Orientalist art 
movement captivating much of the Western world at the time. The formulated 
identity developed by Margaretha Zelle McLeod capitalized on ‘otherness’, 
while the execution by French authorities was, as suggested earlier, a 
resounding rejection of otherness.  
The death of Zelle McLeod and her exotically fashioned character is 
remarkable for a myriad of reasons beyond the theatricality presented 
throughout the staging of the execution. One of the more interesting instances 
                                                






that concerns this study is how Zelle McLeod’s death falls within the notion of 
the “Death of Character” as described by Elinor Fuchs. Fuchs’ article on the 
subject, which precedes Hans Thies-Lehman’s publication Post-Dramatic 
Theatre by nearly two decades, proposed that a shift in live performance took 
place in the transition from modernism to post-modernism, defined in part by 
the decentering of character; “just as Character once supplanted Action, so 
Character in turn is being eclipsed.”273 The reformulation proposed by Fuchs 
one decade later in her monograph The Death of Character identifies the 
exploding of ‘character’ in domains both inside and outside the traditional 
theatre space as being central to the shift of what we might now call “post-
dramatic theatre”. In respect to this project, one of the more resonant 
postulations within Fuchs writing is how the “death of character” applies to a 
lived reality. Echoing Richard Foreman’s speculations on ontological hysteric 
theater, which Fuchs describes as “the vision that what we have taken to be 
human identity disintegrates on scrutiny into discrete sentences and gestures 
that can be perceived as objects,” she then extends this position to “the 
divisions [of her] own character.”274 In turn I would apply this to Zelle 
McLeod’s alternate persona and her very being. The death of both Zelle 
MacLeod and her various characters are a result of failure and are theatrical 
in nature, but also generative of success. With the destruction of MacLeod’s 
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character comes the destruction of her actions, sentences, gestures and 
more. The death of a clandestine operative’s character not only signifies the 
destruction of who they represent, but also the individual qualities of such a 
persona. In the case of Mata Hari, with her destruction comes the elimination 
of her behavior which might include her enjoyment of sex or her so-called 
dance performance, but also the threat she represented as a foreign agent. 
Furthermore, and in respect to acts of espionage, such destruction is a 
permanent purging of the knowledge an agent carries with them. In a sense it 
is the termination of the embodied archive. Espionage in turn relies on this 
activity. If we think about one of the three central tenants of espionage as a 
phenomenon identified by Knightly—that espionage relies on instances of 
success in combating foreign agents to justify its existence—it is possible to 
conclude that the destruction of character acts as the post-dramatic event that 
communicates this theatrical ruse.  
The suggestion that Fuchs makes aides us in placing the death of 
Margarethe Zelle McLeod’s characters, and any other characters employed 
by clandestine agents, within the tradition of post-dramatic theatre. Indeed, it 
could be argued that espionage as signified by the death of character is an 
instance of post-dramatic or post-modern performance which precedes its 
theorization. It might even be argued that espionage not only acts as the 
vanguard of military and political initiative, but is also within the vanguard of 
the post-modern theatre tradition. This possibility requires even further 





performance event, one that Fuchs has described as “Performance Theatre”. 
She explains that “Performance Theater bears some similarity to the 
conventional theater of dramatic texts in situating the theatrical event in an 
imaginative world evoked by visual, lighting, and sound effects, and an 
ensemble of actors. Yet it is like performance art in two signal regards: in its 
continuous awareness of itself as performance, and in its unavailability for re-
presentation.”275 Positioning Zelle McLeod’s exotic dance character within this 
framework is only logical, particularly when McLeod reinvents herself and 
begins to identify publically with the name of ‘Mata Hari’ outside of the theatre 
and dance venues she frequented. The erotic character McLeod creates and 
lives as is a continuously aware performance blurring the lines between the 
real and the representational. The same is true for the agent identities 
employed by Zelle McLeod, which is also true of any clandestine agent 
identity. The outward persona becomes a lived reality while at the same time 
wholly representational. 
Representation is perhaps the most critical element when thinking 
through the death of character. When considering the notion of representation 
often a mimetic understanding of the word is drawn upon. But espionage 
blurs the boundary between the representational and the non-
representational, while also embracing failure. In her work Performance 
Theatre and the Poetics of Failure Sarah Jane Bailes identifies, as Feltham 
does, that failure is often positioned as an undesirable outcome, or at the very 
                                                





least something that should not happen. Bailes explains that failure can be 
read in a multitude of manners but, in her estimation, theatre and 
performance are most often concerned with two. “More than a concern with 
representations that fail (of which clearly there are many) it is the failure of 
representation that focuses my inquiry.”276 For this project I am concerned 
with both. My reading of Bailes’ work informs me that there is significant 
cross-over between both the failure of representation and representations that 
fail. Due to the cyclical nature of failure and success, to most effectively 
understand the relationship between espionage and theatre and performance, 
these two views of representation and failure should not be considered 
independently from each other. To do so would be like analyzing a mirror and 
only thinking about the image within the mirror, while ignoring how that mirror 
comes to reflect the image in the first place. 
With the goal of understanding how representations fail and a failure of 
representation occurs, it is necessary to cycle back to the understanding of 
failure. What Bailes identifies, like Knightley, is that failure is not only a result 
but also a (re)generative departure point. She sets out the parameters of 
failure with a focus on two core ideas: the first concerns Fuchs “Performance 
Theatre” and the second J.L. Austin’s “performatives”. In invoking Fuchs 
definition, Bailes situates her work within a lineage that is indebted to avant-
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gardism. Her citation of terms such as “live art,”277 “experimental theatre,”278 
and “performance art,”279 to name but a few, further illustrates the cross-
pollination that was, and still is, taking place in these artistic endeavors. She 
groups together work by companies such as Goat Island, Forced 
Entertainment and Elevator Repair Service in an effort to prove that the failure 
at the core of this style of artistic work is rooted in aesthetic and compositional 
methods that embrace failure, which at their core are an embracing of the 
ephemeral nature of live art. Moreover, she explains how failure can be used 
as a compositional tactic in the production of theatre events to illustrate the 
tenuousness of success. Espionage can and should be viewed within many of 
these parameters. As has been noted, clandestine initiatives most certainly 
embrace failure as a practice, and even build moments of failure into their 
strategies, such as the telegraphs sent by the Germans that outed Mata Hari. 
Espionage and its undertakers are also highly aware of the ephemeral quality 
of moments and endeavors, and often exploit this nature to further their 
initiatives: instructions are destroyed, informant networks are setup to be 
dismantled quickly, and every undertaken action is meant to be imbued with 
plausible deniability. 
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The aesthetics of failure and representation are also of significant 
importance. What they offer is an understanding of how failure is both 
identified and imagined. In respect to identifying failure, there is perhaps no 
greater example than the death of character. Such destruction of character 
offers perspectives on the instances of failure, and thus the generation point 
of successes. Indeed, if the identified dialectic were understood like the 
Ancient Egyptian Orobouros the instance of failure would be where the mouth 
of the serpent begins to consume its own tail acting as sustenance for its own 
regeneration. The insight that an aesthetic understanding of failure offers 
does not end there. As O’Gorman and Werry write in the introduction to 
Performance Research: On Failure, an employment of failure and 
representation in performance “strategically mobilizes failure to imagine 
alternatives foreclosed by the normative tyranny of success and expected 
outcomes.”280  Herein lies one of the central ideas of failure and success in 
espionage as theatre and performance—imagined futures. As Knightley might 
suggest, the imagined alternative is a potent force in the future justification of 
espionage. The technique used by clandestine agencies to justify their 
funding is to demand that governments and corporations imagine the 
‘conflagration’ that will take place if they are not successful in their work. 
Understanding the aesthetics of the ‘failure of representation’ along with how 
‘representations fail’ within espionage allows us to conduct an analysis of 
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clandestine work. Such potential and imagined futures are truly tactical, 
helping espionage agencies push forward their agenda. More interestingly 
still, it is an instance of futurity that departs from utopic use281.  
The theatricality around the death of character is not the only area of 
espionage in which failure is engaged. Much like the broken-down elements 
identified by Foreman in hysteric ontological theatre, the performative 
elements in the day-to-day exchanges that are at the core of espionage also 
encounter instances of failure. In an earlier part of this dissertation I cited an 
example of when an agent failed in his undercover work and was caught out 
in his role as a ‘spy’ during the Second World War. The story highlighted how 
the agent, after landing in France undercover, proceeded to enter a café and 
request a café noire—a black coffee—even though milk was being rationed 
and all coffees ordered were assumed to come black without the distinction 
being made in the ordering process. In this instance, the operative was 
immediately outed as a foreign agent due to his misfire within the cultural and 
transactional exchange. Such misfires and misexecutions are the second 
core idea influencing Bailes’ conceptualization of poetic failure. She writes 
that failure “indexes the infelicitous outcome of a designated task or action, to 
invoke J.L. Austin […] The act—a performative speech act in his discussion—
always exhibits a number of conditional needs or properties to ensure its 
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felicitous outcome.”282 The central notion presented by Bailes is that failure in 
performance (particularly performance theatre) hinges on the idea of 
felicitous/infelicitous outcomes. The companies at the center of her study 
embrace infelicity and lean into these moments with gusto. She explains that 
utilizing such a technique depicts a moment where the experience of 
watching this work is much like seeing the “haphazard disassembling of its 
parts.”283 These instances of failure, identified in this case as intentional 
infelicity, are another important point for this chapter. Part of the significance 
in identifying these aspects of Bailes’ definition of failure is that it provides a 
rich departure for understanding failure in modes of theatre and performance, 
and more specifically contemporary espionage. Understanding that a post-
modern performance perspective enables us to view the disassembled parts 
of a whole, further allows us to consider both the micro and the macro 
instances of espionage within a given context. To more closely examine 
Fuch’s “Death of Character” and Bailes’ “Poetic Failure” we must turn to a 
contemporary case-study of clandestine affairs. 
 
Femme Raté 
As a bass drum, high-hat symbol, and guitar riff pulse, a video begins 
with a close-up on two yellow-orange insulated travel cups. A figure sitting 
behind the cups and wearing a black shirt with the green logo of RT—the 
                                                
282 Bailes, 4. 
 





Russian News Channel Russia Today—reaches forward and moves the cups 
to either side revealing the words ‘Foreign Agent’ displayed on their t-shirt. 
The anonymous individual then reaches down and lifts another cup to the 
table and places it in between the previous two, now presenting three 
insulated travel mugs upon which is the Cyrillic script ‘БУБУБУ’— 
transliterated to ‘BU-BU-BU’ and suggestive of a multiplicity of puns, 
entendre, and innuendo, but effectively equivalent to the English ‘BLAH-
BLAH-BLAH’. The nameless individual begins to turn the central mug and 
more writing is revealed. But just before the entirety of the script is in view the 
camera cuts to four news clips in rapid fire succession, briefly pivoting back to 
the turning cup in between each clip. Each of the news segments rails against 
the detainment of a Russian woman in the United States, citing the 
outrageousness of the charges laid against her and the unjustified prison 
sentence that followed. As the camera shot snaps back to the coffee cups the 
individual finishes turning the central mug allowing viewers to finally read the 
text—БУБУБУТИНА—in English ‘BUBUBUTINA’. The camera zooms out and 
sitting behind the mugs is the convicted Russian asset Maria Butina who was 
arrested in the United States in 2018 and deported back to Russia in 2019. 
Cheekily, she half smiles at the camera, shrugs her shoulders, and states in 
Russian, “Well, home at last.” Slyly suggesting relief at returning to Russia 
after her stint in the United States, while simultaneously playing into her star 
power as the woman who effectively infiltrated the National Rifle Association 





This testosterone-charged edgy rock star aesthetic video was the 
promotion use to introduce Maria Butina as the new host of the program 
Wonderful Russia Bu-Bu-Bu, a YouTube talk-show supported by RT—the 
state-controlled television network headquartered in Moscow with an 
international reach. As Nathan Hodge suggests, “[t]he title appears to parody 
a catchphrase used by Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who often 
refers sarcastically in his own popular videos to the ‘wonderful Russia of the 
future’ – without Russian President Vladimir Putin.”284  Butina’s hosting of a 
state sponsored television program may seem like a strange fate to befall a 
person who is, arguably, one of the most infamous foreign agents to be 
caught in the United States in the past quarter-century, but it is not without 
precedent. Indeed, the former Russian agent Anna Chapman who was 
arrested and deported in 2010 as a part of the United States Illegals Program, 
became a spokesperson for the Moscow Institute of Art and Industry, 
engaged in a photoshoot with Maxim Magazine (bearing almost no clothes, 
though evidently able to dawn a pistol), and maintains a substantial following 
on social media platforms, following her arrival back in Russia. Evidence that 
success can indeed blossom out of failure in espionage work. 
While Chapman conducts her armed photoshoot post-deportation, 
Butina caters to the gun-loving portion of both the Russian and United States 
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populace in advance of her arrival in the US in 2016, as well as during her 
time as a student. In her photoshoot for the Russian edition of GQ Magazine, 
Butina, sporting a variety of handguns, buckles up stiletto heels by Guess, 
dawns sunglasses by Mykita and earrings by Christian Dior, and pulls on 
leather gloves by the lingerie company Agent Provocateur, to show off her 
support for gun-rights in industrial-chic aesthetic. Extending her weapons-
advocacy to the conventions held by the National Rifle Association, Butina 
can been seen in a multitude of photos holding a variety of weapons which 
range from high capacity rifles to revolvers with barrels that have been 
elongated beyond practicality. Photos depict Butina with members of both the 
NRA executive, such as James W. Porter II and Wayne LaPierre, and 
members of the Republican Party, such as former senator Rick Santorum. 
Her rise through the ranks of both organizations is easily tracked through 
media releases, interviews, and photographic evidence. Thus, on July 15th, 
2018, when the department of Justice announced the detainment and arrest 
Maria Butina, it was likely a surprise to many.  
Charged with acting as a foreign agent without first registering with the 
United States government—a charge frequently referred to as “espionage-
lite” by prosecutors285—she quickly entered into infamy as one of the most 
public cases of espionage(lite) in recent memory. Butina’s arrest and trial just 
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over one hundred years after the execution of Mata Hari is yet another 
instance of failed espionage and one of the best recent examples of 
espionage as theatre and performance. Moreover, the national platform that 
Butina has been provided with post-deportation shows how fame can 
associate with espionage work in the contemporary world. However, with the 
advent of post-dramatic theatre the circumstances and thus our 
understanding of espionage will have shifted. Present-day instances of 
clandestine affairs must be re-contextualized and warrant further scrutiny. 
Unlike the Mack Sennett-aesthetic of the musical Marta Hari, or the dramatic 
production of Mata Hari a.k.a Margaretha Zelle MacLeod’s execution, the 
death of Mari Butina’s character was a gun-toting, rock-and-roll sounding, 
industrial-chic looking event. Her initial arrest was without spectacle, her court 
appearances were relatively low-key and at points shrouded in secrecy, and, 
unlike Mata Hari, no musical rendition has been written…yet. But much like 
Mata Hari, Butina’s career, arrest, trial, and ultimate deportation are imbued 
with instances of failure and thus success.  
Information on Butina’s early life is much less documented than Mata 
Hari, which may be surprising given that over one century has passed since 
the latter was executed. What is generally known about Butina is that she was 
born in 1988 in the Siberian city of Barnaul and attended Altai State 
University. In August of 2016 Butina entered the United States on an F1 
Student Visa to begin studies at American University in Washington, D.C. The 





picture of an individual who is relatively well-connected within the political 
world of both Russia and The United States. As described in the 
“Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing” filed by the Justice Department “Butina 
was not a spy in the traditional sense of trying to gain access to classified 
information to send back to her home country. She was not a trained 
intelligence officer. But the actions she took were nonetheless taken on behalf 
of the Russian Official for the benefit of the Russian Federation, and those 
actions had the potential to damage the national security of the United 
States.”286 It is in this simple sentence that we are offered the most incisive 
aspects of Butina’s espionage – that it was untrained, untraditional, and 
unofficial. Bizarrely, in this quote we are also told that she was a spy (just not 
in the traditional sense), while she has most definitely not been charged as a 
spy. Already the potential for failure is appearing and, as we know from Mata 
Hari, such qualities easily align these cases of espionage with theatre. 
Prior to her arrival in the United States on a Student Visa, Butina was 
already in contact with prominent members of the American public via her 
efforts to promote gun rights in both Russia and The United States. She had 
attended various events hosted by The Republican Party and the NRA as an 
associate of Russian politician Aleksandr Porfiryevich Torshin. FBI Special 
Agent Kevin Helson lays out a timeline of Butina’s efforts in the affidavit 
provided to the courts. In the two years following her arrival on a student visa, 
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Butina attended prayer breakfasts, gun rights campaigns, and even political 
rallies—including one with the soon-to-be president Donald Trump—in an 
effort to advance the interests of the Russian Federation. In the words of 
Helson, her efforts were “diverse and multifaceted, including BUTINA's efforts 
to organize a series of ‘friendship and dialogue’ dinners.”287 The failure at the 
core of Butina’s case is as much a failure of process—not registering as a 
foreign agent—as it is a failure of ‘proper behavior’ and performance. At some 
point Butina strays from the fine balance between the characters of operative 
and visiting student. Instead of occupying the neutral ground of the 
undercover espionage agent, she moves into the character of an identifiable 
foreign agent, which undermines her character as a successful operative. 
 
Games of Character Killing 
 In many ways Maria Butina’s path is the mirror opposite of Mata 
Hari’s. Whereas Hari’s career as a performer and public personality preceded 
the First World War and arguably laid the foundation for her engagement with 
espionage and ultimate execution, Butina’s engagement with espionage and 
her arrest literally kick-started her career as a public personality and media 
presence. And whereas Hari was formally identified as a spy although there is 
a reason to suspect she wasn’t one or wasn’t as significant of a spy as others 
made her out to be, Butina was not formally identified as a spy, was indicted 
                                                





and charged with espionage-like behavior, which leaves the lingering 
suspicion that she was more than the authorities were able to establish.  
What we know about Butina is that her efforts were to infiltrate and 
direct (or perhaps misdirect depending on which organization/country one is 
allied with) powerful political organizations within the United States. Yet 
similar to Mata Hari her success is limited and, as much as can be 
understood, potentially ineffective—though it is not unreasonable to consider 
that there are other issues at play when the government suggests that little 
was accomplished. While Butina may not have the legacy of 
exoticism/eroticism that Mata Hari commands, she was nevertheless wedged 
into the femme fatale category almost immediately after her arrest. Indeed, 
among the organizations pushing this angle was the Federal Government of 
the United States. They argued in their “Memorandum in Support of Pretrial 
Detention” that her relationship with Paul Erikson, a well-known advocate 
both within the NRA and the Republican Party, was insincere. At her trial, the 
prosecution asserted that the relationship between Butina and Erikson “[did] 
not represent a strong tie to the United States because Butina appears to 
[have] treat[ed] it as simply a necessary aspect of her activities. For example, 
on at least one occasion, Butina offered an individual other than [Erikson] sex 
in exchange for a position within a special interest organization. Further, in 





expressed disdain for continuing to cohabitate with [him].”288 As with Hari a 
century earlier, the government centered its case against Butina around a 
profoundly sexist set of moralizing assumptions: that any deviation from a 
monogamous relationship by a woman, whether this be an exchange of 
goods for sex or a polyamorous relationship, was a sign of moral failure and 
an indication that she cannot be trusted and is therefore capable of the 
deceptions and betrayals inherent to the work of spies. What is presumed to 
be a moral failure once again serves as evidence of a detected, thwarted and 
thus failed attempt at espionage.  
What the argument put forward by the government also shows is that 
exoticism and orientalism permeate the perceptions of the foreigner, 
particularly women. Such perceptions are not limited to issues of race, but 
also include language, culture, or religion. Furthermore, these issues of 
exoticism and the erotic indicate that women seen through an orientalist-
erotic lens are then equated with untrustworthiness, deception, ulterior 
motive, etc. This understanding of orientalism is from the standpoint of 
cultural hegemony and imperialistic notions. As Codell and DelPlato explain 
for their readers, “[i]n oriental erotics the constructed oriental body in 
European culture is an object of intense desire for knowledge, power and 
bliss, as well as the abject site at which European meanings of ‘reason,’ 
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language, and social order are destabilized and constantly threatened.”289 In 
the case of Butina the term ‘European’ is extended to the Euro-heritage of the 
United States. Her Russian identity and persona is thus equated to exotic 
character and is used as the impetus for connecting the dots of clandestine 
affairs to destabilizing effect and duplicitousness, and back again. In this 
regard, little has changed over the past century in the tactics of government 
agencies in the Western world in their portrayal of female spies. 
However, the characterization of an individual as exotic in the present 
day holds less sway than it did in early 20th century France. Moreover, the 
gambit of making such an equation runs the risk of failing to convince those 
observing, in this instance the adjudicator, that such ‘behavior’ is a theat. In 
the “Memorandum in Support of Defendant Maria Butina’s Motion For Bond 
Review” Butina’s lawyers pick apart the salacious orientalist-erotic logic: “The 
government argued that Ms. Butina’s relationship with Mr. Erickson is a 
‘duplicitous relationship’ because she ‘appears to treat it as simply a 
necessary part of her activities’[…]The impact of this inflammatory allegation, 
which painted Ms. Butina as some type Kremlin-trained seductress, or spy-
novel honeypot character, trading sex for access and power, cannot be 
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overstated.”290 In their demand for evidence, the defense was presented with 
a single-text exchange which was “sent in Russia between Ms. Butina and 
DK, her longtime friend, assistant, and public relations man for The Right to 
Bear Arms gun rights group that she had founded.”291 What the defense 
attorneys for Ms. Butina determined was that their tactic of approach would 
be to undermine the charges of espionage through a dismantling of the 
characterization that the prosecution had made about Butina.  
We might liken the defense’s strategy to something borrowed from 
Fuch’s “Death of Character.” For the defense attorneys sought to kill off the 
character of Butina-as-exotic-femme-fatale constructed by the prosecution 
and the intelligence services. They attempt to capitalize on the failure of the 
argument alleged by the prosecutorial team and put forward the relatively 
successful argument that such a description of Butina is false. While not 
challenging the oriental-exotic-duplicitous trope, the defense’s strategy was 
nonetheless a moment of success in undermining the credibility of the 
prosecutorial arguments in a way that employs what we have come to know 
as post-dramatic theatre. The remaining events in court are no different. 
Throughout the court appearances that addressed the charges against 
Butina both the prosecution and defense encountered moments of success 
and failure. The most significant of these might very well be the success of 
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the plea agreement that Butina agrees to enter with the prosecutorial team 
and the federal government. As Knightley would likely reason, in this instance 
the United States government and their intelligence agencies, namely the FBI 
when concerning Butina, achieves a recognition of the ‘threat’ they detected, 
which justifies the need for further support of the intelligence services. This 
can be seen as a failure for both Butina and the Russian Government in their 
efforts to politically influence members of both the Republican Party and the 
National Rifle Association. However, as was the case of Mata Hari, success 
and failure are both generative events. Even though Butina was caught and 
charged by the United States government, there is little denying that there 
was ample opportunity for her and her Russian compatriots to wage an 
influence campaign in the two years after her arrival in the United States. 
Indeed, the significant amount of political capital spent by the Trump 
administration on affairs concerning Russia, both in support of and against 
Russian interests, would indicate that there was a distinct possibility for 
influence. Additionally, the dialectic of success and failure is not exclusive to 
the United States or Western World. The demise of an agent, or even a 
politically aligned operative who is merely aiding political initiatives without 
formal training, serves as impetus for further clandestine efforts by the 
opposing faction, in this instance Russia 
Likewise, instances of failure are generative of success. In the case of 
the federal intelligence agencies, their inability to identify and head-off the 





perform effective counterintelligence that stops potential threats before they 
happen. Yet, just as the American agencies argued after the fall of the Iranian 
Shah, which was well-foreshadowed by intelligence reports, they may employ 
such failure to put forward the following argument: “If we got it wrong… then 
this was because we did not have enough money or the men to do a proper 
job. The way to correct this is obvious: fund us properly; let us off the 
leash.”292 Such logic surely gestures towards a failure of the Russia 
government. If the intelligence agencies of the United States capitalize on 
their failure by accruing more funding and support, this will only drive cost and 
need for the Russian intelligence services, or any other intelligence agency 
leading efforts against the United Sates. Not only does the dialectic run 
between success and failure, but a dialectic exists between nations and their 
investment in intelligence work; echoing the arms races that so well defined 
the Cold War.  
Butina’s entire trial—which was never really a trial—was evocative of a 
post-dramatic performance featuring the establishment and destruction of 
character, especially along the terms set out by Fuchs depicting 
representations that both succeed and fail. It was dislocated, performed out of 
order, texts were hidden, and spoken words were shielded from listeners. An 
event like Butina’s trial, or collection of events as Fuchs describes in her 
chapter “Signaling Through the Signs”, is a “curious deconstructive 
                                                





implosion”293 that gestures towards the postdramatic. Although Fuchs writes 
that in post-modern performance “the weaving of fragments never coalesces 
into an illusionistic reality with plot and character,”294 I would suggest that in 
the court proceedings and espionage-related government processes we are 
witness to both illusions and non-illusion; the place where representations 
both fail and succeed. While the diffusion of court-process could be reasoned 
as a tactic to dissuade and obfuscate the efforts of the intelligence community 
through the long-arm of the law and its right hand, the judiciary, such absence 
is just as revealing about espionage-related matters as if a standard-fair trial 
had taken place. Clandestine undertakings are arguably most exposed within 
the court of law, which out of obligation are meant to be public affairs—at 
least within democratic systems. What we are well-aware of is that espionage 
efforts rely on a lack of knowledge. They exist in a reality where linear 
thinking and the successful understanding of their work has the potential to 
undermine their claims and cause them to fail in their efforts to exist. 
If we look more closely at the efforts within the court proceedings, we 
are also revealed a performance event that is almost exclusively a theatrical 
game of high-stakes ‘character-killing’—to perform a bit of word-play with 
Fuch’s idea. In his article “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of 
Cultural and Communal Life” James Boyd White makes the claim that “the 
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law is a branch of [artistic] rhetoric” intertwined with culture and community.295  
At its core, legal proceedings are meant to establish two opposed views with 
the goal of rendering one as the superior argument. Every tactic employed by 
a lawyer leans into the dramatic issues at the heart of the exchange. As Julie 
Peters explains “[t]rials and theatre (it is noted) share an underlying structural 
similarity or have overlapping functions.”296 If we take what Peters says to be 
true, and consider White’s position that law, and thus legal exchanges, are 
rooted in artistic rhetorical impetus, while governed by Harbinger’s “trial by 
drama”, we can understand that the arguments and counterarguments within 
the court setting are meant to undermine the very nature of the argument put 
forward by a legal representative, and by extension whomever or whatever 
they represent. In a sense this would suggest that the rhetorical 
argumentation of legal proceedings, as tied to the capabilities of lawyers to 
put forward a convincing argument, links the exchange to their character of 
capable rhetorician, and in the case of Butina, her claim of not being a spy. 
The courtroom of the post-modern spy is the execution ground for their 
character. In the moment Butina acknowledges her duplicitous act and enters 
the plea agreement, her character of ‘Not-a-spy’ is destroyed. In a certain 
light this would be a representation that has failed.   
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In many regards the very nature of court proceedings are non-
representational. This is in part due to the fact that court proceedings are at 
their core a failure of representation. For example, in the court process of 
reviewing the events that led to charges being laid, such a review in front of a 
judge always fails to effectively represent what happened in its entirety. 
Likewise, court proceedings are representations that fail. Like the speech-acts 
of Austin, the events that occur within the courtroom are performative 
executions; what transpires is actualized immediately. There is no (or at least 
there is not supposed to be any) artifice within this event. It is not theatre. As 
Fuchs might say, events in a courtroom are unavailable for representation. 
Following this, the signing of the plea-agreement by Butina is a transformative 
performance moment that is rooted in failure. She was caught, she was 
accused, she was offered an opportunity, and she agreed. She not only kills 
the ‘operative-character’ in the moment she signs the plea agreement, but 
simultaneously transforms into the character of ‘informant’. But this 
performative transformation leading from failure is not a finalizing moment. It 
is in possession of qualities that gesture to instances of representation, even 
if we are determined to ignore them.  
The democratic ideal of exposing intelligence-work through the court 
system is meant to represent the functionality of democracy, defined in part 
by its transparency. But the idea of transparency is at odds with the 
clandestine nature of espionage espoused by every national government. The 





rather by a belief in “objective” truth and reality that can be established by 
evidence and through argumentation. What the success-failure dialectic of 
espionage indicates is that this belief in objective truth is no more possible 
than a clear distinction between success and failure in espionage. Bringing 
espionage into the courtroom and putting it on trial is a recipe that is destined 
to fail if for no other reason because of all that goes on behind the scenes, 
and that thus cannot be seen in the court or in a frame that gives a definitive 
verdict of success or failure. Bearing these ideas in mind, what for example 
do we call a guilty verdict? Is that a failure because Butina was caught? Or is 
the guilty verdict a stamp of success because the evidence is itself proof of 
infiltration and of an agent’s ability to disrupt or to compromise an adversary’s 
work? And none of this touches upon the extent to which Butina’s work may 
very well entail embarrassing the US, and hence the trial itself is part of that 
strategy. Again, this is success on her part and failure on the part of the US. 
Yet the disconnected, sometimes shielded, manner through which 
evidence is presented or arguments are made exposes the court, judiciary, 
and intelligence services, as opaque institutions—these representations fail 
and stray into the realm of ironic due to their attempts to depict themselves as 
transparent while they draw attention to the failure of an infiltrating 
organization. It is as Bailes writes “failure can be identified through both 
scripted and non-scripted acts, which is to claim that despite our tendency to 
believe in its once-off authenticity, the failed moment or event isn’t necessarily 





as susceptible to manipulation as any other outcome.”297 The entire court-
proceedings of Butina’s conviction is its own theatrical event of transparency, 
but is also a performance that is completely nontransparent. Moreover, if we 
consider the plea-agreement in this light we might begin to suspect that the 
signing of this document may in fact be its own theatrical event meant to 
appear as a performance of transformation i.e. the transition from operative to 
informant.  
We might also view the proposal of the plea-agreement by the United 
States law enforcement agencies as a performative attempt that is, in 
actuality, theatrical. One that moves through the motions of showing success 
in capturing a foreign-agent; an agent who in fact is never charged with 
espionage and who might be offered a plea-agreement to expedite the entire 
ordeal. This would effectively allow the United States government to push this 
event into obscurity while the intelligence agencies self-justify their existence 
and subsequently move forward with further espionage initiatives. When 
considered through this frame the events in court surrounding Butina are 
representations that fail—and deliberately I would add. We can also consider 
this reality in another light. The courtroom and its proceedings are also where 
there is tactical failure of representation. The deliberate action of the law, 
judicial system, and intelligence agencies to hide fact is a choice to fail. 
Seemingly, it serves the desire to perpetuate the system espionage and 
governmental control. 
                                                





The courtroom in which Butina is tried and pleads guilty is clearly not 
the only place where an agent carries out their work. Thus, there are other 
locations where the notion of representation and failure must be further 
explored. For the sake of presenting a balanced perspective let us assume 
now that the entire enterprise against Butina is in fact as it appears to be and 
that there was an agent operating in collaboration with the Russian 
Government who the United States detected, arrested, accused, and 
convicted through a plea-agreement. If the assertion that Butina was only in a 
relationship with Erikson to gain access to members of the NRA and 
Republican Party is true, this would be a representation that fails when such a 
reality is revealed in the court proceedings. It might even be theorized that in 
an effort to move up the chain of influence in either of the aforementioned 
American organizations, Butina would break off the relationship with Erikson 
to begin a new relationship with someone of more influence. This would 
arguably be a tactical failure of representation built into the approach to glean 
information and influence by Butina. Again, this is merely conjecture. But what 
it does illustrate is that failure of representation can be employed in both 
intelligence and counterintelligence initiatives. It might even be argued that 
both the failure of representation and the representation of failure are inherent 
to espionage. So too is the death of character. This suggests that espionage 
can be located within the realm of postdramatic or postmodern theatre.  
 If espionage is post-dramatic or post-modern theatre, then what does 





failure and success, what we are presented with is the following: in each 
instance in which a character dies it is arguably a moment for when a new 
character emerges. For example, the character of ‘Butina the student’ is 
effectively killed off when she is accused. She instead becomes ‘Butina the 
Russian operative’. Yet, at the same time as alleging that Maria Butina is in 
fact ‘Maria Butina the Russian operative’, the United States government casts 
Butina as the character of ‘femme fatale’. Allow me to invert this too. While 
the United States intelligence services characterize themselves as ‘Protectors 
of Democracy’, they simultaneously engage in addressing attacks on 
democracy in a wholly undemocratic way, instead revealing their character of 
‘Protectors of Democracy-lite’. The attempt here is to illustrate how characters 
are created and destroyed in rather rapid succession. Moreover, what is also 
remarkable is that through such creation and killing of character we are also 
witness to entities possessing multiple characters at any given instance; 
much like Mata Hari and her quadruple characters cited earlier. And these are 
not accidental events. Indeed, the self-justifying systems of espionage would 
suggest that these are directed and intentional undertakings. This is incredibly 
similar to how in some postmodern or postdramatic theatre we witness “the 
motif of self as text.”298 Where the character in the performance is able to 
write themselves into a new reality and identity, effectively rendering the 
participants in espionage, and even the espionage event itself, as a sort of 
tabula rasa.  
                                                





Tabula Rasa and Character Casting 
Espionage effectively has a built-in canvas or empty stage that may 
place host to the characters of the post-modern performance. To understand 
how the idea of (re)writing identities and realities functions in relation to 
espionage it is important to briefly delve into what the tabula rasa is, and how 
it was conceived. The tabula rasa, famously addressed by scholars from 
antiquity to the present day, is a nearly perfect description of both the 
metaphysical reality that belies espionage, and the more tangible settings and 
people that both host and participate in the espionage events.  We see this in 
the court-room, where the nearly simultaneous creation and destruction of 
character occurs; with the people conducting espionage and counter-
espionage, who move through characters and who often have their very being 
playing host to more than one character at a time; and even built into the 
system of espionage, where the potentiality of failure and success are central 
to the progression of intelligence affairs. In his essay “Bartleby, or On 
Contingency” Georgio Agamben discusses the potential of generative action 
as he works through the idea of potentiality and the mind, making citation of 
Aristotle and his notion of tabula rasa. As Agamben discusses these concepts 
he makes note that the ancient-Greek philosopher put forward the position of 
both ‘potential’ and ‘non-potential’ in his argumentation, much like how 
Feltham suggests the potential of both failure and success in any given 
undertaking. Agamben explains it as follows: “[j]ust as the architect retains his 





player is a kithara player because he can also not play the kithara.”299 So too 
does espionage possess the quality of potential and ‘non-potential’. This is 
most certainly the case in respect to character, representation, failure, and 
success. Each are imbued with a potential that may or may not happen. They 
are—following both Aristotle and Agamben’s metaphor—like the wax writing 
tablet “on which nothing is written,” which has the potential to be scrapped 
and impressed upon, but also reshaped.300 With this idea in mind we can see 
that Butina, deliberately or not, was both the staging ground and the 
performer for the post-modern performance of contemporary clandestine 
work. Her ability to be recast as a new character was both within, and out of, 
her control, and has even extended to her career post-espionage work. 
Concerning espionage more broadly, in each instance of character creation 
we are also witness to the Death of Character, and vice versa. Through such 
deaths we are able to understand how representations that fail and the failure 
of representation are both innate and tactical events within clandestine affairs. 
 
Exposing the Dialectic 
Espionage exists for itself first and foremost. It operates through a 
shrewd construction that is able to morph failure into success and success 
into failure, thus enabling espionage’s continued existence. By linking 
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together issues of success and failure with representation, and by employing 
a lens of theatre and performance, notably Fuchs theories on post-modern 
theatre, we can tease apart a dialectic that enables espionage as an 
undertaking. Moreover, by viewing espionage, trials, executions, and court-
proceedings around clandestine affairs through a theatre and performance 
lens, the opacity of espionage and related government endeavors is rendered 
slightly more transparent. It is possible to view the exchanges and their 
artifice, the performative qualities and practices, and the dramatic stakes that 
imbue acts of espionage and charges of espionage. Furthermore, a theatre 
and performance understanding allows us to glimpse the motivations of 
espionage. We are able to understand it as the theatrical plague that it is, 
threatening a conflagration of not only the society being infiltrated, but of the 
society undertaking the infiltration.  
As I suggested earlier, what threatens phenomena like espionage most 
is the exposure of the system of self-preservation and self-justification. 
Theatre and performance allow us to do that. Moreover, with the 
understanding that espionage and its undertakers often engage in methods of 
work that are undemocratic, theatre and performance analysis can act as a 
vanguard against the avant-garde. The one remaining issue harkens back to 
the introduction, which proposes that if we think of theatre and performance 
through Althusser’s ideas on State Apparatus, then we must be careful to 
identify that theatre and performance, as cultural endeavors, often fulfill the 





straddle the line between ISA and RSA, while simultaneously offering us a 















































Conclusion - Suspicion and Espionage in the 21st Century 
  
Of all the case-studies reviewed in this project, the actions of James 
Jesus Angleton and Maria Butina, as well as the activities of Huawei, might 
be the most illustrative of the challenges of contemporary espionage and the 
direction these practices might be heading in. With this research project 
having identified the relationship between espionage, and theatre and 
performance, the necessary next step would be to identify which direction 
theatre and performance research might head in to address contemporary 
issues in depth. The narrative of Angleton’s molehunt presents an intriguing 
instance to research another aspect of espionage, namely the notion of 
suspicion. Angleton’s paranoia developed out of his obsession with 
understanding instances of falsity within the CIA. Harkening back to the ideas 
explored in chapter three, the principle at stake is that what seems to be 
truthful is in fact untruthful. If we recall, so strong was Angleton’s belief that 
the CIA had a mole within it that he suspected no less than forty senior 
officers, and seriously investigated a minimum of fourteen. Additionally, 
Angleton’s beliefs on who could be trusted were so conflicted, and his 
reliance on Golitsyn so great, that “Angleton’s suspicions of other Soviet 
defectors, all of whom Golitsyn proclaimed to be fakes designed to distract 
the CIA from his revelations, led to underutilization of their information, or 
worse.”301 What is identifiable in this passage is that suspicion, whether 
                                                





warranted or not, has a clear ability to disrupt. Angleton’s suspicion hindered 
his performance as a senior CIA officer. Moreover, it stymied the efforts of the 
CIA on whole. 
The reason behind how suspicion manifests as a phenomenon could 
be analyzed from a myriad of positions. However, keeping the focus on the 
role of espionage, and looking back to the ideas of deception, truth, and 
secrets, what might be concluded is that suspicion is a state preceding the 
acceptance of something as completely truthful. A belief by an individual that 
they are being deceived and that which appears to be truthful is in fact 
untruthful. As was noted in chapter one, Thomas Carson suggests that “in 
order for there to be deception it is necessary that the deceiver believes what 
she causes the other person(s) to believe is false.”302 With suspicion, the 
individual who would otherwise believe that which is false, no longer holds 
this belief. Instead they are put in a position where they discount the 
truthfulness of the intended deception, or even discount instances of truth. 
This could be aligned with Sissela Bok’s position on lying, which proposes 
that deceit and violence are “two forms of deliberate assault on human 
beings.”303 We might then suggest that suspicion is a moment hesitancy 
aiding in the prevention of being assaulted. Bok, in fact, alludes to this later 
when working through the perspective of the deceived individual. She 
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suggests not only that someone who is deceived feels wronged because they 
have been denied agency, but that they are also consequently “resentful, 
disappointed and suspicious” and remain wary of future instances in which 
they may be deceived and thus again assaulted.304 Suspicion, in other words, 
is at times a result of an individual being made aware that they were 
previously a recipient of deceitful behavior. This then might be extended to a 
theatre and performance paradigm. 
In principle, in most theatre we are engaged with instances of staged 
deception that we consent to. Watching a theatre production, the audience is 
fully aware that the performance is not real but chooses to willingly suspend 
their disbelief. Moreover, and aligning with Carson’s perspective, no 
performer (the deceiver in this analogy) believes what the audience is seeing 
and hearing, to be false, while the audience believes it to be true. Yet, 
theatricality is arguably at the heart of deception. Indeed, not only did Plato 
banished the poets from his republic because the arts inaccurately replicate 
nature, but that by extension the arts in their replicable abilities could also be 
used to falsely represent and deceive, as well as instruct and promote 
problematic ideas. In Boal’s Invisible Theatre the audience, or spect-actors as 
Boal identifies them, are unaware that a performance is taking place. The 
performers willingly present their performance with the full awareness that the 
audience believes that what they are seeing is true, when the performers 
know it to be false. This is a deception. But what is happening in these 
                                                





instances is two-fold. Firstly, and in line with Bok’s position, this deceptive 
form of theatre willingly assaults the spect-actors. However, and secondly, 
this assault is acknowledged afterwards to aid in the instructional process that 
typically follows performances of Invisible Theatre. The desire is for the 
audience members to reflect on their willingness to standby in these moments 
of social dynamism. Bearing this in mind, some might argue that those 
engaging in Invisible Theatre hope for instances in the future, when a similarly 
dynamic social injustice is taking place, that the audience will recall their 
previous experience, watch the new event with suspicion, and ultimately 
recall their previous lack of intervention and involve themselves in the next 
instance. In this, suspicion is capitalized on in an effort to facilitate social 
change through theatre. Other instances exist within theatre and performance 
as well. 
Within performance studies we might look to suspicion as a moment of 
poor reception for a performative. That while the performative is enacted, 
those witnessing do not receive or recognize the intention of those executing 
the act. Similarly, we might extend the idea of suspicion to Goffman’s work on 
the presentation of self or the con artist. That those presentations that stray 
from the realm of normalcy are perceived with suspicion. As Allison Scott-
Baumann identifies in Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion the 
principles of suspicion are tied to doubt. She provides a succinct definition of 





about the motives of others.”305 Revisiting Austin’s performative utterances, 
we might consider the moment a bride says, ‘I do’ to be false. That she does 
not agree to love and to cherish. Or in the case of Goffman, we might doubt 
the presentation of the con man, believing that we are at risk of being 
assaulted by his deceptive performance. Thinking through Schechner’s 
position on the transformative and transportative qualities of rituals also 
shows how suspicion might disrupt the ritual. Doubt towards the sincerity of 
the ritual, for example that a child participating in a religious coming of age 
ceremony does not possess a particularly strong conviction towards their 
religion, would hinder the transportative (and potentially even transformative) 
qualities of the enactment. Like with Angleton, suspicion hinders the 
execution of the theatrical and/or performative event. This might then be 
brought back to espionage of the 21st century. 
As identified in chapter three, the company Huawei has increasingly 
found itself at odds with the governments of western nations. The primary 
charge made against the company is that the infrastructure that Huawei will 
help build and run does not exclusively operate for use by the public. That it 
simultaneously acts, or could act, as a vessel for Chinese government 
espionage efforts. The suspicion cast upon Huawei renders its efforts to 
expand its business futile. Moreover, if the Chinese government is indeed 
using this digital infrastructure to conduct espionage, then suspicion hinders 
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this initiative as well. The issue of suspicion is not only at play within digital 
espionage, but also more traditional analogue efforts. Maria Butina, like 
Huawei, was caught out in part due to suspicion towards her work in the 
United States. While her efforts were allegedly meant to bridge gun rights 
groups within the United States and Russia, the doubt cast by American 
intelligence services facilitated the charges laid against her, as well as her 
arrest, trial, and eventual deportation. What is particularly interesting about 
the Butina case is that formal parameters exist in the United States to avoid 
coming under suspicion. If Butina had followed the proper protocols of 
registering as an agent of a foreign nation, effectively performing the role of 
law-abiding foreigner, would she then have moved more freely and been 
suspected less? To put it another way, does normalcy inhibit suspicion? An 
investigation into suspicion could attempt to address these ideas. 
As the lines between corporations, nations, and their espionage efforts 
become blurred, and as corporations continue to siphon data from customers 
at an increasing rate, the issues of ulterior motives, deception, and untruth 
are given more fertile ground. By many accounts the public had already 
become attuned to these concerns and affected by them. This might be 
because the previously noted instances of deception are assaults on the 
populace—if considered in-line with Bok’s theorizations on lying. It is easily 
intuited that expressions of suspicion by members of the populace have 
become more pronounced and entrenched in recent years. It may be this very 





distrust for government institutions. These individuals doubt what is being 
shown and communicated to the public. That the information is not truthful 
and is in fact deceptive. 
What then does this mean for espionage? In many respects the 
developments in espionage, as traced from Angleton, to Butina, to Huawei, 
show that the traditional spy is being rendered obsolete. What need is there 
for a person to be physically present when information can be gleaned via 
networks, servers, and digital infrastructure. It might even be suggested that 
the very concept of espionage has so radically changed that it is difficult to 
identify. To quote former NSA employee Joel Brenner again “your spy’s job is 
no longer stealing information but planting malicious software from the inside 
to enable a remote cyberthief to snatch information later.”306 This is done in 
an insidious manner. By being built into the very systems that are required for 
information sharing, we might liken contemporary espionage to being closer 
to biological warfare. That it is meant to spread virally, affect large groups of 
people at once, and is often meant to incapacitate. Historically speaking, this 
is not out of the realm of ordinary. If we recall the mandate of the SOE set by 
Winston Churchill, that the organization was meant to “set Europe ablaze”, we 
can see that espionage is meant as intervention. In the digital era, the 
facilitation of espionage through networks and servers allows interventionist 
activity to occur much more easily. But instead of stealing information these 
networks of espionage allow for the dissemination of false information, 
                                                





scandal, polarizing politics, and more. These campaigns are meant to cause 
disruption so that those conducting espionage gain the upper hand in the 
conflict/competition. Furthermore, when we think of Butina-like espionage, 
and if we believe what Butina says to be true, then we find ourselves 
investigating a form of espionage that is undertaken by amateurs or in 
amateurish ways. What this all points to is that 21st century espionage begins 
to look like large-scale disembodied intervention that is conducted at a 
distance via networks that utilize intel gleaned from users. This type of 
espionage is found in the disinformation campaigns that seem to be so 
prevalent in recent years, such as the 2016 United States election and the 
Brexit vote, and even the global vaccine campaign against COVID-19. In 
these instances, espionage was, and is, used to develop and spread 
suspicion. Suspicion of other races, nations, sexes, genders, classes, and 
more. The challenge is in identifying where efforts to engage in espionage, 
and where the generation points of suspicion, begin and end. What should be 
evident is that doubt and suspicion are a rich area of investigation that utilizes 
the research within this project as a departure point, especially regarding 
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